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ANDERSEN

Motion and Notice of Hearing (3/24/08 @ 10:30) Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

ANDERSEN

Affidavit of Counsel

Jon J. Shindurling

14/2008

NDDT

DOOLITTL

3rd Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces
Tecum of Michael A. Demos, M.D.

Jon J. Shindurling

18/2008

MEMO

WILLIAMS

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
(Re: Document Review)

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in Jon J. Shindurling
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motin (Re: Document
Review)

12/21/2007

128/2008

1612008

Judge

Jon J. Shindurling
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lI25/2008

HRHD

QUINTANA

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/24/2008
10:30 AM: Hearing Held Plaintiffs Motion for
Original Documents

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

QUINTANA

Minute Entry

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

QUINTANA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/12/2008 11 :00
Jon J. Shindurling
AM) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

:128/2008

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Amended Notice Of Hearing
a.m.

./4/2008

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Bruce
Crawford

Jon J. Shindurling

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service
Defendants)

Jon J. Shindurling

1712008

NTOS

DOOLITTL

18/2008

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of William J. Flynn

Jon J. Shindurling

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of
Bruce Crawford

Jon J. Shindurling

115/2008

ORDR

QUINTANA

Order Re: Original Documents

Jon J. Shindurling

116/2008

NOTH

WILLIAMS

Second Amended Notice Of Hearing - 5/12/08 @ Jon J. Shindurling
11:00 a.m.

117/2008

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Motion for Order Pursuant to Rule 56 (f)

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel

Jon J. Shindurling

118/2008

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Sandi
Christiansen

Jon J. Shindurling

121/2008

NOTH

WILLIAMS

Notice Of Hearing on Motion for ORder Pursuant Jon J. Shindurling
to Rule 56(f)

MOTN

WILLIAMS

Motion to Shorten Time Re: Motion for Order
Pursuant to Rule 56(f)

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

ANDERSEN

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motino
for Order Pursuant to Rule 56(f)

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

ANDERSEN

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in Jon J. Shindurling
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motino for Order Pursuant
to Rule 56 (f)

CO NT

QUINTANA

Hearing result for Motion held on 05/12/2008
11:00 AM: Continued Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

QUINTANA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/09/2008 09:00
AM) Motion for Summary Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel RE: Rule 56(f) Jon J. Shindurling
Motion

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Lori Brown Jon J. Shindurling

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Idaho
Heart Institute, P.C. Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6)

Jon J. Shindurling

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service (Defendant Idaho Heart
Institute P.C.'s Answers to Plaintiffs 2nd Set of
Requests for Admission)

Jon J. Shindurling

125/2008

129/2008

30/2008

Judge

5-5-08 @ 11 :00

(Plaintiffs 2nd Discovery to

Jon J. Shindurling

Notice Of Service
(Defendants' Responses to Jon J. Shindurling
.. Plaintiffs 1st Set of Requests for Production)
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5/2/2008

NTOS

ROBBINS

Notice Of Service Defendant Idaho Heart
Institutes Responses to P's Second Discovery to
Defs.

Jon J. Shindurling

3/12/2008

TRAN

WILLIAMS

Transcript Filed (Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten
Time/Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(f) April 28, 2008)

Jon J. Shindurling

5/27/2008

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service
Defendant)

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Memorandum

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Marvin F. Morgan
Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Bradley K. Morgan
Judgment)

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Barbara Ella Spencer
Judgment)

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Gary E. Ellwein, M.D. (Autopsy
Pathologist)

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Jay N. Schapira, M.D.
Judgment)

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

2nd Affidavit of William J. Flynn
Judgment)

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel Ryan S. Lewis (Summary
Judgment)

Jon J. Shindurling

19/2008

HRHD

KER

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/09/2008
09:00 AM: Hearing Held Motion for Summary
Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

111/2008

ORDR

KER

Order Setting Pre-Trial Conference and Trial

Jon J. Shindurling

OR DR

KER

Order Appointing Mediator

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

KER

Minute Entry

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

KER

Minute Entry

Jon J. Shindurling

ORDR

KER

Order Appointing Mediator

Jon J. Shindurling

ORPT

KER

Order Setting Pretrial Conference and Trial

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

KER

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
02/09/2009 10:00 AM)

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

KER

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/23/200901 :30 Jon J. Shindurling
PM)

2312008

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service (Defendant Idaho Heart
Institute, P.C's Responses to Plaintiffs 3rd
Discovery to Defendants and Defendant Idaho
Heart Institute's Supplemental Responses to
Plaintiffs 2nd Discovery to Defendants)

Jon J. Shindurling

28/2008

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order, Opinion, Decision on Parties Motions for
Summary Judgment: Plaintiffs request for
Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Jon J. Shindurling

Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests

Jon J. Shindurling

5/28/2008

'18/2008

15/2008

NTOS

DOOLITTL

(Plaintiffs 3rd Discovery to

(Summary
(Summary
(Summary

(Summary
(Summary

Jon J. Shindurling
Jon J.Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling
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10/17/2008

NTOS

WILLIAMS

Notice Of Service (Plainitffs Response to
Defendants' First Requests for Production of
Documents and a CD containing Ipdf documents
lableded MM101508 - 1 thorugh 232)

11/17/2008

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/08/200809:00
Jon J. Shindurling
AM) Mtn to Continue Trial - Quane Smith to ntc appear telephoncially

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Compel

MEMO

DOOLITTL

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Jon J. Shindurling
Compel

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Defendants' Motion to Compel

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial
12-8-08 @ 9:00 a.m. (fax).
Setting

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

DOOLITTL

Motion to Continue Trial Setting

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Continue Trial Setting
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

11/20/2008

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/12/200910:30
AM) Mtn to Compel -Quane to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

11/24/2008

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' Motion to
Compel
1-12-09 @ 10:30 a.m.

Jon J. Shindurling

11/25/2008

NOTC

WOOLF

Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Plaintiff
Marvin Morgan

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Identification of Expert Witnesses

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITIL

Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Supplemental Expert Witness
Disclosure

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs 2nd Supplemental Expert Witness
Disclosure

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Hearing

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel Opposing Trial Continuance
and Lifelong Medical Records

Jon J. Shindurling

RESP

DOOLITIL

Plaintiffs Response Opposing Defendants'
Motion to Compel

Jon J. Shindurling

RESP

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Response Opposing Defendants'
Motion to COntinue Trial Setting

Jon J. Shindurling

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/08/2008
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearirig
estimated: under 100 Mtn to Continue Trial Quane Smith to ntc - appear telephoncially

Jon J. Shindurling

CONT

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
02/09/2009 10:00 AM: Continued

Jon J. Shindurling

CONT

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/23/2009
01:30 PM: Continued

Jon J. Shindurling

11/28/2008
12/112008

21212008

2/8/2008

(fax)

12-8-08

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling
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12/8/2008

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
03/09/2009 10: 15 AM)

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/30/2009 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling
PM) 2 week trial

GWALTERS

Notice of Hearings - PTC set on 3/9/09 at 10: 15 Jon J. Shindurling
AM; JT set on 3/30109 at 1:30 PM

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry re Mtn hrg held on 12/8/08 at 9 AM: Jon J. Shindurling
The Mtn to cont trial was GRANTED. PTC is cant
to 2/9/09 at 10: 15 AM. JT is reset to 3/30109 at
1:30 PM. The Mtn to Compel hrg is set for hrg as
scheduled on 1/12/09 at 10:30 AM. (see doc for
details)

2110/2008

NTOS

WILLIAMS

Notice Of Service of Offer of Settlement (12-9-08) Jon J. Shindurling

2/12/2008

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service
Defendant)

2/17/2008

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service of Supplemental Discovery
Response

Jon J. Shindurling

17/2009

NTOS

WILLIAMS

Notice Of Service of Discovery Responses

Jon J. Shindurling

19/2009

AFFD

WOOLF

Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Compel

Jon J. Shindurling

112/2009

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Brad
Morgan
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/12/2009
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 Mtn to Compel -Quane to
ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry re Mtn Hrg held on 1/12/09 at 10:30 Jon J. Shindurling
AM: Mtn to Compel is DENIED. Mr. Hawkes
requested a new Pretrial date. Court advised that
2/23/09 is available and some time is available on
3/2109. Mr. Hawkes was advised to call the office
to arrange a new PTC date. (see doc for details)

NDDT

WILLIAMS

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Barbara
Spencer

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
02/23/2009 10:00 AM)

Jon J. Shindurling

HRVC

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
03/09/2009 10:15 AM: Hearing Vacated

Jon J. Shindurling

GWALTERS

Notice of Hearing - PTC reset to 2/23109 at 10
AM

Jon J. Shindurling

12/9/2008

'13/2009

'14/2009

(Plaintiff's 4th Discovery to

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

1512009

NOTC

WILLIAMS

Notice of Rescheduled Pretrial Conference 2/23/09 @ 10:00 a.m.

Jon J. Shindurling

16/2009

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service of Supplemental Discovery
Responses

Jon J. Shindurling

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of The
Records Custodian of Vicki Lee Macy, M.D.

Jon J. Shindurling
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1/20/2009

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Records
Custodian of Regence Blue Shield of Idaho

Jon J. Shindurling

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the
Records Custodian of Mountain View Hospital

Jon J. Shindurling

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Records
Custodian of Rocky Mountain Diabetes and
Osteoporosis Center

Jon J. Shindurling

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the
Records Custodian of Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center

Jon J. Shindurling

ASRV

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Service - 1/9/09 (Brad Morgan Subpoena and Notice of Depo)

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

WILLIAMS

Subpoena Returned - Brad Morgan

Jon J. Shindurling

ASRV

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Service" - 1/16/09 (Sandy Martin Subpoena and Notice of Depo)

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

WILLIAMS

Subpoena Returned (Records Custodian of
Regence Blue Shield of Idaho)

Jon J. Shindurling

ASRV

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Service - - 1/8/09 (Barbara Spencer)

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

WILLIAMS

Subpoena Returned - (Barbara Spencer)

Jon J. Shindurling

ASRV

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Service - 1/19/09 (Vicky Poole for
Rocky Mt. Diabetes & Osteoporosis Center)

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

WILLIAMS

Subpoena Returned (Rocky Mountain Diabetes
and Osteoporosis Center - Records Custodian)

Jon J. Shindurling

ASRV

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Service - no date on return - served
Chalise Taylor for EIRMC

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

WILLIAMS

Subpoena Returned (Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center Records Custodian)

Jon J. Shindurling

ASRV

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Service - 1/19/09 (Suzy for Mountain
View Hospital)

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

WILLIAMS

Subpoena Returned (Mountain View Hospital
Records Custodian)

Jon J. Shindurling

3012009

NOTC

WOOLF

Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of
Jon J. Shindurling
the Records Custodian of Mountain View Hospital

212009

MOTN

WOOLF

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and to Shorten Time and Notice of Hearing
2/23/2009 @ 10:00 AM

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

WOOLF

Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment RE: Causation

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTC

DOOLITTL

Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Teecum of
Records Custodian of Regence Blue Shield of
Idaho
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Objection to
Jon J. Shindurling
Plaintiaffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(fax)

DOOLITTL

Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Jon J. Shindurling
Judgment
(fax)

'/22/2009

12612009

128/2009

Judge
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2/5/2009

AFFD

WOOLF

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Alternative
Motion for Order Pursuant to Rule 56(f)

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

ROBBINS

Motion to Shorten time for Hearing Defs
Objection to PIt's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment andlor Alertnative Motion for Order

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

ROBBINS

Alernative Motion for Order

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

ROBBINS

Memorandum in Support of Alernative Motion for Jon J. Shindurling
Order

AFFD

ROBBINS

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Alternative
Motion for Order

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTC

ROBBINS

Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of the
Records Custodian of Margaret Wagner, M.D.

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTC

ROBBINS

Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of the
Records Custiodian of David Chamberlain, D.O.

Jon J. Shindurling

2/6/2009

AFFD

WILLIAMS

Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Alternative Motion for Order Pursuant to Ruel
56(f) **fax**

Jon J. Shindurling

2/9/2009

RESP

WOOLF

Plaintiffs Response Opposing Defendants'
Jon J. Shindurling
Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment and Alternate Motion Pursuant to Rule
56(f) and Motion for Reconsideration

2/10/2009

SUBR

DOOLITTL

Subpoena Returned
Utah Heart Clinic)

DOOLITTL

Proof of Service
(fax)

(Records Custodian of

2-6-09

Utah Heart Clinic

Jon J. Shindurling
Jon J. Shindurling

~/11/2009

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry on Mtn hrg held on 2/10109 at 2:30 Jon J. Shindurling
PM: OIA on Mtn for 56(f) was heard, Mtn for Part
S/J was withdrawn. PTC will be held on 2/23/09 at
10 AM as scheduled (see doc for details).

~/18/2009

NOTC

DOOLITTL

Notice of Vacating Deposition Duced Tecum of
The Records Custodian of Margaret Wagner,
M.D.
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

~/19/2009

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the
Records Custodian of Mountain States
Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgery, PLLC

Jon J. Shindurling
(fax)

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the
Records Custodian of P. Jeffrey P. Thompson,
M.D. (fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

NDDT

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the
Records Custodian of B. Shields Stutts, M.D.
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Defendants' Exhibit List

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service of Supplemental Discovery
Responses
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Defendants' Witness List

Jon J. Shindurling

NTOS

(fax)

(fax)
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2/23/2009

DCHH

GWALTERS

GWAlTERS

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
Jon J. Shindurling
02/23/2009 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Helc
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100
Request for Jury

Jon J. Shindurling

MISC

WOOLF

Plaintiff's Rule 16(c) Pretrial Statement (Pretrial
2/2312009) (Trial 3-30-09)

Jon J. Shindurling

MISC

WOOLF

Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit List

Jon J. Shindurling

MISC

WOOLF

Plaintiff's Trial Witness List

Jon J. Shindurling

MISC

MCGARY

Defendants' Requested Jury Instructions and
Proposed Special Verdict

Jon J. Shindurling

RTOS

DOOL/TTl

Return Of Service 2-6-09 Margaret Wagner
m.d. Records Custodian (Fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

DOOL/TTl

Subpoena Returned
Records Custodian

Jon J. Shindurling

RTOS

DOOL/TTl

Return Of Service
(fax)

SUBR

DOOL/TTl

Subpoena Returned
Records Custodian

MINE

GWAlTERS

Minute Entry re PTC held on 2/23/09 at 10 AM: Ct Jon J. Shindurling
discussed jury details w/parties (see doc for
details).

~/25/2009

NOAP

GWALTERS

Defendant: Demos, Michael Alexander MD Notice Jon J. Shindurling
Of Appearance Matthew F McColl

,/5/2009

SUBR

DOOL/TTl

Subpoena Returned Mountain States
Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgery, PPl
Records Custodian
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

RTOS

DOOL/TTl

Return Of Service 2-19-09 Mountain States
Cardiovascular by serving Amy Plume
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

DOOL/TTl

Subpoena Returned
P. Jeffrey Thompson,
M.D. Records Custodian (fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

RTOS

DOOL/TTl

Return Of Service 2-19-09 P. Jeffrey
Thompson by serving Lisa Alcof
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

DOOL/TTl

Subpoena Returned
Records Custodian

B. Shields Stutts, MD.
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

RTOS

DOOL/TTl

Return Of Service NON- Service B. Shields
Stutts RETIRED AND MOVES AWAY
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTC

DOOL/TTl

Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of
The Records Custodian of Mountain States
Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgery, PllC
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTC

DOOL/TTl

Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of
The Records Custodian of P. Jeffrey Thompson,
MD.
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOL/TTl

Defendants' 1st Supplemental Witness List (fax) Jon J. Shindurling

U24/2009

Margaret Wagner, MD.
(fax)
2-6-09 David Chamberlain

Jon J. Shindurling

David Chamberlain, D.O.
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling
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3/11/2009

SUBR

DOOLITTL

Trial Subpoena Returned
MD.)
(fax)

(Jeffrey E. Keller,

Jon J. Shindurling

SUBR

DOOLlTTl

Trial Subpoena Returned
M.D.)
(fax)

(Gregory Hodson,

Jon J. Shindurling

3/12/2009

NOTC

WOOLF

Notice of Vacating Disposition Duces Tecum of
the Records Custodian of B. Shields Stutts, MD

3/13/2009

NDDT

KBAIRD

Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the records Jon J. Shindurling
custodian of eastern idaho cardiology associates

DOOLITTL

Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed
Jury Instructions

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Defendant's 2nd Supplemental Witness List

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLlTTl

Defendants' 1st Amended Exhibit List

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLlTTl

Defendants' Trial Brief

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTl

Affidavit of Counsel RE: Trial Brief

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

2nd Affidavit of counsel RE: Trial Brief

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTl

Affidavit of Counsel RE: Mediation

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLlTTl

Defendants' 1st Supplemental Requested Jury
Instructions

Jon J. Shindurling

ASRV

DOOLlTTl

Affidavit of Service - 3-12-09 Jeffrey E. Keller
M.D.
(Trial Subpoena)

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

ROBBINS

Notice Of Hearing on Defs Motion in Limine
3/24/09 at 2:00 pm

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

ROBBINS

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Defs Motions Jon J. Shindurling
in Limine

AFFD

DOOLlTTl

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants'
Motions In Limine

MEMO

DOOLlTTl

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motions Jon J. Shindurling
In Limine

MOTN

DOOLlTTl

Defendants' Motions In Limine

Jon J. Shindurling

RESP

WilLIAMS

Plaintiffs Response Opposing Defendants'
Motion to Shorten Time Re: Motions in Limine

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

WilLIAMS

Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Re: March
27,2009 Depositon of Eastern Idaho Cardiology
Associates

Jon J. Shindurling

'18/2009

NOTC

DOOLITTL

Notice Vacating the Deposition Duces Tecum of
The Records Custodian of Eastern Idaho
Cardiology Associates
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

'20/2009

AFFD

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to
Exclude Jay Schapira, MD. **fax**

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

WILLIAMS

Defendants' Motion to Exclude Jay Schapaira,
M. D. **fax**

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

WILLIAMS

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Jon J. Shindurling
Exclude Jay Schapira, M.D.)

NOTH

WILLIAMS

Notice Of Hearing - 4/2/09 @ 2 p.m.

3/16/2009

11712009

Judge

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling
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3/20/2009

MOTN

WILLIAMS

Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: Defendants'
Decedent Ella Morgan's Medical Conditions
Which are Not in Issue

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

WILLIAMS

Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: Defendants'
Cumulative Experts

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

WILLIAMS

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Defendants'
Motion to Exclude Jay Schapira, M.D.

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Defendants' Exhibits Volume 1 A & B

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOL/TTL

Defendants' Exhibits Volume 2 C-GG

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTC

WOOLF

Notice of Hearing on Defendants' Motion to
Exclude Jay Schapira, MD.cy

Jon J. Shindurling

MISC

WOOLF

Defendants' Second Amended Exhibit List

Jon J. Shindurling

ROBBINS

Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 3 ring Binder

Jon J. Shindurling

ROBBINS

Plaintiffs Objections to Defs Requested jury
Instructions

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Counsel Opposing Late-Filed,
Post-Pretrail Motions

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

QUINTANA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/24/2009 02:00
PM) Defendant's Motion in Limine
Defendant's Motion to Exclude

Jon J. Shindurling

HRHD

QUINTANA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/30/2009
01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 2 week trial

Jon J. Shindurling

HRHD

QUINTANA

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/24/2009
02:00 PM: Hearing Held Defendant's Motion in
Limine
Defendant's Motion to Exclude

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

QUINTANA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/30/2009 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling
PM)

ASRV

WILLIAMS

Affidavit of Service - 3/16/09 (Subpoena - Eastern Jon J. Shindurling
idaho Cardiology Records Custodian)

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/30/200910:00
AM) Mtn to Exclude - McColl to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order Shortening Time for Hrg Defs Mtns in
Limine (see doc for details).

Jon J. Shindurling

OR DR

GWALTERS

Order Shortening Time for Hrg Defs' mtn to
Jon J. Shindurling
Exclude Jay Schapira, M.D. (see doc for details).

MOTN

GWALTERS

Renewed Motion to exclude P's expert witness
abo Os.

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

GWALTERS

Notice Of Hearing on Mtn to exclude set on
3/30109 at 10 AM

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

GWALTERS

Affidavit of Counsel in Spt of Renewed Mtn to
exclude P's expert witness obo Os.

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

GWALTERS

Motion to Short time for hrg on Os' renewed mtn
to exclude P's expert witness obo Ds.

Jon J. Shindurling

3/23/2009

3/24/2009

112512009

Judge
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3/25/2009

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order Shortening time for hrg Os' renewed mtn to Jon J. Shindurling
exclude P's expert witness: Hrg is set on 3/30/09
at 10 AM (see doc for details).

AFFD

WOOLF

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Renewed
Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay
N. Schapira, MD

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

GWALTERS

Memorandum in spt of renewed mtn to exclude
P's expert witness obo Os. (fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff's Notice of Compliance (Schapira)

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

GWALTERS

Memorandum in Opposition to P's Mtn in Limine Jon J. Shindurling
Re: Medical Conditions which are not in issue obo
Os. (fax)

AFFD

GWALTERS

3/26/2009

Supplemental Affidavit in Supt of Os' Renewed

Jon J. Shindurling

Mtn toExclude P'sExpert Witness obo Os. (fax)
1/27/2009

AFFD

WOOLF

Affidavit of Jay N. Schapira, MD in Opposition to
Os' Renewed Motion to Exclude

Jon J. Shindurling

,/30/2009

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/30/2009
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sandra Terrill (T& T)
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 Mtn to Exclude - McColl to
ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
09/14/2009 10:30 AM)

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/06/200909:00 Jon J. Shindurling
AM)

CONT

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/30/2009
01 :30 PM: Continued 2 Week Jury Trial

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry re Mtn hrg held on 3/30/09 at 10 AM: Jon J. Shindurling
Defs' mtn to exclude expert witness was partially
granted. The Ct advised the defs to submit a mtn
for sanctions re costs. Trial is continued to
10/6/09 at 9 AM. Each side will have 4 trial days
for their case. Mr. McColl will prepare order for
the Court's signature. (see doc for details).

ORPT

GWALTERS

Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial: PTC is set Jon J. Shindurling
on 9/14/09 at 10:30 AM. JT is reset to 10/6/09 at
9 AM. (see doc for details).

20/2009

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order Re: Defendants' Renewed Mtn to Exclude Jon J. Shindurling
Expert Schapira: D's Mtn to exclude is
PARTIALLY GRANTED, and the trial is continued
to allow Os time and latitude to inquire into P's
expert, Schapira's prior testimonial history. This
order incorporates the oral findings of this Ct at
the hrg of this mtn as if fully set forth herein. (see
doc for details).

28/2009

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/09/2009 11.00
AM) Mtn for Sanctions - Quane to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling
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WS/2009

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/15/200909:30
AM) Mtn for Sanctions - Quane to ntc

HRVC

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/09/2009
Jon J. Shindurling
11:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for Sanctions Quane to ntc

MOTN

WOOLF

Motion for Sanctions

MEMO

WOOLF

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

WOOLF

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for
Sanctions

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTC

WOOLF

Notice of Hearing on Defendants' Motion for
Sanctions 6/15/2009 @ 9:30

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

WOOLF

Memorandum of Expenses Costs and Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

WOOLF

**~NoE:nlJeJopeProvidedto Mail Back Affidavit of Jon J. Shindurling
Counsel in Support of Motion for Sanctions.
Document is in fi/e****

;/1/2009

Judge
Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

/4/2009

AFFD

WILLIAMS

Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion for Sanctions

Jon J. Shindurling

/20/2009

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/22/2009 09:30
AM) Mtn for Sanctions

Jon J. Shindurling

CO NT

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/15/2009
09:30 AM: Continued Mtn for Sanctions Quane to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

GWALTERS

Notice of Hearing - Mtn hrg reset to 6/22/09 at
9:30 AM

Jon J. Shindurling

'19/2009

BRIF

GWALTERS

Responsive Brief in Support of Mtn for Sanctions Jon J. Shindurling
obo Defendants (fax)

'22/2009

RESP

ROBBINS

Plfs Response Opposing Defs Motion for
Sanctions

Jon J. Shindurling

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/22/2009
09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 Mtn for Sanctions

Jon J. Shindurling

23/2009

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry on Mtn hrg held on 6/22/09 at 9:30 Jon J. Shindurling
AM: Ct GRANTED Mtn for Sanctions as to some
costs/DENIED as to some costs/fees. Mr. McColl
will prepare/submit order for signature. (see doc
for details).

3/2009

TRAN

WOOLF

Transcript Filed of the June 22, 2009 Trial
(Defendants' Motion for Sanctions)

Jon J. Shindurling

TRAN

WOOLF

Transcript Filed of the 3/24/2009 Hearing
(Motions Hearing)

Jon J. Shindurling

TRAN

WOOLF

Transcript Filed of the 2/23/2009 Hearing
(Pretrial Conference)

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/08/2009 11 :00
AM) Mtn for S/J - Hawkes to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

10/2009
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7/10/2009

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order Regarding Os' Mtn for Sanctions: Os' Mtn
for Sanctions is GRANTED (see doc for details).

Jon J. Shindurling

8/12/2009

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/01/200901 :30
PM) Mtn to exclude - McColl to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

8/17/2009

NOTH

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' 2nd Renewed
Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay
Schapira, M.D. 9-1-09 @ 1:30 p.m.

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

DOOLITTL

2nd Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Jon J. Shindurling
Witness Jay N. Schapira, M.D., or Alternative
Motion to Dismiss

MEMO

DOOLITTL

Memorandum in Support of 2nd Renewed Motion Jon J. Shindurling
to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N.
Schapira, M.D., or Alternative Motion to Dismiss

AFFD

DOOLITTL

~ffidavAof

Counsel irLSupportot2ndRenewed
Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Wintess Jay
N. Schapira, M.D., or Algernative Motion to
Dismiss

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

DOOLITTL

Affidavit of Counsel RE: Defendants' 2nd
Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert
Witness Jay N. Schapira, M.D.

Jon J. Shindurling

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's Supplemental
Response to Interrogatory #8 of Defendant's
Chambers and Demos)

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

DOOLITTL

Jon J. Shindurling
Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Defendants'
2nd Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert
Witness Jay Schapira, M.D.

HRVC

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 09/08/2009
11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for S/J Hawkes to ntc -

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 9/1/2009
Time: 1:45 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters
Tape Number:

Jon J. Shindurling

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 09/01/2009
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 75 Mtn to exclude - McColl to
ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

1/312009

TRAN

GWALTERS

Transcript Filed: Mtn to exclude/mtn to dismiss
heard 9/1/09

Jon J. Shindurling

'1412009

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/08/200910:00
AM) Mtn to exclude - McColl to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

HRVC

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
09/14/2009 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Jon J. Shindurling

8/26/2009

3/1/2009

Judge
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1/4/2009

HRSC

GWALTERS
GWALTERS

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
09/14/200909:00 AM)

Jon J. Shindurling

Notice of Hearing - PTC reset to 9/14/09 at 9 AM Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

WOOLF

Memorandum in Support of Third Renewed
Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay
N. Schapira, MD

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

WOOLF

Thrid Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs
Expert Witness Jay N. Schapira, MD

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

WOOLF

Notice of Hearing on Defendants' Third Renewed Jon J. Shindurling
Motion to Exluce Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay
Schapira, MD 3/30/2009 @ 10:00 AM

MOTN

WOOLF

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Defendants'
Third Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs
ExpertWitoessJay Schapira, MD.

AFFD

WOOLF

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Third Renewed Jon J. Shindurling
Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay
N. Schapira, MD

LYKE

Amended Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing
Defendants' Third Renewed Motion to Exclude
Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay Schapira, M.D.

NOTH

LYKE

Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' Third Renewed Jon J. Shindurling
Motion (09/14/09@9:00AM)

110/2009

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order Denying Ds' 2nd Renewed Mtn to exclude
and Mtn to Dismiss: (see doc for details).

Jon J. Shindurling

111/2009

MEMO

WOOLF

Plaintiffs Memorandum Opposing Defendants'
Third Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs
Expert Witness Jay Schapira, MD

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

WOOLF

Affidavit of Counsel Opposing Third Renewed
Motion to Exclude (9-11-09)

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 9/14/2009
Time: 9:00 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters
Tape Number:

Jon J. Shindurling

DCHH

GWALTERS

Jon J. Shindurling
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
09/14/200909:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel(
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 9/14/2009
Time: 9:00 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters
Tape Number:

18/2009

'15/2009

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling
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9/15/2009

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion held on 09/14/2009
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 Mtn to exclude - McColl to
ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

HRVC

GWALTERS

Hearing resu It for Jury Trial held on 10106/2009
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Jon J. Shindurling

3/16/2009

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order Granting Ds 3rd Renewed Mtn to Exclude Jon J. Shindurling
P's expert witness Jay N. Schapira M.D. (see doc
for details).

10/23/2009

NOTC

WOOLF

Notice of Firm Name Change Quane Smith LLP Jon J. Shindurling
is now known as Carey Perkins LLP

1/15/2010

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
03/08/2010 11 :00 AM) stat of case

GWALTERS
3/8/2010

122/2012

121/2012

'22/2012

Judge

Jon J. Shindurling

Notice of Hearing - Stat conf set 3/8/10 at 11 AM Jon J. Shindurling
Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 3/8/2010
Time: 11 :08 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Digital Record
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters
Tape Number:
Lowell Hawkes
Matt McColl

DCHH

GWALTERS

Jon J. Shindurling
Hearing result for Status Conference held on
03/08/2010 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing He/<
Court Reporter: digital recorder
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 50 stat of case

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order Granting Permission to Appeal (Rule 12(c), Jon J. Shindurling
IAR: This case is appropriate for and meets
criteria of Rule 12(a), IAR (see doc for details).

STATUS

GWALTERS

Case Status Changed: inactive

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTC

DOOLITTL

Notice of Substitution of Counsel for Plaintiff
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

NOAP

DOOLITTL

Plaintiff: Morgan, Marvin F Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling
M. Brent Morgan

MOTN

SOLIS

Plaintiff - Motion To Reopen And To Reconsider
Order Granting Defendants' Third Renewed
Motion To Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay
N. Schapira MD

AFFD

SOLIS

Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Reopen And To Jon J. Shindurling
Reconsider Order Granting Defendants' Third
Renewed Motion To Exclude Plaintiff's Expert
Witness Jay N. Schapira MD

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/09/2012 11 :30
AM) Mtn to reopen case - Morgan to ntc

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling
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3/23/2012

NOTH

lYKE

Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Reopen and to
Reconsider Order Granting Defendants's Third
Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert
Witness Jay N. Schapira, M.D.
(04/09/12@11:30AM)

4/312012

MOTN

GWAlTERS

Motion in Supt of Oppo to P's Mtn to Reopen &
Jon J. Shindurling
for Reconsideration & in Spt of Alternative Mtns to
Dismiss abo Os (fax)

AFFD

GWAlTERS

Affidavit of Matthew McColl in Spt of Mtn in Supt
of our Opposition to P's Mtn to Reopen & for
Reconsideration & in Spt of Alternative Mtns to
Dismiss abo Os (fax).

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

GWAlTERS

Memorandum in Spt of Mtn in Spt of our
Opposition to P's Mtn to Reopen & for
Reconsideration &jn Spt of Alternative Mtns to
Dismiss abo Os. (fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

GWAlTERS

Motion for Order Shortening Time abo Defs (fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

GWAlTERS

Notice Of Hearing abo Os (fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

ORDR

GWAlTERS

Order on Motion to Shorten Time

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

DOOL/TTl

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Response & Jon J. Shindurling
Objection to Defendants' Alternative Motions to
Dismiss
(fax)

AFFD

DOOL/TTl

Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Response &
Objection to Defendants' Alternative Motions to
Dismiss
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

RESP

DOOL/TTl

Plaintiffs Response & Objection to Defendants'
Alternative Motions to Dismiss
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

RESP

GWAlTERS

Response & Objection to Defs' Alternative Mts to Jon J. Shindurling
Dismiss abo P (fax)

AFFD

GWAlTERS

Affidavit in Support of P's Response & Objection
to Defs' Alternative Mtns to Dismiss abo P (fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

GWAlTERS

Memorandum in Supt of P's Response &
Objection to Ds' Alternative Mtns to Dismiss abo
P (fax).

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

GWAlTERS

AMENDED Motion to Reopen & to Reconsider
Order Granting Ds' 3rd Renewed Mtn to Exclude
P's Expert Witness Jay N. Schapirs, M.D. abo P.
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

GWAlTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 4/9/2012
Time: 11 :30 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters
Tape Number:
Brent Morgan
Matt McColl

Jon J. Shindurling

4/6/2012

4/9/2012

Jon J. Shindurling
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·/9/2012

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Jon J. Shindurling
District Court Hearing Hel(
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 50 Mtn to reopen case Morgan to ntc; Mtn & oppo re reopening case Carey Perkins to ntc

04/09/2012 11 :30 AM:

ORDR

LMESSICK

Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Reopen Jon J. Shindurling
Case

CDIS

LMESSICK

Civil Disposition entered for: Chambers, John D.
JR. MD, Defendant; Demos, Michael Alexander
MD, Defendant; Idaho Heart Institute, P.C.,
Defendant; Morgan, Marvin F, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 5/24/2012

Jon J. Shindurling

STATUS

LMESSICK

Case Status Changed: Closed

Jon J. Shindurling

1112012

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Plaintiff - Motion To Reconsider And To Alter Or
Amend Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs Motion
To Reopen Case

Jon J. Shindurling

14/2012

JDMT

GWALTERS

Judgment: P shall take nothing, this actn is
DISMISSED wlo prej. Costs, if any to Defs
Michael Alexander Demos, M.C., John D.
Chambers, Jr., M.D., and Idaho Heart Institute,
P.C., to be determined later.

Jon J. Shindurling

CDIS

GWALTERS

Civil Disposition entered for: Chambers, John D.
JR. MD, Defendant; Demos, Michael Alexander
MD, Defendant; Idaho Heart Institute, P.C.,
Defendant; Morgan, Marvin F, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 6/4/2012

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/03/201209:30
AM) Reconsideration - Morgan to ntc Permission by phone?

Jon J. Shindurling

STATUS

GWALTERS

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

SOLIS

Notice Of Hearing On Motion To Reconsider

Jon J. Shindurling

124/2012

'6/2012

812012

07/3/2012 @9:30 AM
20/2012

HRSC

GWALTERS

CONT

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/02/2012 11 :00
AM) Reconsideration - cont'd by Ct Morgan to
appear by phone

Jon J. Shindurling

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on

Jon J. Shindurling

07/03/201209:30 AM: Continued
Reconsideration - Morgan to ntc - Permission by
phone?
GWALTERS

Notice of Resetting Hearing - Mtn hrg reset to

Jon J. Shindurling

7/2/12 at 11 AM
GWALTERS

Notice of Resetting Hearing - Mtn hrg reset to

Jon J. Shindurling

7/2/12 at 11 AM
21/2012

MEMO

HUMPHREY

Memorandum In Support Of Defendants'
Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Reconsider
And To Alter Or Amend Opinion And Order On
Plaintiffs Motion To Reopen Case (Fax)

Jon J. Shindurling
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Marvin F Morgan

Marvin F Morgan

VS,

VS,

Michael Alexander Demos MD, etaL

Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D, JR Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P,C,

Date

Code

User

3/26/2012

HRSC

GWALTERS

CO NT

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/30/2012 11 :00
AM) Reconsideration - cont'd by Morgan

Jon J, Shindurling

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on

Jon J. Shindurling

07/02/201211:00 AM: Continued
Reconsideration - cont'd by Ct Morgan to appear
by phone

5/27/2012

GWALTERS

Notice of Hearing - Mtn hrg RESET to 7/30112 at Jon J. Shindurling
11 AM

TRAN

GWALTERS

Transcript Filed - Hrg on Mtn to Reopen &
Reconsider held 4/9/11 bfr Judge Jon J.
Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/06/2012 11 :30
AM) Mtn to reconsider - cont'd by Morgan

Jon J, Shindurling

CONT

GWALTERS

IJearing re~ult for Motion scheduled on
Continued
Reconsideration - cont'd by Morgan

Jon J. Shindurling

CEARLY

Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiff's Motion To
Reconsider 8-6-12 @ 11 :30 AM

Jon J. Shindurling

CEARLY

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jon J. Shindurling
Supreme Court Paid by: Morgan, M. Brent
(attorney for Morgan, Marvin F) Receipt number:
0034280 Dated: 7/16/2012 Amount: $109.00
(Check) For: Morgan, Marvin F (plaintiff)

NOTC

CEARLY

Notice Of Appeal

Jon J, Shindurling

APSC

LMESSICK

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Jon J, Shindurling

CERTAP

LMESSICK

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Jon J. Shindurling

BNDC

LMESSICK

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 35075 Dated

Jon J, Shindurling

07/30/2012 11 :00 AM:
'/2/2012

NOTH

'/12/2012

119/2012

7/19/2012 for 100.00)
124/2012

LMESSICK

(SC) Notice of Appeal Filed - Record Due:
October 30, 2012

Jon J. Shindurling

125/2012

GWALTERS

Request for Additional Transcripts & Records
Pursuant to IAR 19 abo Defs (Fax).

Jon J. Shindurling

MINE

GWALTERS

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 8/6/2012
Time: 11 :37 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters
Tape Number:
Brent Morgan
Matt McColl

Jon J, Shindurling

DCHH

GWALTERS

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Jon J, Shindurling
District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 50 Mtn to reconsider - cont'd by
Morgan

'6/2012

08/06/2012 11 :30 AM:
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Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, etal.

Marvin F Morgan VS. Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D. JR. Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P.C.
Judge

Date

Code

User

9/20/2012

OR DR

GWALTERS

Opinion & Order on P's Mtn to Reconsider & to
Jon J. Shindurling
Alter or Amend Opinion & Order on P'S Mtn to
Reopen Case: P'S mtn to reconsider and to Alter
or Amend Opinion & Order on P'S Mtn to Reopen
Case is DENIED.

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Objection To The Record

9/27/2012

(Fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

10/1/2012

NOTC

HUMPHREY

Defendants Notice Of Change Of Address

Jon J. Shindurling

10/17/2012

HRSC

GWALTERS

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 11/19/2012 10:00
AM) Objectn to the record by McColl

Jon J. Shindurling

STATUS

GWALTERS

Case Status Changed: Reopened

Jon J. Shindurling

GWALTERS

Notice of Hearing Objctn to rcrd hrg set 11/19/12 Jon J. Shindurling
at 10 AM

STIP

DOOLITTL

Plaintiffs Stipulation to Request to Augment the
Record
(fax)

10/26/2012

HRVC

LMESSICK

Jon J. Shindurling
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on
11/19/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Objectn
to the record by McColl

10/31/2012

ORDR

GWALTERS

Order Granting Objection to the Record: Defs
Jon J. Shindurling
Objection to the Record is GRANTED and record
shall be augmented.

LMESSICK

Appellate Record Due 1/4/13

1/212012

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling
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Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852)
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775)
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Telephone: (208) 235-1600
FAX: (208) 235-4200
Attorneys for P laintif.!

TIS
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MARVIN F. MORGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS,
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.;
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.;

~

tJ ·00-~33~

COMPLAINT
AND
JURY DEMAND

)
)
)

Defendants.

Count One -

)

Case No.

District Court Jurisdiction/The Parties

1. The District Court has jurisdiction because the amount at issue herein is
in excess of$10,000.00.
2. Plaintiff Marvin F. Morgan is the husband of Greba Ella Morgan,
Deceased. Mrs. Morgan was also sometimes known as G. Ella Morgan and Ella G.
Morgan. Mrs. Morgan died on February 23,2004 as a result of the medical negligence
and wrongs set forth herein. At all times material, Plaintiff and Mrs. Morgan were

COMPLAINT & JURY DEMAND -
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husband and wife and residents of Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho, having been
married over 50 years.
3. Defendants Michael A. Demos, M.D. and John D. Chambers, Jr., M.D.
were, at all times material, residents of Bonneville County, Idaho and employees and
agents of The Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. At all times
material, Defendants Demos and Chambers held themselves out to the public as providing
quality healthcare in a state-of-the-art facility.
4. The "Idaho Heart Institute P.C." is the corporate entity through with
Defendants Demos and Chambers practiced medicine as herein material and the ultimate
successor to an original Idaho professional corporation created on December 28, 1994 as
"Robert W. Cameron, M.D. P.A." later changed on December 15, 1997 to "Snake River
Cardiology Associates, P.C." and on July 16, 1998 to "Idaho Heart Institute P.C.". On
March 8, 2004 the Idaho Heart Institute P.C. was "administratively dissolved" by the
Idaho Secretary of State for failure to file the required Annual Report. It was reinstated
by the Idaho Secretary of State on March 29,2004.

Medical Facts I Wrongful Death
5. Prior to February 4,2004 Ella G. Morgan had established a physicianpatient relationship with Defendant Chambers who ultimately recommended she subject
herself to a diagnostic angiogram.

COMPLAINT & JURY DEMAND -
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6. Prior to February 4,2004 Mrs. Morgan had undergone some preliminary
testing ordered by Defendant Chambers that was the represented basis of Defendant
Chambers recommending the diagnostic angiogram at issue herein.
7. On February 4,2004 Ella G. Morgan went to the Idaho Heart Institute
for purposes of having the diagnostic angiogram performed by Defendant Chambers.
8. Prior to February 4,2004 Defendant Chambers had given assurances that
he would personally perform the diagnostic angiogram ultimately scheduled for February
4,2004.
9. Prior to February 4,2004 Defendant Demos was unknown to Mrs.
Morgan or her husband, Plaintiff herein; she had not at any time established any
physician-patient relationship with Defendant Demos nor consented to any care or
treatment of her by Defendant Demos nor been informed in any mailing or other
document that Defendant Demos was even at the Idaho Heart Institute ..
10. Prior to February 4,2004 Defendants Chambers and the Idaho Heart
Institute knew that Defendant Demos had medical practice issues that would be material
to any person considering selecting him as a physician; he had been subjected to medical
disciplinary procedures in at least three states prior to practicing medicine in Idaho Falls
with the Idaho Heart Institute and the prior medical disciplinary actions against Defendant
Demos even included discipline for his concealment from the Colorado Board of
Medicine of medical practice violations in another state.

023
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11. On February 4,2004 Defendant Demos - not Defendant Chambers as
previously agreed and scheduled - negligently performed the diagnostic angiogram on
Mrs. Morgan causing a dissection and damage to her heart and right coronary artery and
creating a medical emergency.
12. As a direct result of the negligence of Defendant Demos, Mrs. Morgan
was transported by ambulance on an emergency basis to the Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center and subjected to further high-risk medical procedures and complications
that ultimately resulted in her death on February 23,2005.
13. Those further emergency procedures established that, with the
exception of the damage done by Defendant Demos, Mrs. Morgan had no significant
heart or cardiac health issues.
14. Defendant Chambers was negligent in his care and treatment of Mrs.
Morgan, both prior to and following the diagnostic angiogram and complications
resulting from the negligence of Defendant Demos in performing the diagnostic
angIOgram.
15. Defendants were professionally and grossly negligent and breached the
standard of care proximately resulting in the death ofElIa G. Morgan.
16. The death ofElIa G. Morgan was avoidable through the exercise of
non-negligent medical care.
17. Plaintiff Marvin F. Morgan has been specially and generally damaged
in, among other things, the loss of society, companionship and support of his wife.

024
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Page 4

Morgan v. Demos, Chambers, The Heart Institute

Count Two

18. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 17.
19. Defendants' acts, omissions, and gross negligence constitute lack of
informed consent which proximately resulted in the death ofElIa G. Morgan and
Plaintiffs special and general damages.
20. Defendants' actions described above violated Idaho Code §39-4304
through §39-4306.
Count Three

21. Plaintiffrealleges paragraphs 1 through 20.
22. At all times material, Defendants had a fiduciary duty to Ella G.
Morgan.
23. Incidental to the negligence and wrongdoing set forth above,
Defendants provided false, incomplete, and misleading information to Plaintiff and
sought to misrepresent the true facts and alter the medical records ofElIa G. Morgan in
order to conceal their negligence, gross negligence, and wrongdoing
24. The Plaintiff has been additionally damaged by the foregoing.
Count Four

25. Plaintiffrealleges paragraphs 1 through 24.

COMPLAINT & JURY DEMAND -
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26. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongdoing set forth above, it
has been necessary for Plaintiffs to hire legal counsel to prosecute this action because of
Defendants' wrongdoing and unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility in any degree.
27. Plaintiffis entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-120 and/or §12-121 and the applicable rules of the Idaho Rules o/Civil Procedure.
19. Plaintiffs were damaged by the foregoing and are entitled to an award
of damages, both special and general, in an amount to be proven at trial.

Count Five
20. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 19.
21. It has been necessary for Plaintiffs to hire legal counsel to prosecute
this action because of Defendants' unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility in any
degree.
22.

Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho

Code §12-120 and/or §12-121 and the applicable rules of the Idaho Rules o/Civil
Procedure.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants jointly
and severally on all Counts, for his special and general damages, without limit, in such
amount as shown by the evidence, plus costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein, and
such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

COMPLAINT & JURY DEMAND -
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.JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2006.

...

COMPLAINT & JURY DEMAND -

Page 7

Morgan v, Demos, Chambers, The Heart Institute

027

Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852)
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775)
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Telephone: (208) 235-1600
FAX: (208) 235-4200
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling

MARVIN F. MORGAN,

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS,
M.D.; JOHND. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.;
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.c.;

AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND
JURY DEMAND

)
)

Defendants.

Count One -

)
~
)

Case No. CV-06-4332

District Court JurisdictionlThe Parties

1. The District Court has jurisdiction because the amount at issue herein is
in excess of$10,000.00.
2. Plaintiff Marvin F. Morgan is the husband of Greba Ella Morgan,
Deceased. Mrs. Morgan was also sometimes known as G. Ella Morgan and Ella G.
Morgan. Mrs. Morgan died on February 23,2004 as a result of the medical negligence
and wrongs set forth herein. At all times material, Plaintiff and Mrs. Morgan were
AMENDED COMPLAINT & JURY DEMAND Morgan v. Demos. Chambers. The Heart Institute
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husband and wife and residents of Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho, having been
married over 50 years.
3. Defendants Michael A. Demos, M.D. and John D. Chambers, Jr., M.D.
were, at all times material, residents of Bonneville County, Idaho and employees and
agents of The Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. At all times
material, Defendants Demos and Chambers held themselves out to the public as providing
quality healthcare in a state-of-the-art facility.
4. The "Idaho Heart Institute P.C." is the corporate entity through with
Defendants Demos and Chambers practiced medicine as herein material and the ultimate
successor to an original Idaho professional corporation created on December 28, 1994 as
"Robert W. Cameron, M.D. P.A." later changed on December 15, 1997 to "Snake River
Cardiology Associates, P.C." and on July 16, 1998 to "Idaho Heart Institute P.C.". On
March 8, 2004 the Idaho Heart Institute P.C. was "administratively dissolved" by the
Idaho Secretary of State for failure to file the required Annual Report. It was reinstated
by the Idaho Secretary of State on March 29,2004.

Medical Facts I Wrongful Death
5. Prior to February 3,2004 Ella G. Morgan had established a physicianpatient relationship with Defendant Chambers who ultimately recommended she subject
herself to a diagnostic angiogram.

o2~)
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6. Prior to February 3,2004 Mrs. Morgan had undergone some preliminary
testing ordered by Defendant Chambers that was the represented basis of Defendant
Chambers recommending the diagnostic angiogram at issue herein.
7. On February 3,2004 Ella O. Morgan went to the Idaho Heart Institute
for purposes of having the diagnostic angiogram performed by Defendant Chambers.
8. Prior to February 3,2004 Defendant Chambers had given assurances that
he would personally perform the diagnostic angiogram ultimately scheduled for February
3,2004.
9. Prior to February 3,2004 Defendant Demos was unknown to Mrs.
Morgan or her husband, Plaintiff herein; she had not at any time established any
physician-patient relationship with Defendant Demos nor consented to any care or
treatment of her by Defendant Demos nor been informed in any mailing or other
document that Defendant Demos was even at the Idaho Heart Institute.
10. Prior to February 3, 2004 Defendants Chambers and the Idaho Heart
Institute knew that Defendant Demos had medical practice issues that would be material
to any person considering selecting him as a physician; he had been subjected to medical
disciplinary procedures in at least three states prior to practicing medicine in Idaho Falls
with the Idaho Heart Institute and the prior medical disciplinary actions against Defendant
Demos even included discipline for his concealment from the Colorado Board of
Medicine of medical practice violations in another state.

AMENDED COMPLAINT & JURY DEMAND Morgan v. Demos, Chambers, The Heart Institute
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11. On February 3,2004 Defendant Demos - not Defendant Chambers as
previously agreed and scheduled - negligently performed a diagnostic angiogram on
Mrs. Morgan causing a dissection and damage to her heart and right coronary artery and
creating a medical emergency.
12. As a direct result of the negligence of Defendant Demos, Mrs. Morgan
was transported by ambulance on an emergency basis to the Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center and SUbjected to further high-risk medical procedures and complications
that ultimately resulted in her death on February 23,2004.
13. Those further emergency procedures established that, with the
exception of the damage done by Defendant Demos, Mrs. Morgan had no significant
heart or cardiac health issues.
14. Defendant Chambers was negligent in his care and treatment of Mrs.
Morgan, both prior to and following the diagnostic angiogram and complications
resulting from the negligence of Defendant Demos in performing the diagnostic
angiogram.
15. Defendants were professionally and grossly negligent and breached the
standard of care proximately resulting in the death ofElIa G. Morgan.
16. The death ofElIa G. Morgan was avoidable through the exercise of
non-negligent medical care.
17. Plaintiff Marvin F. Morgan has been specially and generally damaged
in, among other things, the loss of society, companionship and support of his wife.
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Count Two

18. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 17.
19. Defendants' acts, omissions, and gross negligence constitute lack of
informed consent which proximately resulted in the death ofElIa G. Morgan and
Plaintiff's special and general damages.
20. Defendants' actions described above violated Idaho Code §39-4304
through §39-4306.
Count Three

21. Plaintiffrealleges paragraphs 1 through 20.
22. At all times material, Defendants had a fiduciary duty to Ella G.
Morgan.
23. Incidental to the negligence and wrongdoing set forth above,
Defendants provided false, incomplete, and misleading information to Plaintiff and
sought to misrepresent the true facts and alter the medical records ofElIa G. Morgan in
order to conceal their negligence, gross negligence, and wrongdoing
24. The Plaintiff has been additionally damaged by the foregoing.
Count Four

25. Plaintiffrealleges paragraphs 1 through 24.

032
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26. All of the foregoing constitute reckless misconduct pursuant to Idaho

Code § 6-1603 (4 )( a) on the part of Defendants removing the limitation on non-economic
damages.
27. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongdoing set forth above, it
has been necessary for Plaintiffs to hire legal counsel to prosecute this action because of
Defendants' wrongdoing and unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility in any degree.
28. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§12-120 and/or §12-121 and the applicable rules of the Idaho Rules o/Civil Procedure.
29. Plaintiffs were damaged by the foregoing and are entitled to an award
of damages, both special and general, in an amount to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants jointly
and severally on all Counts, for his special and general damages, without limit, in such
amount as shown by the evidence, plus costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein, and
such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues.
DATED this 10th day of May, 2007.
LOWELL N. HAWKES,

AMENDED COMPLAINT & .JURY DEMAND lvforgan v. Demos, Chambers, The Heart Institute
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifY that on this 10th day of May, 2007 I faxed a copy of the
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza,
101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O. Box 519, Boise, Idaho 83701, FAX 208-345-8660.
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B()
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977
Matthew F. McColl, ISB No. 6005
QUANE SMITH LLP
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF_TIjE ST_A}E OF IJ?~HQ/IN~r'tD
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVIN F. MORGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-06-4332
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C.,
Defendants.

Come Now, Defendants Michael Alexander Demos, M.D., John D.
Chambers, Jr., M.D. and Idaho Heart Institute {"Defendants"} and move this Court for
entry of Summary Judgment dismissing this action on the ground there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

This Motion is based upon Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Affidavits of Counsel, Michael Alexander Demos, M.D. and John D. Chambers, Jr.,
M.D.; the Memorandum in Support thereof, filed contemporaneously herewith; and the
files and records in the above-entitled action.

DATED this 20th day of November, 2007.
QUANE SMITH

LLP

-'- Mc_CoU, Ofthe Eirm
Attorneys for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of November, 2007, I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated
below, addressed as follows:
Lowell N. Hawkes
Ryan S. Lewis
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201

[Xl
[l
[]
[ .]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 235-4200

Matthew F. McColl

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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ORIGINAL
Jeremiah A Quane
QUANE SMITH LLP
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
ISB No. 977
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVIN F. MORGAN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-06-4332

vs.

ANSWER

MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C.,
Defendants.

COME NOW the above-entitled Defendants and answer the Amended
Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE

The Amended Complaint fails to state claims upon which relief can be
granted.
SECOND DEFENSE

ANSWER -1

I.
Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Amended Complaint not
herein specifically and expressly admitted.

II.
Admit that Defendants Michael Demos, M.D. and John D. Chambers, M.D.
were licensed physicians who rendered medical services to Greba E"a Morgan, the demise
of Greba Ella Morgan and that the Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of Greba Ella Morgan.
III.
Admit that Defendant Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. is the corporate entity that
employedOefendants Michael Demos, M.D.-and John D. Chambers,-M.D:whenthey
rendered services to Greba E"a Morgan.
THIRD DEFENSE
The claims of the Plaintiff against Defendant Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. are
barred by § 5-219, Idaho Code.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing in this action, that
the Amended Complaint be dismissed and Defendants be awarded their costs of suit and
such other and further relief as the Court deems just.
DATED this

2 ({;

day of February, 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

(0 day of February, 2008, I served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER by delivering the same to each of the
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Lowell N. Hawkes
Ryan S. Lewis
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201

[X]
[]
[]
[]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 235-4200

~C
O vJ

ANSWER- 3

Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852)
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775)
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Telephone: (208) 235-1600
FAX: (208) 235-4200
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling

MARVINF.MORGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS,
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.;
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

Case No. CV-06-4332

MOTION FOR ORDER
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f)

~

)

Defendants.

)

Plaintiff moves the Court for its Order pursuant to Rule 56(f), Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, for a one month extension within which time to respond to the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment presently scheduled for hearing on Monday,
May 12,2008. This Motion is made upon the grounds that such additional time is
minimally necessary and needed by Plaintiff in order to provide to the court the facts and
opinions essential to justifY the Plaintiff s opposition to the motion for summary
judgment as more fully set forth in the Affidavit of Counsel filed herewith.
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The extension requested by this Motion has been informally requested of
Defense counsel who have declined to allow the additional time.
Plaintiff further moves the Court for its order shortening the time for
hearing of this motion so as to enable Plaintiff to have a ruling from the Court prior to the
existing deadlines.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2008.
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 16th day of April, 2008 I faxed a copy of the
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane and Matthew F. McColl of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth
Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O. Box 519, Boise, Idaho 83701,
FAX 208-345-8660.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MARVIN MORGAN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
-vs.)
)
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; )
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
)
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.
)
)
Defendailts;
)

Case No. CV -2006-4332
MINUTE ENTRY

April 28, 2008, a Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time and Rule 56fMotion came on for
hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho
Falls, Idaho.
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Rhonda Quintana, Deputy Court Clerk,
were present.
Mr. Lowell Hawkes appeared on behalf of plaintiff.
Mr. Matthew F. McColl appeared on behalf of the defendant.
The Court granted the Motion to Shorten Time to allow this proceeding.
Mr. Hawkes offered argument in support of the motion.
Mr. McColl responded in opposition and indicated all ofthis delay is for nothing. He

further argued that nothing in the motion has been supported.

MINUTE ENTRY - 1

042

Mr. Hawkes responded and offered rebuttal argument in support. He further requested
that the Court allow time to provide affidavits.
The Court granted continuance and reset the Motion for Summary Judgment for June 9,
2008 at 9:00 a.m.
Court was thus adjourned.

c: Lowell Hawkes
Matthew McColl
042808AMShindurl #5

MINUTE ENTRY - 2
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Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852)
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775)
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Telephone: (208) 235-1600
FAX: (208) 235-4200
A ttorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURtr
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO

I

I

The Honorable "'on .... Shlndurllng

~

MARVIN F. MORGAN,

Plaintiff,
VS.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS,
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.;
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.;

Defendants.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES COUNTY

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-06-4332

jl

AFFIDAVIT
JAY N. SCHAPI
, M.D.
(Summary Judg ent)

)
)
)
)

)
:ss
)

JAY N. SCHAPlRA, M.D., being first duly sworn, deposes
follows:

rur states as
j

j.

II
j
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1. I make this Affidavit on personal and professional

knOWled~e and the

opinions stated herein are based on reasonable medical probability and the

4d

of

Ij

information cardiologists rely upon in formulating opinions.

2. I am a board-certified cardiologist having been licensed to ~actice
medicine since 1973 with offices at Cedars Sinai Medical Center in Los Ang~les,
California. I am experienced in invasive cardiology and, specifically, with, akong others,
I

II

the invasive cardiac procedure commonly called an "angiogram" or "heart

j

catheterization" as was perfonned on Ella G. Morgan on February 3, 2004 atllhe Idaho

I

Heart Institute in Idaho Falls, Idaho. My CV is attached.

!

3. As pertains to this case, I am familiar with the standard of crre
applicable to board-certified cardiologists and the standard of care to which

rna

G.

Morgan was entitled in Idaho Falls, Idaho in February of 2004. Both defencljants Demos
and Chambers acknowledged in their depositions that Mrs. Morgan was entifled to the

benefit of their cardiology board certification training and were unable to st1te any
deviations from that board-certified standard in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Dr. Ch~bers further
acknowledged that it was not accepted "as to any specialty" in Idaho Falls 4at '"a
1

physician practice at a standard that was lower than his National Board Cert~fication

I
training" received. Chambers Depo, 121:10-20'; Demos Depo 116'1.5"10se
. 1 Q. At any time incidental to your coming to Idaho Falls did anybodJ ten you that the
standards in Idaho Falls were lower than what you bad been trained at?
"j
MR. McCOLL: I object to the form.
A. Not that I am aware of. I think we practice very good cardiology.
Q. Have you ever heard in the entire time you have been in Idaho Falls that, as to anylspecialty, it was

I
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deposition admissions have been continned to me by an Idaho physician fampiar with the

I

standard of care in Idaho Falls in February of2004.

4. For the reasons stated herein, it is my opinion that the deathlofElla G.

I

Morgan on February 23,2004 was unnecessary and avoidable and the result rf
substandard and negligent medical care she received as a patient of the Defefdants herein
and the dissection of her right coronary artery incidental to the February 3, 2?04

I

angiogram perfonned by Defendant Demos.
An~ioKtam Dissection was Cause of Death

1

5. The Pos;"'ortem Examination ("~utopsy") of Mrs. Morgan rerfonned by

Idaho FallslEIRMC pathologist Gary El1wein detennined that the death of Epa G.
Morgan on February 23, 2004 was the result of damage to her heart sustainek on February
3,2004 when an angiogram perfonned on her by Defendant Demos at the

IJahO Heart

Institute resulted in a dissection of her right coronary artery. Dr. Ellwein's JutoPSY report

1

explained that the pathological aging of scar tissue made it possible to detetine that the
heart damage that lead to her cardiac arrest on February 23,2004 had occuded
1
approximately three weeks earlier at the time of the February 3, 2004 angiokram. Both

accepted in Idaho Falls that a physician practice at a standard that was lower than hiS/ National Board
Certification training?
!I
A. Not that I'm aware of. - Chambers Depo. 121:10-20

I

2

Q Would it be fair

to say that, at the time Ella Morgan was under you~ care at the Idaho

Heart Institute, that she as a patient was entitled to the fun benefit of aU of your training, experience, and
board certification?
A Yeah, of course. - Demos Depo 116:1-5

I

I
!

AFFIDAVIT OF JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. Morgan

y,

Demos. Chambers. Idaho Hearl Institute

Page 3

!I

046

!

~---

-_

r " ......

11

Defendants Chambers and Demos acknowledged in their depositions that the had no
basis to disagree with pathologist Gary EUwein's findings and opinions nor h d even
talked with him about them. Chambers Depo 86:11-18; 87:19-25; Demos De 0110:611.

1

I

N e2li~ence in Performin&: Angiolaam

6. An angiogram is an invasive procedure wherein a very fine 1atheter is
inserted tlrrough a vein in the thigh and theu channeled into the heart for the tlease of a
radiopaque dye that enables the cardiologist to view the arterial anatomy and ,~ny
obstructions. Because it

is an invasive procedure insidethe coronaryarterieJ, it is

I

absolutely essential that the cardiologist pay careful attention to the images ttat are
available for hlm to view on the hlgh resolution screen as the catheter is inse~ed and
advanced. The cardiologist must be sure that the catheter is "coaxial" -

a!ired parallel

so that the mean axis of the catheter (the long axis of the tip of the catheter) is parallel in
1

all three dimensions -

with the mean long axis of the vessel so that the tip tfthe

catheter will be in the opening of the artery in an aligned fashion instead of ~ misaligned

I

fashion. The failure to do that is negligence.

I

1

7. A "dissection" of an artery is a breaking-away of the innertrtion of the
lining of the artery. When that lining is tom away it creates a "flap'7 that ob

cts blood

I

flow diverting blood behind the artery lining where it is trapped and/or allov}ing the

I

i
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I

slower-moving or blocked blood to coagulate and create a clotting blockage

~d creating

a bursting of the blockage and the dissection flap over time.

I

8. In his deposition Dr. Demos was asked why the dissection t9 Mrs.
i

Morgan happened and he stated "1 have no idea, because two injections wer made into
the vessel prior to this, and that was just fme."

Demos Depo 54:20.

That to al-lack-of-

knowledge answer of Dr. Demos reflects a negligent and most-basic lack of
understanding of what causes a dissection and a negligent inattentiveness to
on February 3, 2004 incidental to the angiogram.
9. The #4 French catheter used by Dr. Demos on Mrs. Morg

other things, essentially an instrument capable, when misused, of injuring

edical

~. Morgan
!

j
I

IS,

among

e artery and

causing a dissection. A #4 French catheter is only 1.33 rum in diameter an has
I

significant stiffuess which makes it capable of dissecting a coronary artery

i~ it is not
1

handled properly and not positioned "coaxially." It is absolutely essential ~at the #4
French catheter not be advanced nor injected through unless it is fully visu1ized to be
positioned properly and in a coaxial position within the lumen of the artery.j Otherwise

a~ery sidewall
and start a dissection; it must be properly positioned and coaxial with the ~ery.

there is a risk that when the catheter is advanced it will be pushed into the

10. The angiogram equipment, whenproperly used by a care}ully
observant cardiologist. allows the cardiologist to safely advance the cathett without
causing a dissection.

1

I
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I
11, It is also essential that the cardiologist never advance or 4ect througb

tbe catheter against resistance or wben the catheter is malpositioned or non-1",dal in a
significant fashion, such as occurred with Mrs. Morgan. Ruslllng or inattentteness
I
when performing an angiogram, or advancing or inj ecting the catheter into tHe wall can

I

J

cause a dissection such as occurred in Mrs. Morgan.

I

I

12, A cilIeful, non-negligent cardiologist is aware of resistancl with the

catheter and visually aware of the location of the catbeter with relation to thel"rtery, The
medical evidence in Mrs. Morgan's case demonstrates that Dr. Demos was nft
l

sufficiently attentive to p';sition the ~atheter coaxially and avoid a dissectionj
13. Because Dr. Demos has stated in his deposition that he ha4 "no idea"
I

what caused the dissection (Demos Depo 54:19-21), it is my opinion that he trobablY was
unaware of the unsafe positioning of the catheter and injected contrast into

t,e
I

coronary

I

wall causing the dissection and propogation of the dissection.

1
J

14. The deposition of Bruce Crawford explains that only afterlElla Morgan
was in distress did he and Dr. Demos go back and review the angiogram fil+ and saw
the arterial dissection for the first time after contrast had been injected three times.

I

Crawford Depo 28,11·22,

15. A dissection during an angiogram is easily recognized wi~ careful
observation and is avoidable with cautious and watchful care, But Dr,

Dem~s did rot
I

I
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I

observe the first dissection when he caused it to Mrs. Morgan. It was negligtce and

I

substandard to not have been aware of the dissection at the time it occurred.

16. Dr. Demos further testified in his deposition that there waslno
dissection problem incidental to the first two contrast injections. Demos

D&10 54:20·21.
,

In fact, prior to the first contrast injection it can be seen on the angiogram fiUns that Dr.

I
Demos did not maintain the catheter coaxial to the artery but has impacted ~ catheter

into the artery wall evidencing "tenting" of the otherwise smooth artery wauJ Dissection

Hei
Ii

of the artery waIl at that point can also be observed in those same Idaho

filrrtS.

Institute

j

!
17. What is seen on Mrs. Morgan's angiogram films, on the lasr injection,

f
J

(which was 9 of9) is that towards the second half of the injection there was

staining

along the aortic wall representing the dissection. This should have been seeJ by Dr.
Demos and diagnosed as a dissection at that point in time, as sequence 9 of

~ in the Idaho

Heart Institute angiogram films.
I 8. The dissection of the aortic root implies that there bas beet di ssection
at the point of "'tenting" where the dye entered the coronary artery at the

POir of

dissection by the tip of the catheter and the stream of contrast and the retrOgrade
I

dissection back in to the aortic root from the point of dissection in the right toronary
artery. This should have been immediately recognized by Dr. Demos and tr~ated

I

I
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!
appropriately, in which case Mrs. Morgan would have suffered no Significanj injury or
damage -

I

and certainly would not have lost her life.

19. The standard of care in perfonning an angiogram is that wtenever one
sees this persistence of dye, one must immediately suspect an acute dissectio with
1

subintimal dye collection and further investigate and treat the complication. That is
exactly the case here and the earlier timely recognition would have penmtte, earlier

I

intervention and prevented Mrs. Morgan's death.

J

20. The appearance of dye in the aortic root is a clear diagnoslic sign of a
dissection and that dissection c~e from. the right coronary artery where thejdissection
I

started and dye fIrst entered and caused the problem that we see in Mrs. Mo gan.
21. It is my opinion that Dr. Demos probablY fIrst positioned

e catheter

and inj ected the dye without fIrst determining that it was safe to do so and

I

us advanced

the dye into the artery wall, causing a dissection.
22. Thus, the dissection caused by Dr. Demos was visible in tie initial
views oftbe right coronary artery. It was negligence and substandard to haVj not been
sufficiently observant to have seen what was there "on-screen" to be seen jd to have
seen that it was unsafe to proceed further with the catheter in that position. Jfhe had
caught the dissection at that point he could have -

and should have -

stofPed the
1

procedure. In high probability it would have responded to an angioplasty 1d stent and
been resolved without any pennanent damage to Mrs. Morgan's heart..

I

I
i
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23. A dissection is a serious, potentially life-threatening medic

emergency.3 It is a consideration of every angiogram that must be discussed

ith every

angiogram patient and considerations of a physician's ethical/fiduciary duty4

0

a patient

require disclosure and documentation of the risks of perfonning an angiOgraj in a facility
without the capacity promptly respond to a dissection emergency. That was ot done

I

here.

I

I

u1.

3

Q. Is the dissection of the kind that occurred to her potentially
"'natening?
A. Yes.
I
Q. Is it a serious emergency?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there ever a discussion with Ella Morgan about the aspeCj of a dissection
and if it occurred. it was a life-threatening emergency?

I

A. Yes.
Q. And is it your testimony that that also occurred on January 217
A. Yes.
j
Q. Is that documented anywhere?
A. No, sir.
i
Q. Did you ever explain to Ella that if there was a dissection at ihe Idaho Heart
Institute, if the procedure were done there, that there were no eme~gency facilities
to treat it?
I
A. I don't kn(}w that it waS' explained in that manner. What we r~utinelY explain
to patients is that we are a diagnostic testing facility. If there wa4 an emergency,
we have a transfer agreement that's in place with Eastern Idaho R~gional Medical
Center and the patients would have to be emergently transferred 4ver to have that
!
done.
Q. As happened. in Ella's case.
I
A. Yes.
I
-

Cham bers Depo 52:3-53:4

I

1
4 I am advised that the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the relationship between
a patient and a physician is "consensual, highly fiduciary and particularly depe~dent upon the
patients or client's trust and confidence." Intermountain Eye v. Marie MiIIsr,1r2ldaho 218,
228,127 P3d 121 (12-20-05)
1
1

I
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24. It is my further opinion that it was negligence and a breac of the
Defendants' ethical/fiduciary duties to Mrs. Morgan to not have clearly prov ded Mrs.
Morgan with the "reasonable medical alternative" of having the angiogram

the Eastern

Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC") where emergency operative car was readily
available to her in the event of any serious complication. Both Defendants
and Demos admitted in their depositions Mrs. Morgan was entitled to be ad ised of that
"reasonable medical alternative." Chambers Depo 53:5-54:6; Demos Depo 19:6-12.
Dr. Chambers claimed that Mrs. Morgan "was given the option" of having
performed at EIRMC but nowhere is any such conversation documented;

e angiogram

itls

noticeably

absent from the January 27, 2004 chart note made for the visit with Mrs. M rgan during
which he contends the reasonable medical alternative or performing the an 'ogram at
EIRMC was covered. With Dr. Chambers being assigned by IBI/or the w

k to EIRMC

on February 3,2004, and he being the only physician with whom Mrs. Morr.an had had a
physician-patient relationship as between he and Dr. Demos, it is highly prlbable that
Mrs. Morgan would have elected to have the angiogram at EIRMC to asstu1e her of
having the advantage of her existing cardiologist physician relationship

an4 the extra

measure of safety the EIRMC hospital environment provided. s And Dr. DJmos admitted

I
5 Essentially, the only reason Dr. Chambers gave for not doing the angi gram was that he
was at EIRMC on the every-other-week rotation between he and Dr. Demos; he test' ed he had "every
intention of doing her angiogram" and yet Dr. Demos was the only one scheduled the y before to do it.
Chambers Depo. 45:2-19.

053
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!
that he did not discuss with Ella Morgan the medical option/alternative of pe)fOnning the

i

angiogram at EIRMC. Demos Depo 120'2-4.

25. While Dr. Chambers readily acknowledged that a dissectior of the
right coronary artery like :Mrs. Morgan had is a "serious emergency" that is "f0tentiaiIY
life-threatening" he admitted he did not explain the absence of emergency selices at the
Idaho Heart Institute. Chambers Depo 52:3-53:4.

1

I

26. The record at this point leads to the conclusion that there

1as

negligent indifference on the part of the Defendants' to both the physician's

a

I

ethicallficuciary duties to a pati";"t:rod to Mrs. Morgan's rights to a full explf,nation of

1

this "reasonable medical alternatives" consideration.

I

27. Mr. Crawford, the apparent IHI Cath Lab Manager/Opera~or on
!

February 3, 2004, testified that 20-25 minutes to get Mrs. Morgan to EIRMcj; and

I

emergency care was "exceptionally fast." Crawford Depo 24:16·25:10. Ho ! ever, that
was more than sufficient time for permanent heart damage to occur as in fac happened to
Mrs. Morgan, and, as detennined by pathologist Ellwein causing a damaged1heart that

.

j

would thereafter arrest, as. it did on Mrs. Morgan one day short of three weep later, on
February 23,2004 causing her death.

Medical Record -

EthicalfFiduciary Duties

I

28. The Idaho Heart Institute medical record on Ella Morgan ~s very
troubling and substandard. There are many irreconcilable inconsistencies inithat medical
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1

record as well as things that are just not true. For example, on an overall basi~, it clearly
I

appears that Ella Morgan's physician-patient relationship had been solely wi~ Dr.
Chambers and that he had promised to perfonn the February 3, 2004

angio~.

She was

entitled to rely upon those assurances. However, despite Dr. Chambers contehtions that
1

he intended to, and told her, he would do Mrs. Morgan's angiogram he did n1t. His
deposition contention that he was "planning on doing the case" even while at EIRMC the
morning of February 3, 2004 is at odds with the deposition testimony of Dr.

em os that

he solely was scheduled the day before to do the angiogram. Chambers Dep 49:8-15 cf.
Demos Depo 55:6.11; 61:2,11·12.

29. There are other aspects of the medical record that are trou ling and at
odds with the physicians' ethical/fiduciary duties to Mrs. Morgan. Among thers, these
I

include lHI documents generated at 12:45 and 3:58 p.m. on February 3, 200f reciting

J44, 51, 66;

incorrectly that it was Dr. Chambers who perfonned the angiogram (MR 75,

I

Chambers Dapo. 13:4-8; 71:21·72:3; 74:22-23),

Dr. Demos contending in h+ angiogram

report dictated tvvo days later when he absolutely knew otherwise that Mrs. *organ'S
problems on February 3, 2004 may have been caused by an "arterial spasm"j and had told

I

Dr. Chambers at the time that "the right coronary artery was probably disseted" (MR 6364; Demos Depo 52:7-18; 99:7-13) and that her death on February 23,2004 1 as a result
I

ofa "gastrointestinal bleed." Demos Depo 73,2.11; MR 30 cf. Chambers DtpO' 85:22·
86:10. Those entries were without a reasonable medical basis in fact to hav~ included in
1

,
;1
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Mrs . Morgan's medical record and reflect an unwillingness to take responsib lity for what
had happened. In addition, Dr. Demos is not even shown as performing the

giogram on

the Idaho Heart Institute "Invasive Procedure Report" until a report generate on
February 25,2004 at 10:10 a.m.- two days after Mrs. Morgan died.

MR 3

Chambers Depo. 94:16·96:9.

30. The evidence in this case, as con finned by Dr. Gary Ellwe' 's autopsy,
is unequivocal that on February 3,2004 Ella Morgan did not have any signi lcant

coronary artery disease or other compromising heart condition. Her death

. ..
II

wl av~idable

and her death was a direct result ofthe combined negligence of the Defend
DATED this 20 th day of May, 2008

ts.

-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 20th day of Ma

(SEAL)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVINF. MORGAN,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
-vs.)
)
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D., JOHN )
D. CHAMBERS, JR., M.D., and IDAHO HEART )
INSTITUTE, P.c.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CV-2006-4332
ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE AND TRIAL

Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the following pre-trial
schedule shall govern all proceedings in this case:
I. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1.

Formal pre-trial conference pursuant to Rule 16, LR.C.P., will be held on

February 9, 2009, at 10:00 a.m., at which time witness lists, exhibit lists and any
proposed jury instructions must be filed.
2.

Jury Trial shall commence at 1:30 p.m., on February 23, 2009.
No later than ninety (90) days before the date set for trial, counsel shall disclose
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of expert witnesses that may be
called to testifY at trial.

4.

All discovery shall be completed seventy (70) days prior to trial. l

5.

All Motions for Summary Judgment must be filed sixty (60) days prior to trial in
conformance with Rule 56(a), LR.C.P.

6.

All Motions for Summary Judgment must be heard at least twenty-eight (28) days
prior to trial.

1

Discovery requests must be served so that timely responses will be due prior to the discovery cutoff date.
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II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall, no later than fourteen (14)
days before trial:
L

Submit a list of names to the court of persons who may be called to testify.

2.

Submit a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered into evidence to the
court indicating which exhibits counsel have agreed will be received in evidence
without objection and those to which objections will be made, including the basis
upon which each objection will be made.

3.

Submit a brief to the court citing legal authorities upon which the party relies as to
each issue of law to be litigated.

4.

Ifthis isajurytrial, counsel shall submit proposed jury instructions to all par"1:ies
to the action and the court. All requested instructions submitted to the court shall
be in duplicate form as set out in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 51(a)(1).

5.

Submit that counsel have in good faith tried to settle this action.

6.

State whether liability is disputed.

III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall no later than seven (7) days
before trial:
1.

Submit any objections to the jury instructions requested by an opponent specifying
the instruction and the grounds for the objection.

2.

Deposit with the clerk of the court all exhibits to be introduced, except those for
impeachment. The clerk shall mark plaintiffs exhibits in numerical sequence as
requested by plaintiff and shall mark all defendant's exhibits in alphabetical
sequence as requested by defendant.

3.

A duplicate set of all exhibits to be introduced, except those for impeachment,
shall be placed in binders, indexed, and deposited with the clerk of the court.

IV. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
1.

Any exhibits or witnesses discovered after the last required disclosure shall
immediately be disclosed to the court and opposing counsel by filing and service
stating the date upon which the same was discovered.
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2.

No exhibits shall be admitted into evidence at trial other than those disclosed,
listed and submitted to the clerk ofthe court in accordance with this order, except
when offered for impeachment purposes or unless they were discovered after the
last required disclosure.

3.

This order shall control the course of this action unless modified for good cause
shown to prevent manifest injustice.

4.

The court may imrose appropriate sancfons for violation of this order.
DATED this

l

day of June, 2008.

066
ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND JURY TRIAL - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of June, 2008, I did send a true and correct copy of
the aforementioned Order upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage
thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered.
Mr. Lowell Hawkes
Mr. Matthew McCall

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

By:

gG

DeputYierk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MARVIN F. MORGAN,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV -06-4332
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER
ON PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS,
M.D., JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR., M.D.,
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C.,
Defendants.

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ella Morgan underwent treadmill and stress testing in January 2004 at the Idaho Heart
Institute. As a result of the tests, Dr. Chambers recommended an angiogram for further testing.
Mrs. Morgan scheduled an angiogram for February 3, 2004, which Dr. Chambers said he would
perform. Instead, Dr. Demos performed the procedure.
On February 23,2005 Mrs. Morgan died.
On August 3,2006 Plaintiff, Mrs. Morgan's widower, filed a Complaint in Bonneville
County, seeking damages against Defendants for Mrs. Morgan's wrongful death, arguing that
Defendants' negligence in treating Mrs. Morgan proximately caused her death.
On November 23, 2007 Defendants filed this Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing
that Plaintiff did not timely file the complaint and that Plaintiff did not produce necessary expert
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testimony.
On May 28, 2008 Plaintiff filed a Summary Motion Memorandum, arguing against
Defendants' motion and requesting summary judgment, arguing that Defendants did not present
facts in their affidavits.
On June 9, 2008 this matter came before the court. Both sides presented argument and
the court took this motion under advisement at that time.
After considering the Court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the
argument of counsel, the Court renders the following opinion.

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "summary judgment shall be
granted forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." DBSIITRI V v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 801,
948 P.2d 151, 156 (1997) (citing Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 234,
912 P.2d 119, 121 (1996».
When assessing the motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party.

Furthennore, the trial court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. Litz v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282,
283, 955 P.2d 113, 114 (Ct.App.l998) citing G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho
514,517,808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991) and Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 8n, 874,
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). If reasonable people could reach different conclusions based
on the evidence, the motion must be denied. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125
Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
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791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990).
The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided ... , must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). In attempting to
establish such facts, "a mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester &

Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). In other words, "the party opposing
the motion must present more than a conclusory assertion that an issue of fact exists." Coghlan
v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300,313 (1999).
IIL~~~_

ANALYSIS
A. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim against the Idaho Heart Institute must fail because
it violates the Statute of Limitations. I.C. § 5-219(4) requires that actions based on professional
malpractice for wrongful death must be brought within two years.
Additionally, Defendants argue that filing an application for pre-litigation screening by
the Board of Medicine could not toll the statute oflimitations because the Idaho Heart Institute is
a professional corporation and is not subject to the provisions of the pre-litigation statute.
Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations was tolled when he filed an application for
pre-litigation screening because under the law of professional corporations, the corporation is
liable for the acts of its employees. I.C. § 30-1304.
I.C. § 6-1001 states:
The Idaho state board of medicine, in alleged malpractice cases involving
claims for damages against physicians and surgeons practicing in the state
ofIdaho or against licensed acute care general hospitals operating in the
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
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state of Idaho, is directed to cooperate in providing a hearing panel in the
nature of a special civil grand jury and procedure for prelitigation
consideration of personal injury and wrongful death claims for damages
arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide hospital or
medical care in the state of Idaho, which proceedings shall be informal
and nonbinding, but nonetheless compulsory as a condition precedent to
.
litigation.
The statute oflimitations is tolled for any claim subject to I.C. § 6-1001 "during the time
that such a claim is pending before such a panel and for thirty (30) days thereafter." I.C. § 61005.
Defendant would argue that the Idaho Heart Institute is not a physician, surgeon, or acute
care general hospital, and that I.C. § 6-1001, and thus § 6-1005, does not apply.
Plaintiffurg~s

this cQurtJQ_adQpt the reasouingJQundjn Eoster_v. Traul,_Bannock County

Case CVPI-O 1-00070-B. In Foster, Judge Smith determined that under the doctrine of
respondeat superior a physician's employer is also a physician for the purposes ofLC. § 30-

1304 and that the tolling provision of I.e. § 6-1005 applies.
Though this court is not bound by the decisions of other district courts, it may consider
such opinions persuasive authority. Respondeat superior requires that "a master, or employer, is
responsible for the torts of his servant, or employee, when they are committed within the scope
of the servant's employment." Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909, 911 (Ct. App. 1982)(citing
Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 46 Idaho 334 (1928»).

Here Drs. Chambers and Demos have acknowledged that they are employees of the Idaho
Heart Institute. The advantages of a professional corporation require the law to view the
corporation as a single legal entity; it would be incongruous to treat the professional liability of
the employees separately from the liability of the employer.
Defendants Chambers and Demos are physicians, anfthe Idaho Heart Institute is, for the
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purposes of the statute, a "physician" and the statute of limitation was tolled for the time the
claim was before a pre-litigation panel and for 30 days thereafter.
Mrs. Morgan died February 23,2004; Plaintiff filed the pre-litigation request on January
21,2005. On January 21,2005 Plaintiff had 14 months and 2 days to file the claim under the
statute of limitations. The pre-litigation panel filed its report and recommendation on June 24,
2005. Plaintiff had until September 26, 2006 to file his complaint against Defendants and filed
the complaint on August 3, 2006. The statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiffs claim against
Defendant Idaho Heart Institute.
B. Community Standard of Health Care

Defendants next argue for summary judgment on the groundsihatPlaintiffhas not
produced expert testimony showing a breach of the applicable standard of care.

I.e. § 6-1012 states:
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any
person, brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of
health care, including, without limitation, any dentist, physicians' assistant,
nurse practitioner, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse
anesthetist, medical technologist, physical therapist, hospital or nursing
home, or any person vicariously liable for the negligence of them or any of
them, on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care or on
account of any matter incidental or related thereto, such claimant or
plaintiff must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief affirmatively
prove by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the
competent evidence, that such defendant then and there negligently failed
to meet the applicable standard ofhealth care practice of the community
in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided, as such
standard existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence of such
physician and surgeon, hospital or other such health care provider and as
such standard then and there existed with respect to the class of health care
provider that such defendant then and there belonged to and in which
capacity he, she or it was functioning.
Defendants correctly read I.e. § 6-1012 to require Plaintiff to prove that Defendants
failed to meet the local standard of care through expert opinion testimony.
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Plaintiff has presented an affidavit of Dr. Jay Schapira, a cardiologist practicing in Los
Angeles. Idaho law requires expert witnesses from outside the state to "possess actual knowledge
of the local community standard. Ifhe is board certified in the same specialty, he must, at a
minimum, inquire of a local specialist to determine wl1ether the community standard varies from
the national standard for that board-certified specialty." Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 216
(1989)(citing Buck v. St. Clair, 108 Idaho 743 (1985)). The Idaho Supreme Court has also said
an out-of-state physician may become familiar with the local community standard of care by "a
review of a deposition stating that the local standard does not vary from the national standard,
coupled with the expert's personal knowledge of the national standard." Grover v. Smith 137
Idaho 24 7, 25J _(2002)(qUQtingJ)el"r)! v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med Ctr.,! 34 IdahoA6,51.,52
(2000)).
Dr. Schapira is a board certified cardiologist, and he has inquired of a local physician to
determine that the local standard does not vary from the national standard. Additionally, Dr.
Schapira has reviewed the Defendant physicians' depositions where they stated that the local
standard does not very from the national standard. Dr. Schapira's affidavit meets the
requirements of I.e. § 6-1012 and Strode and Grover.
Dr. Schapira's affidavit is based on his personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
C. Informed Consent
-,

Defendants seek Summary Judgment of Plaintiff's claim for lack of informed consent,
contending that Idaho law requires expert testimony on the community standard for consent.
Plaintiff seeks to recover on a theory of lack of informed consent, arguing that Mrs. Morgan was
not informed of the risks associated with an angiogram or ofreasonable medical alternatives to
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the procedure.
To establish a claim for lack of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove three elements:
nondisclosure, causation, and injury. Sherwoodv. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 257 (1991).
Defendants argue that without expert testimony Plaintiff has not established the nondisclosure
element of the claim.
Under I.e. § 39-4506, consent is valid if:
[T]he physician or dentist to whom it is given or by whom it is secured has made
such disclosures and given such advice respecting pertinent facts and
considerations as would ordinarily be made and given under the same or similar
circumstances, by a like physician or dentist of good standing practicing in the
same community.
Defendants argue Jhat I.e. §3 9-4506 requires plaintiffsin aTI.-informed consentcase to
present expert testimony to establish a violation of the local community standard of disclosure.
Defendants contend that I.e. § 39-4506 is akin to the local community standard of care
requirements for I.e. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. However, with I.e. § 6-1012 the legislature
explicitly requires plaintiffs to present expert testimony in order to pursue a medical malpractice
claim. No such limitation exists in statute for a claim for lack of informed consent.
Additionally, Defendants are unable to cite any Idaho cases that would support the notion
that every informed consent claim must be accompanied by expert testimony.
Defendants cite several cases from other jurisdictions to support their argument. Even
among the cases cited by Defendants, courts are split in their requirements for expert testimony
to pursue a claim for informed consent. In Illinois, expert testimony is required unless the matter
is one of common knowledge or within the experience of the layman. Weekley v. Solomon, 510
N.E.2d 152 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987). In Pennsylvania, expert testimony is only "required to establish

the existence ofrisks in a specific medical procedure, the existence of alternative methods of
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treatment and the existence of risks attendant with such alternatives. " Festa v. Greenburg, 511
A.2d 1371, 1376 (Pa. Supp. 1986)(emphasis in original). In some jurisdictions, expert testimony
is never required to establish the scope of the physician's duty to disclose. Festa, 511 A.2d at
1376 (citing Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W.Va. 1982); Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 589
P.2d 180 (1978); Sardv. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977». In Florida and Arizona
expert testimony is apparently always required. ld. (citing Thomas v. Berrios, 348 So.2d 905
(Fla.App.1979); Rodriquez v. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 13,574 P.2d 481 (1977».
Here, the question of when Idaho law requires expert testimony is moot, because Plaintiff
has presented expert testimony on the issue of informed consent. In his affidavit, Dr. Schapira
concludes, after having reviewed their depositions, thatDefendants failed to properly inform
Mrs. Morgan ofthe dangers of the angiogram and of viable alternatives to the procedure. It is not
necessary for the purposes of this case to determine whether Idaho law requires expert testimony
to establish the scope of a physician's duty to disclose, as Plaintiff has met any possible
requirement to do so. Dr. Schapira's affidavit satisfies the undoubtedly more stringent criteria for
out-of-state expert testimony set forth both in Idaho statute and case law for expert witnesses in a
medical malpractice case; there is no indication that some other limitation prevents his testimony
on this issue.

D. Plaintiff's Request for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff urges the court to grant summary judgment on the issue of community standard
of care, arguing that Defendants failed to set forth specific facts in their depositions. Courts "may
grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion
with the court. A motion for summary judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed
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before it as a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that the court will find against it."
Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677 (2001).

Reviewing the affidavits of Defendants shows that they have sworn to specific facts
regarding their training and treatment of Mrs. Morgan sufficient to establish a genuine issue of
fact for trial.

IV.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's request for summary judgment is DENIED.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORD~JlliD.

Dated this ~ day of August, 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this d.-t:> day of August, 2008, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.
Attorney for Plaintiff

Lowell N. Hawkes
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Attorney for Defendants

Matthew F. McColl
Quane Smith
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83}Ql
Ronald Longmore
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

by

~cp- t QJo.QtQ c!
Deputy Clerk
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BOIl
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852)
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775)
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Telephone: (208) 235-1600
FAX: (208) 235-4200
Attorneys for Plaintiff

28 Pl1 3= 55

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling

MARVIN F. MORGAN,

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS,
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.;
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.;

Defendants.

)
)

Case No. CV-06-4332

PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT
WITNESS DISCLOSURE

~

)
)

Plaintiff disclose his expert witnesses as follows:
• Jay N. Schapira, M.D. FACC, FCCP, FACP, JNS Consultants, Cedars
Sinai Medical Office Towers, 8635 West Third Street, Suite 750W, Los Angeles, CA
90048; Phone: (310) 659-2030; and
• William J. Flynn, B.S., D-ABFDE, Affiliated Forensic Laboratories,
3030 North Central Avenue, Suite 501, Phoenix, AZ 85012; Phone (602) 241-1890.
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DATED this 25 th day of November, 2008.
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED

CERTifiCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on 25 th day of November, 2008 I faxed a copy of the
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane and Matthew F. McColl of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth
Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O. Box 519, Boise, Idaho 83701,
FAX 208-345-8660.
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Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852)
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775)
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Telephone: (208) 235-1600
FAX: (208) 235-4200
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling

MARVIN F. MORGAN,

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS,
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.;
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.;

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
~
)

Case No. CV-06-4332

PLAINTIFF'S

SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT
WITNESS DISCLOSURE

)
)

Plaintiff disclose his expert witnesses as follows:
• JayN. Schapira, M.D. FACC, FCCP, FACP, JNS Consultants, Cedars
Sinai Medical Office Towers, 8635 West Third Street, Suite 750W, Los Angeles, CA
90048; Phone: (310) 659-2030;
• William J. Flynn, B.S., D-ABFDE, Affiliated Forensic Laboratories,
3030 North Central Avenue, Suite 501, Phoenix, AZ 85012; Phone: (602) 241-1890; and
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• Gary E. Ellwein, M.D., Pathology Associates of Idaho Falls, 3100
Channing Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83404, Phone: (208) 529-6050.
DATED this 26th day of November, 2008.
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 26 th day of November, 2008 I faxed a copy of the
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane and Matthew F. McColl of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth
Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O. Box 519, Boise, Idaho 83701,
FAX 208-345-8660.
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COUNTY.

Lowell N. Hawkes (rSB #1852)
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775)
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Telephone: (208) 235-1600
FAX: (208) 235-4200
Attorneys for Plaintiff

ID/\/-W

DEr. - I Pii 12: 1: 6

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling

MARVIN F. MORGAN,

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS,
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.;
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.;

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
~
)

Case No. CV-06-4332

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND

SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT
WITNESS DISCLOSURE

)
)

Plaintiff discloses his expert witnesses as follows:
• Jay N. Schapira, M.D. FACC, FCCP, FACP, INS Consultants, Cedars
Sinai Medical Office Towers, 8635 West Third Street, Suite 750W, Los Angeles, CA
90048; Phone: (310) 659-2030;
• William J. Flynn, B.S., D-ABFDE, Affiliated Forensic Laboratories,
3030 North Central Avenue, Suite 501, Phoenix, AZ 85012; Phone: (602) 241-1890;
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• Gary E. Ellwein, M.D., Pathology Associates ofIdaho Falls, 3100
Channing Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83404, Phone: (208) 529-6050, and
• Michael Denyer, M.D., Mountain States Cardiovascular, 2860 Channing
Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83404, Phone: (208) 535-4600.
DATED this 26 th day of November, 2008.
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 26 th day of November, 2008 I faxed a copy of the
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane and Matthew F. McColl of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth
Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O. Box 519, Boise, Idaho 83701,
FAX 208-345-8660.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVINF. MORGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, MD,
et aI,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

OJ

Case No. CV -2006-4332
!
\0

MINUTE ENTRY ON
MOTION HEARING

)

On December 8, 2008, at 9:00 A.M., a Motion to Continue Trial came on for hearing
beforeJhe Honor_a.bleJonJ.Shilldllfling, Pistrict Jlldge,si1tingil1 open court at Idaho Falls,
Idaho.
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court Clerk, were
present.
Mr. Lowell Hawkes was present on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. Matthew McColl was
present telephonically on behalf of the defendants.
Mr. McColl presented argument on the Motion to continue trial.
Mr. Hawkes argued in aggravation and only wished to continue to the trial ifthe defense
stipulated to an unfair advantage if the plainti ff died in the interim before trial.
The Court offered a date on March 30,2009. The case will take two (2) weeks to try. The
Court will continue this trial and conditionally set the case for jury trial on March 30, 2009 at
1:30 PM. Pretrial conference is set on March 9, 2009 at 10:15 AM. The Motion to Continue is
GRANTED. The Motion to Compel is set for hearing as scheduled on January 12,2009 at 10:30
AM.
Court was thus adjourned.

J. SHINDURLING

c: Lowell Hawkes
Matthew McColl

MINUTE ENTRY - 1
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977
Matthew F. McColl, ISB No. 6005
Angela K. Hermosillo, ISB No. 7425
QUANE SMITH LLP
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVIN F. MORGAN,

Case No. CV-06-4332

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D.

vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C.,
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants the Idaho Heart Institute, P.C., Michael A. Demos,
M.D. and John D. Chambers M.D. by and through their counsel of record, and move this
Court for an order excluding the testimony of Jay Schapira, M.D. Defendants soberly move
for this order, on the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiff has failed to provide counsel
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and this Court with necessary information relating to Dr. Schapira's unparalleled testimonial
history.
This motion is based upon and supported by the Memorandum in Support
thereof, filed contemporaneously herewith; the Affidavit of Counsel in Support thereof, filed
contemporaneously herewith; the pleadings and files on record; as well as the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, including but not limited to, Rule 26 and 37 and the Idaho Rules of
Evidence, including but not limited to, Rule 701 through 705.
The Court has previously set a hearing on Defendants' Motions in Limine and
Defendants are ready, willing and prepared to have this motion heard at that time, as it is
a proper pre-trial matter. Defendants so move pursuant to I.Re.p. Rule 6 that this Motion
be heard at that 2:00 p.m. March 24, 2009.
DATED this 20 th day of March, 2009.
QUANE SMITH LLP

By~~

______________________

tthew F. McColl, Of the Firm
orneys for Defendants

08G
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAP/RA, M.D. - 2

141029/045

03/20/2009 14:08 FAX

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of March, 2009, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA,
M.D. by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Lowell N. Hawkes
Ryan S, Lewis
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHTD.
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho
Telephone (208) 235-1600
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ J Hand-Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[X] Facsimile (208) 235-4200

r

ij

Matthew F. McColl
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISS No. 977
Matthew F. McColl, ISS No. 6005
QUANE SMITH LLP
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVIN F. MORGAN,

Case No. CV-06-4332

Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, MD.

vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, MD.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C.,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
: SS.

County of Ada

)

COMES NOW Matthew F. McColl, having been first duly sworn upon oath
and deposes:
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AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA,
M.D. -1

i4J 031/045

1.

I am an attorney with the law firm Quane Smith LLP! counsel of record

for Defendants John A. Chambers, Michael D. Demos and the Idaho Heart Institute, P.A.
The information and facts testified herein are based upon your Affiant's own first-hand and
personal knowledge.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Court

transcript for Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time/Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(f)
April 28, 2008, which was ordered by Plaintiffs counsel.
3.

Your Affiant has endeavored to learn some of the testimonial history

of Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jay Schapira.
4.

Your Affiant has securecltweLve (12) depositionLtriaitranscripts from

the year 2004 forward.
5.

A careful review of the twelve (12) transcripts from 2004 forward

reveals that none of them relate to allegations relating to breach of the standard of practice
in an angiogram or catheter procedure.

6.

Additionally, your Affiant has secured additional information relating

to Dr. Schapira's past testimonial history, which reflects that in at least twenty one (21)
other cases, Dr. Schapira has been retained relating to allegations that a physician
breached the standard of practice relative to the performance of an angiogram or the use
of a catheter. Your Affiant does not have copies of the depositions of those twenty one

(21) cases.
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FURTHER your Affiant saith naught.

Matthew

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20 th day of March, 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20lh day of March, 2009, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D. by delivering the same to each of the following, by the
method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Lowell N. Hawkes
Ryan S. Lewis
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHTD.
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Telephone (208) 235-1600
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[Xl Facsimile (208) 235-4200

Matthew F. McColl

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY
M.D. - 3
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~
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Exhibit A
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

MARVIN F. MORGAN,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

Case No. CV-06-4332

)

MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M. D . "
)
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR., M.D.;
)
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.,)
)

Defendants.

)

-------------------------------------------)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME/
MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f)
APRIL 28, 2008

IDAHO FALLS, BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING

COpy

NANCY MARLOW, CSR
Official Court Reporter
605 North Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho
83402
TELEPHONE (208) 529~1350 Ex. 1194
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7
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FOR THE DEFENDANT:

MATTHEW F. MCCOLL, ESQ.
Quane Smith, LLP
101 South Capitol Boulevard
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1

1

2

2
3
4
5
6
1
8
9
10
11
12
13

plaintiff's motion to shorten time and motion for
relief pursuant to Rule 56(f).
MR. HAWKES: Thank you, Your Honor.
The impetus of this involves a summary judgment
motion that was filed basically on the basis of two

of eight depositions
before the end of trial. And that's just a few of the
things I was dealing With.

THE COURT: All right. We'll go on the record
in Bonneville County Case No. CV-06-4332, Morgan

3
4

versus Michael Alexander Demos, et a!. Present on

5

behalf of the plaintiff is Lowell Hawkes. Present on
behalf of the defendant is Matthew McColl. This is
the time set for hearing with regard to the

6

hearing notice, I called Dr. Shapira, our expert

7
8

cardiologist, at Cedars Sinai, talked to his
scheduler. He was gone at the time. My first chance

9

to talk with him was Saturday afternoon, April 12th.

10
11

And so the next week I talked with Matt. And I said,
Matt, I was not able to talk with Dr. Shaplra until

12

the 12th. He's gone the first two weeks of May. I'm

13

gOing to be gone to Boston. I'm not coming back until

So what we have done is, as soon as we got that

14

affidavits that were conc/usory, saying, we know the

14

this last Thursday. That essentIally would give me

15

standard and we didn't do anything wrong. And it was

15

one day to get what, at a minimum, is two affidavits.

16

flied in the latter part of November, as I recall. We

16

And I asked if they could accommodate a change of one

11

had just finished up a malpractice trial here. And

18
19

after the posttrial motions we got wound up in
December, we noticed up the depositions of the

17
18

month, to the 12th of June. We had previously talked
about just kicking it one week after my federal trial.

20

defendants.

21
22
23

Jerry Quane wrote me back and said that was

19

And Matt said he would talk with Jerry Quane. And I

20
21

got a response back that they wouldn't agree to it, so
we filed this Rule 56(f) motion.

kind of short for him under all the circumstances,
could r work with him on it? And I said, sure. 1

22

24

told him just to give me some dates that we can both

24

got an expert in Phoenix and an expert in Los Angeles,

25

agree on. My letter said, you know, vacating those

25

and they need more time.

23

I'd ask to be given a month extension. I'm in
no position to file responsive affidavits today. I've

4

r need

more time. I would

6

1

also assumes equal consideration as to your filed but

1

like to give Your Honor a Quality product. They

2
3

not noticed motion. We just want adequate time after
the depositions to respond to that motion. Your

4
5

confirming letter to that effect will be appreCiated.
And we got through in late February. We had

2
3
4
5

haven't claImed any prejudice here. But I would also
like a chance, if necessary, after the meet and confer
requirement with counsel, to come before Your Honor,
because there's some pretty hostility to discovery

6

the depositions of the entity and Dr. Chambers, but

that we're seeking, hostilities to some pretty basic
things. We may be able to work that out. But just
like I mentioned, depositions seem to yield new

7

the defense hadn't even filed an answer to the

6
7

8

Complaint until six days after those first two

8

9

depositions, and they weren't able to give me

9
10
11

things.
When I took Dr. Chambers' deposition, on
February 20th, we talked about a lady by the name of

10

Dr. Demos' deposition in Durango, Colorado, until

11
12

March 17th.
As Your Honor knows, each deposition generally

12

Lori Brown. And in that depOSition, Dr. Chambers told

13

raises new things that have to be pursued, either

13

me, well, she, Lori Brown, was just probably helping

14
15

through follow-up depositions or discovery. And we
have done both.

14
15

in the recovery area after work. That's after
somebody has had an angiogram, and they go to a

16

For instance, on -- we had the motion relative

separate area of that facility.
Well, what was learned Friday, when Ryan took
the deposition of Sandi Christensen -- and that

17

to our document expert, and it was in that setting

16
17

18

that a hearing date for the summary judgment came up.

18

19
20

As I came to court that day to argue the motion

19

deposition resulted from when I took Bruce Crawford's

relative to getting access to the original documents,

21
22
23
24
25

Mr. McColl hadn't mentioned to me that they were going
to seek a hearing date. I didn't have a calendar with
me. I'm kind of amazed that I totally missed it when
we originally got the May 5th date. I had a federal
felony trial scheduled; and jf that went, a backup

20
21

deposition. You may remember, Your Honor, that
Bruce Crawford was a wItness to the consent document

22
23
24
25

that we have a question on. And when I took
Bruce Crawford's deposition in Salt Lake, I learned
that the time that's written on there, even though he
was a witness, he didn't write it in. But he thought

5
1 of 5 sheets

7
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1

that was Sandi Christensen.

deposition was

1

of 2006.

ing contained in the rules or

2

taken last Friday. She

2

suggests he gets to run after every

3

it. But just like the other depositions, what came up

3

single fox to try and figure out whether there's some

4
5
6

there is that Lori Brown wasn't just back in the

4

question of fact.

recovery area. She was apparently right there at the
time of the emergency, and so I want to take her

5
6

that, becaUSE! the Idaho Supreme Court has told him

7
8

deposition. And to the extent that the
Bruce Crawford's deposition also showed us on their

7
8

that emphatically in Foster v. Traul. Those
affidavits are affidavits that every Single medical

9

log, the timeline in this case becomes very relevant

9

malpractice lawyer in the state sees every single

that she signed

The affidavits are not conclusory. He knows

10
11
12

and very important. And we're finding changes,

13

was the manager of the cath lab, on the cath lab log,

14

15
16
17
18
19

avoiding another 30(b)(6) to have the Heart Institute

19

with an affidavit. And that's only on the Issue as to

20

tell me, on that log, What's that number mean? Who

20

the standard of health care practice and informed

21

put it in there? Because nobody can tell me.

22

Now, what I would prefer in this case,

21
22

There is not one single element in all of this

23

Your Honor, is that we not be put, as the plaintiffs,

23

surplusage that Mr. Hawkes is mentioning that has

10
11

inconsistency in documents.
Bruce Crawford, even though it appeared that he

time. If it was not Mr. Hawkes' burden to have an
expert witness in his camp when he filed this

12

complaint, it was his burden to have an expert witness

13

when he started prosecuting this matter per 6-1012.

there's an entry that is supposed to show in minutes

14

If it wasn't his burden to do it then, it was his

and seconds how much radiation Mrs. Morgan got. And

15

there's, as I recall, a five or a six digit number,

16

burden to do it when r filed my motion for summary
judgment on November 20th of 2007.

but he has no idea whose handwriting it is, what the

17

number means or anything. And so I don't see myself

18

All of this delay is for nothing. My clients
are ready to go. Dr. Shapira should have come forward

consent with respect to Dr. Demos and Dr. Chambers.

24

in a position of a double standard as to discovery.

24

anything to do with whether or not the plaintiff filed

25

The deposItion of Dr. Demos disclosed that literally

25

his complaint against the Idaho Heart Institute on

10

8

time. That's an issue that we can address two weeks

the month after Mrs. Morgan's angiogram, the insurance

1
2
3
4
5

company retained the defense, and they were involved

2

from today. Under the standard, under the statute,

in the case. So they've had four years of discovery
free reign to look at things, and I don't want to
waive discovery. I would prefer, in this case, that

3

there was a two-year limIt to file the complaint

4

against the Idaho Heart Institute, and they didn't do

5

it.

6

we have a trial date with discovery cutoff and a full

S

There's -- the rules are here for a reason,

7

opportunity before we have to deal with summary

7

Your Honor. You know, it's my position that I don't

B

judgment motions. We don't have any sort of a

8

have to show prejudice in order to get a motion that 1

9

scheduling order in this case yet, and I would really

10

request that we try to do that. But my specific

9
10

filed on Thanksgiving heard before Mother's Day. The
motion for summary judgment has a 28-day limit. He

11

motion said the time I minimally need, given

11

got six weeks after we set the hearing. He's going to

12

Dr. Shaplra being gone the first two weeks of May, is

12

have six months after we set the motion. There's

13

a month on the May 12th date to June 12th. And I ask

13

nothing in his affidavit that supports that any of

14

for that, Your Honor. There's nothing that they have

14

this information that he is seeking Is relevant, and I

15

responded to that suggests any prejudice on their

15

think, Your Honor, you should deny the motion.

part.

16

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

THE COURT: Rhonda, can I have the calendar?

17

Anything else, Mr. Hawkes?

All right. Mr. McColl?

18

MR. HAWKES: Yes, Your Honor.

16
17
18
19

MR. MCCOLL: Thank you, Your Honor.

19

20

There's not one thing that Mr. Hawkes

20

Lest the Court be misled, counsel has misstated
the truth here. I did not just go looking for

21

mentioned, with all of those things contained in his

21

Dr. Shapira after they filed the hearing notice. I,

22

affidavit, not one of those things Is remotely

22

In fact, did have a relationship with him prior to

23

relevant. The only thing relevant that was mentioned

23

filing this case, and so I notified his office,

24

was that Dr. Shapira was just contacted about two

24

Susan Anderson, as soon as they sought this date. And

25

weeks ago. Mr. Hawkes filed his complaint in August

25

what I told you in my affidavit was true. I was not

11

9
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amen, and we're done. And the

1

able to talk to him. These

people. Both of

1

standard of

2

our experts are people that

ny things going on,

2

3

4
5

and I was not able to talk to him until Saturday,
Aprit 12th. But the things that in meeting with an
expert they want you to find out and that are things

3
4

up or shut up.
plaintiff has
I'm willing -- usually willing to give
plaintiff a little bit of latitude in getting that

5

done, because it does take some time to take these

6
7

that are still coming. It's not his job to define
what may be relevant for us to prove our case.

S

Now, I don't have a problem if we want to just

6

depositions and then get the expert to digest that

7

material and make a presentation.
I don't think there's been any undue delay here

S

9

argue the motion relative to the statute of limitation

9

10
11

on the entity. The essence of that motion is that the
entity is not subject to the pre-litigation process,

10
11

address these issues. Standard of care is something

12

so there's no tol/ing. And I dealt with that before,

13
14

and they had a chance to appeal that, and they didn't.
The way I see it shaking down is, if doctors

12
13

that can be fairly easily addressed up front, if
you've got the goods. But I will grant a continuance

15

choose to practice medicine only in an entity named,

14
15

on this for -- can we hear it on the 9th of June?
That's my hearing date.

that I have seen, but I'm not going to let you go,
Mr. Hawkes, until the discovery is closed before we

16

and that's the evidence in this case, they're

16

17

employees. They do nothing except in the entity name.

17

18

Their entity is subject to the pre-lit, and there's

19

tolling there. I'm sure if we filed a complaint

18
19

20

against the entity, we would get hit with a tolling

20

MR. HAWKES: Okay.

21

deal, if we did it before pre-lit. I don't mind doing

21

THE COURT: Well, I've got to hear it early in

22

that before. But what I don't want to do is to be in

22

23

a position where, as is happening here, they are

23

the month. Otherwise, we're going to have to go to
July.

24
25

essentially dictating my discovery rights in the face
of us not having a discovery scheduling cutoff. And I

24
25

MR. MCCOLL: The 9th is perfect for me,
Your Honor. I start a two-week trial -- Jerry and I

MR. HAWKES: I could do that if we could give
me the same filing dates as if it were the 12th.
Could you live with that, Matt?
MR. MCCOLL: No.

12

1

just want a full chance.

2

3

1

start a two-week trial the next day. So we should

THE COURT: Well, thank you. I appreciate

2

hear it on the 9th. That would be six months.

3

THE COURT: Okay. Let's hear it.

First of all, I'll grant the motion to shorten

4
5

And what's your problem with the time?
MR. HAWKES: Well, could you look on your

that.

4
5

14

time as to this hearing today, Since we're here.

6

Now, as to the continuance, it seems to me that

7

the motion for summary judgment, as is presented, is a

8
9

r think you've got in

limited one; that is, this is a standard of care. And
there the consent issue.

10
11
12

MR. MCCOLL: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And then the entity issue, which is
not terribly complicated. But the standard of care

13

is, to some extent. It requires the digesting of some

14
15

of the material.
Frankly, I'm not going to hold off. And I get

16

counsel all the time saying, hold off on allowing

17

summary judgment until the discovery is closed. Well,

1B

that's not going to happen. Summary judgment can be

19

filed at any time that there is a -- that it's

20

propitious, under the circumstances of the case, to

21
22
23

raise the issue of whether or not there's an issue of
law which is determinative in the case. And in
medical malpractice cases, you always have this

24
25

threshold of standard of care. Frankly, it's fairly
easy for the defendants to come in and say, we met the

6

calendar and tell me what two weeks back from that

7

would be? Your eyes are good enough, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The 9th of June would be the

8
9
10

27th of -- no, excuse me.
MR. MCCOLL: The 26th of May, Your Honor.

11
12

THE COURT: 26th of May.
MR. MCCOLL: It's a month from now.

13
14
15

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. HAWKES: 1 know I'm in Michigan -THE COURT: So it would be -- the 27th would be

16
17

your deadline.
MR. HAWKES: I'll make it work, Your Honor, you

18
19
20

know.
THE COURT: Let's do that. That's three days
early. But as I say, if I get later in the week, I'm

21

going to be into my criminal calendar, and that makes

22
23
24
25

it difficult.
MR. HAWKES: That's fine.
THE COURT: So the 9th at -- let's do it at
9;00. r may have another medical malpractice trial

13
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1

going at that time. We'll try

2

in the day.
conference, Your Honor, and set a trial date? Courd
we do that?
THE COURT: Do you have a calendar with you

6

7
8

today, Mr. McColl?
MR. HAWKES: Why don't we do that on the 9th?

9

That would be fine. You could bring your calendar,

10

1

2

MR. HAWKES: Could we have a scheduling

3

4
5

it in earlier

Matt, and I'll bring mine.

3
4

5
6
7
8
9

10

11

MR. MCCOLL: Let's do it on the 9th,

11

12

Your Honor. 1 don't have Jerry Quane's calendar.

12

13

He's in trial.

13
14
15

THE COURT: All right. Let's do it the 9th,

14

15
16
17

then.
Set it for status conference that day, as well,
Madam Clerk.

16
17

18

Bring calendars. All right.

18

19

MR. MCCOLL: Thank you, Your Honor.

19

20

THE COURT: Thank you.

20

21
22

21
(Proceedings Concluded)

22

23

23

24

24
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25

16

18

1

1

2
3
4

2
3
4
5

5

6

6

7

7

8

8
9

9
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11
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12
13

13

14

14
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15
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Jeremiah A. Quane, IS8 No. 977
Matthew F. McColl. IS8 No. 6005
Angela K. Hermosillo, IS8 No. 7425
QUANE SMITH LLP
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P.O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVIN F. MORGAN,

Case No. CV-06-4332

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUMIN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D.

vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C ..
Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff has failed to comply with requests for the testimonial history of Jay
Schapira, M.D. Given Dr. Schapira's status as a professional witness, that failure has is
not justifiable, is prejudicial and Defendants request that he be excluded from testifying.
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II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
On October 19, 2006 Plaintiff was served, by U.S. Mail with Defendant Idaho
Heart Institute's First Set of Interrogatories. See Affidavit of Counsel RE: Trial Brief, filed
March 13,2009. Those Interrogatories clearly asked for the name and address of each
person Plaintiff intended to call as an expert witness in the trial of this matter, as well as
"the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify ... the substance of the facts
and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify ... [and] the underlying facts and
data upon which the expert opinions are based, in conformity with Rule 705, Idaho Rules
of Evidence." See Interrogatory No.8, Exhibit A, Supra.
Plaintiff responded within three days, by saying he did not know yet who he
would cal! but that the "Answer will be supplemented upon determination of those experts
which Plaintiff intends to call as an expert witness at the triaL" See Exhibit B, supra.
Then, on January 3, 2007, both Dr. Demos and Dr. Chambers served, by
mail interrogatories, which mirror the new Rule 26. Both of those requests read:
INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please state the
name and address of each person whom you
intend to call as an expert witness at the trial,
and for each such person set forth a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and
the basis and reasons therefore, the data or
other information considered by the witness in
forming the opinions, any exhibits to be used as
a summary of or support for the opinions, a list of
all publications authored by the witness within
the preceding ten years, the compensation to be
paid for the testimony and a listing of any other
cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert at trial or by deposition within the
preceding four years.
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See Interrogatories No.8, to Exhibits C and 0 to the Trial Brief Affidavit,

supra.
The extent of Plaintiffs response has been limited to answering Drs. Demos
and Chambers interrogatories by saying he'd not decided on witnesses, but would
supplement later; the Affidavits of Flynn and Schapira and the Plaintiffs identification of
witnesses. See Exhibits E-J, Supra,
In addition to not providing a proper statement of Dr. Schapira's opinions,
with bases, and the data considered; importantly, Plaintiff has not set forth Dr. Schapira's
four years of testimonial history, nor the rate of his compensation.
Jay Schapira, M.D. is a professional expert witness from California. It may
not be known, ever, how many times he has been retained to give expert opinions in
medical malpractice matters or give depositions or testify at trial or arbitration. He appears
to have made a rather healthy living saying all manner of things about doctors throughout
the country, while keeping close to the vest the true extent of the scope of his testimonial
industry.
Plaintiffs Counsel has had a relationship with Dr. Schapira, that predated this
case: "I did not just go looking for Dr. Schapira after they filed the hearing notice. I, in fact,
did have a relationship with him prior to filing this case, .. ," See Transcript of Hearing on
Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time/Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(f) , p.11, II 20-22,
Appended as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Exclude, filed
contemporaneously herewith.
Though Plaintiff refused to supply Counsel and the Court with information
relating to his testimonial history, Defense counsel, at Defendants' expense, has
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endeavored to learn some of that information. See Affidavit of Counsel, supra. In fact,
Defendants' counsel have 12 depositions/trial transcripts from 2004 forward. Id. Not one
of these testimonial records involves a case in which the allegation is that a doctor
breached the standard of practice in an angiogram procedure. Id.
While Defendants attempted to use their own means to obtain what was
requested and refused from Plaintiff, the scope of the effect of Plaintiffs refusal is now too
great a burden and too prejudicial to allow. Upon review of a U.S. District Court opinion
from March of 2008, Defendants now know that they have not even seen the tip of the
iceberg.
In Bondv. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1988'1 (Ore. 2008), Judge
Robert Jones issued an opinion following a Court trial. (The case is appended). In the trial,
Dr. Schapira was identified as an expert for the Plaintiff, and he testified. Judge Jones
found that Dr. Schapira was "a very experienced medical/legal expert witness who charges
$10,000 per day and who has testified at trial more than 100 times in his career, at least
20 times between 2000 and 2005. In 2005 he testified in depositions as many as 42 times

.... " Id. at *12 (emphasis added). Judge Jones, understandably. expected Dr. Schapira
to "be extremely careful in presenting his testimony in his Rule 26 report .... " Id. at *13.
Obviously, either Dr. Schapira. or Plaintiff have not been here.
Assuming that Dr. Schapira has kept up the testimonial pace observed by
Judge Jones. through 2006, 2007, 2008, there would be greater than 165 depositions
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given, and several, if not dozens of trials. Defendants can not even begin to know how
many of these involved angiograms, but suspect that it could be dozens, if not more. 1
This is not, then, a simple case of Plaintiff hiding the ball and Defendants
working harder to find it. This is an expert who has made a career of this type of work, and
whose success must depend on his ability to keep from view all that he has said in
hundreds of cases.
III. EXCLUSION IS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION
FOR PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT
That Defendants had requested the testimonial history and expert fee
information from Plaintiff is not a secret. Plaintiff, in fact, at least provided a list of cases
in which Mr. Flynn had testified. See Exhibit G, to the Affidavit of Counsel Re: Trial Brief.
Plaintiff cannot be excused from ensuring that a timely and complete list of that information
was forthcoming from Dr. Schapira, a man known to Plaintiff's counsel even before this
case.
Court's interpreting Federal Rule 26, upon which Idaho's rule was modeled
have held that failure to exactly comply with Rule 26 results in automatic exclusion of the
expert. Elgas v. Colorado Belle, 179 F.R.D. 296 (U.S. Dist Nevada 1998). (Attached).
There, a 9 th Circuit court held that a witness whose testimonial history had not been
disclosed should be excluded. Id., 179 F.R.D. at 300. Disclosure of:

1 Counsel for Defendants has now reviewed the information available to him, which they
have secured through their own means. There are at least twenty one (21) cases, identified, in which Dr.
Schapira testified regarding angiograms and/or catheters, unfortunately, there are no depositions or
deposition trial testimony transcripts available relative to those cases.
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Prior recorded testimony is designed to give the
other party access to useful information to meet
the proposed experts' opinions. The proliferation
of marginal or unscrupulous experts will only be
stopped when the other party has detailed
information about prior testimony ... [Plaintiff]
has not shown how the failure to disclose is
substantially justified or harmless.

/d. (emphasis added). See a/so, Waf/ace v. Hounshell. 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 44977 (S.
Dist. Ind. 2008). (Attached).
This Court has already been fully briefed, in Defendants' trial brief, on Idaho
law relating to disclosures of experts, and Defendants would only reiterate that the Idaho
Supreme Court has made it very clear that discovery rules were put in place to prevent the
evils of non-disclosure and compliance with those rules is needed for the other side to
prepare effective cross-examination. See, Radmer v. Ford, 120 Idaho 86,89,813 P.2d
897,900 (1991).
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants are faced with an expert whose testimonial history over the last
4 years is expansive, if not unparalleled. Plaintiff has not provided one single case in
which the expert has testified, although there are at least 42, and perhaps hundreds.
Though Defendants, through their own work. have managed to uncover some of that 4
years of testimony, they do not have anything that speaks to the issues of this case.
Defendants have every reason to believe that Dr. Schapira has so testified. At this stage,
Plaintiff has run out of time, and his failure to comply with a request for information, which
is the /ynchpin of effective cross-examination is prejudicial to the point of damning the
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effective cross of this witness. Defendants respectfully submit that Dr. Schapira must be
excluded and so move.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2009.
QUANE SMIT

LLP

By____-+~-----------------Matthew F. McColl, Of the Firm
Attomeys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of March, 2009, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D. by delivering the same to each of the following, by
the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Lowell N. Hawkes
Ryan S. Lewis
LOWELL

N.

HAWKES, CHTD.

1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho
Telephone (208) 235-1600
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 235-4200

Matthew F. McColl
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.·LexisNexis·
LEXSEE 179 F.R.D 296
MARY ELGAS, Plaintiff, vs. COLORADO BELLE CORP., d/b/a COLORADO
BELLE HOTEL AND CASINOj and DOES I through XXV, Defendants.
CV-S-96-347 -LDG-(RJJ)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA

179 F.R.D. 296; 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7205

May 11, 1998, Decided
May 11, 1998, Filed
DISPOSITION:
[** I] Defendant Colorado Belle
Corporation's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness
Designation (# 56) granted in part and denied in part.

COUNSEL: For Plaintiff: Tom Davis, Esq.

expert witnesses. At the request of the parties, the Court
extended [**2J the deadline to August 8, 1997. On August 8, J997, the Plaintiff identified her experts. The disclosure identified James Bass and Dr. Kenneth Jackson,
M.D., , as experts. The disclosure also stated that the
Plaintiff "is investigating the possibility of having a corporate security department expert testify at trial."

For Defendants: Cam Ferenbach, Esq.
JUDGES: Hon. Robert J. Johnston, US Magistrate
Judge.
OPINION BY: Robert 1 Johnston
OPINION

[*297] ORDER
This matter was submined to the undersigned Magistrate Judge on Defendant Colorado Belle Corporation's
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Witness Designation
(# 56). The Court has considered Defendant's Motion to
Strike (# 56), the Defendant's Errata (# 59), the Plaintiff's
Opposition (# 60), and the Defendant's Reply (# 68).
BACKGROUND
On April 13, 1996, the Plaintiff, Mary Elgas, filed
an amended complaint alleging disparate treatment, disparate impact, sexual harassment, retaliation, breach of
contract, violation of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Subsequently, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for tortious
discharge in violation of public policy.
Pursuant to the Court's original Scheduling Order,
the Plaintiff had until February 24, 1997, to designate her

The disclosure indicated that Nurse Practitioner, Joyce Matcham would "testify as to Ms. EIgas' medical condition while she was working at
the Colorado Belle." No other information was
provided regarding Ms. Matcham, including all
items required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
On September 5, 1997, Defendant, Colorado Belle's
attorney sent Plaintiff's counsel a letter saying that the
disclosure was inadequate. The Defendant's objections
were that the Plaintiff failed to name or retain a corporate
security department expert, failed to supply a signed report for Bass or Dr. Jackson, failed to list Dr. Jackson's
qualifications, failed to provide infonnation regarding
publication, prior testimony or exhibits [**3] for either
expert, failed to submit Dr. Jackson's compensation rate,
and failed to give information regarding the basis for
opinions or data considered for the opinions of either
expert.
On September 17, 1997, the Plaintiff served a supplemental disclosure. The supplemental disclosure stated
that "Dr. Jackson andlor Nurse Matcham will testify as to
Ms. Elgas's medical condition while she was working at
the Colorado Belle. . [and thatJ they will also act as
both fact and expert witnesses." Additionally the supplemental disclosure said that "Dr. Jackson's office
treated Ms. Elgas in a time frame which allowed the office to witness and testify to the destructive effects that
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the Colorado Belle's conduct had on Ms. Elgas while she
was working at the Colorado Belle." Since the Plaintiff
states that neither Dr. Jackson [*298] or Matcham has
been retained, the Plaintiff believes no other disclosure
for these two witnesses is necessary.
The Plaintiff attached to the supplemental disclosure
"Mr. Bass's Curriculum Vitae" and an expert report prepared by 8ass. The supplemental disclosure also listed
the compensation for Bass. Moreover, the Plaintiff stated
that "Mr. Bass has previously testified ["*4] about mental health issues in general. He has testified in various
types of cases, but is unable to currently compile a specific list of cases." The Plaintiff advised that she would
disclose the required information for the corporate security department expert upon retention. In response to the
information submitted in the original disclosure and in
the supplement disclosure, the Defendant filed this Motion to Strike (# 56).
DISCUSSION
Rule 26(a)(2)(A) l of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to disclose the identity of all expert witnesses. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) adds that:
(8) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure shall,
with respect to a witness who is retained
or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as
an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and
signed by the witness.

Subsection 8 requires the expert report to contain:
(1) a complete statement of all opinions
to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefor;
(2) the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions;

(3) [H 5]

any exhibits to be used as a
summary of or support for the opinions;
(4) the qualifications of the witness, including a Jist of all publications authored
by the witness within the preceding ten
years;
(5) the compensation to be paid for the
study and testimony; and,

**

(6) a listing of any other cases in which
the witness has testified as an expert at
trial or by deposition within the preceding
four years.

"The rule contemplates two different classes of experts:
those retained or specially employed to give testimony in
the case, and other witnesses who may qualify as an expert but are not retained or specially employed." Piper v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. 173, 174 (D. Nev.
1997). This dichotomy was recognized and explained in
the advisory committee's notes. "The requirement of a
written report in paragraph (2)(B), however, applies only
to those experts who are retained or specially employed
to provide such testimony in the case or whose duties as
an employee of a party regularly involve the giving of
such testimony. A treating physician, for example, can be
deposed or called to testify at trial without any requirement for a written report." Fed. R. eiv. [**6] P. 26 advisory committee's n-otes. Since a treating physician's
opinion on matters such as "causation, future treatment,
extent of disability and the like" are part of the ordinary
care of a patient, a treating physician may testify to such
opinion without being subject to the extensive reporting
requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(8). Piper v. Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. at 174-175. "However, if a physician, even though he may be a treating physician, is specially retained or employed to render a medical opinion
based on factors that were not learned in the course of
the treatment of the patient, then such a doctor would be
required to present an expert written report." H ali v.
Sykes, 164 F.R.D. 46, 48-49 (E.D. Va. 1995); see generally Piper v. Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. at 175
(citing cases that support the requirement that a treating
physician must acquire the opinions through treatment of
a patient); Shapardon v. West Beach Estates, 172 F.R.D.
415,417 (D. Haw. 1997) (concluding that treating physicians' opinions based upon information received from
outside sources, such as an independent medical examination report, would [*299] trigger the report requirement of Rule [**7] 26(a)(2)(B»).

2 Rule 26(a)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part: "a
party shall disclose to other parties the identity of
any person who may be used at trial to present
evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence."
"The reason for requiring expert reports is 'the
elimination of unfair surprise to the opposing party and
the conservation of resources." Reed v. Binder, 165
F.R.D. 424, 429 (D.N.J. 1996) (citations omitted). "The
test of a report is whether it was sufficiently complete,
detailed and in compliance with the Rules so that sur-
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prise is eliminated, unnecessary depositions are avoided,
and costs are reduced." Id Furthermore, Rule
26(a)(2)(B) appears "to require exact compliance in all
particulars with the disclosures" requirement. Sullivan v.
Glock. Inc., 175 F.R.D. 497,503 (D. Md. 1997) (citation
omitted) (declaring "a literal reading of Rules 37(a)(3)
and 37(c)(I) would result in the application of the automatic exclusion of an expert's trial testimony if there was
(*"'8) not complete compliance with the requirements of
Rule 26(a)(2)(B), unless the court finds that there was
substantial justification for the failure to make complete
disclosure or that failure to disclose is hannless").

1. Dr. Kenneth Jackson, M.D.
The Court needs only to decide whether Dr. Jackson

is a treating physician subject to the Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
expert report requirement. According to Plaintiffs supplemental disclosure. Dr. Jackson would testify about the
Plaintiffs medical condition and act as both fact and expert witness. Additionally, Dr. Jackson would testify
abouj thealJeged destructive effects that Colorado Belle's
conduct had on the Plaintiff while she worked at Colorado Belle. The Plaintiff argues that an expert report pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) is unnecessary because Dr.
Jackson is not "retained or specifically employed to provide testimony" and is "a treating physician" The Plaintiff asserts that "Dr. Jackson has not been retained to give
expert testimony, but rather will testifY at trial as a fact
witness, where he may be requested to give testimony to
the area of his expertise, including opinions and the basis
for such opinions." See, e.g., Brown v. Best ["'*9]
Foods, A Division of CPC Int'l, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 385,
388 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (discussing when a physician
receiving compensation for expert testimony is "retained" or "specially employed"); Smith v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 164 F.R.D. 49. 54- 56 (S.D. W.Va.
1995) (discussing when experts who are neither fact witnesses nor treating physicians are not retained).
Treating physicians are not normally subject to the
strict disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Piper
v. Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. at 173-74; Sprague
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 177 F.R.D. 78 CD.N.H.1998)
(stating "the majority of other courts in the country have
concluded that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reports are not required
as a prerequisite to a treating physician expressing opinions as to causation, diagnosis, prognosis and extent of
disability where they are based on the treatment"). "[A]
physician does not need to submit an expert report if
planned testimony was acquired, 'not in preparation for
trial, but rather because he was an actor or viewer with
respect to transactions or occurrences that are a part of
the subject matter of the lawsuit.'" Bucher v. Gainey
Transp Servo of Indiana, Inc., [*"10J 167 F.R.D. 387,
390 (M.D. Pa. 1996). Nonetheless, the Plaintiff cannot
avoid the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reqUirements by simply indi-

**

eating that her expert is a treating physician. Bucher v.
Gamey Transp. Servo of Indiana, Inc, 167 FR.D. at 390.
Here, Dr. Jackson has never met the Plaintiff, but
was the directing physician at the medical clinic visited
by Ms. Elgas. Specifically, the Plaintiff states that "Dr.
Jackson did not personally treat Ms. Elgas, he was consulted, and directed the work of the nurse practitioner
who did treat Ms. Elgas." This is a concern because Dr.
Jackson's actual involvement with the Plaintiff is limited.
A treating physician usually acquires knowledge through
personal treatment of a patient. See Piper V. Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. at 175 (citing cases that state treating physicians generally obtain their opinions through
direct examination, diagnosis, or treatment of a patient).
Since Dr. Jackson did not treat the Plaintiff, Dr. Jackson
is not a typical treating physician. Nevertheless, Dr.
Jackson did playa role in the Plaintiffs treatment when
the nurse practitioner consulted him. Thus, to the extent
that Dr. [*300] Jackson has knowledge of the Plaintiffs
[**11]
medical condition through consultation, Dr.
Jackson is a treating physician and not subject to Rule
26(a)(2)(B) requirements. However, Dr. Jackson should
not be allowed to render a medical opinion based on factors that were not learned in the course of his limited
treatment of the Plaintiff at his clinic.
2. James Bass
The Court should strike the designation of Bass as
an expert, because Bass has not listed other cases in
which he has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. ) An expert's report
must be "detailed and complete." Sierra Club v. Cedar
Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 FJd 546, 571 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. eiv. P. 26 advisory committee's note).
An expert's failure to maintain records
in the ordinary course of his business sufticient to allow the disclosures to be
made, does not constitute "substantial justification" for the failure to provide required disclosures as to any retained expert expected to testifY at the trial of the
case. The requirements of the Rule 26(a)
are mandatory as to any expert retained to
testify. If the expert is unable or unwilling
to make the disclosures he should be excluded as a possibility [** 12] for retention as an expert witness in the case.

Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 675 (D. Kan 1995).
Elgas argues that the she is unable under her current financial situation to find another expert. However, the
Court agrees with Nguyen that "[a) party may not simply
retain an expert and then make whatever disclosures the
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expert is willing or able to make notwithstanding the
known requirements of Rule 26." Id.
3

Nevada Local Rule 26-1 (e)(3) modifies Fed.
R Civ. p, 26(a)(2)(C) to require the disclosure of

experts 60 days before the discovery cut-off date.
That allows time for a party to depose the person
who has been identified as an expert and to designate a rebuttal expert if desired. Discovery, including expert disclosures and depositions, must
be completed within the court-approved discovery period. Discovery is closed in this case.
Eigas infers in her opposition that any undisclosed
information should be excluded at the time of trial. Certainly to the extent prior testimony enhances [*"'13] the
experts' credibility and standing before the fact finder,
plaintiffs suggestion is appropriate, Unfortunately, the
disclosure of prior recorded testimony is designed to give
the other party access to useful information to meet the
proposed experts' opinions, The proliferation of marginal
or unscrupulous experts will only be stopped 'when the
other party has detailed information about prior testimony. The list of other cases in which the witness has
testified as an expert should include the court, the names
of the parties, the case number, and whether the testimony was by deposition or at trial.
Elgas has not shown how the failure to disclose is
substantially justified or harmless. Therefore, the Court
should strike the designation of Bass as an expert.

3. Corporate Security Department Expert
The Court should strike the designation of the unnamed corporate security department expert, because the
Plaintiff has not retained or designated an expert. A party
must provide the names of expert witnesses it expects to
call before the close of discovery. See Derby v. Godfather's Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 1212, 1214 (8th CiT. 1995)

(excluding an expert because the plaintiff failed to timely
[H 14] disclose expert's identity) Elgas has failed to
show how her failure to name this expert is harmless,
Discovery is closed and to allow her to designate a corporate security department expert at this point would be
prejudicial and cause a substantial hardship to the Defendant. Since the Plaintiff has not designated a corporate security department expert, the requirements of the
expert report are not met. To allow the Plaintiff to violate
the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and then to provide
supplemental disclosure after the close of discovery is
prejudicial to the Defendant. Thus, the Court should
strike the Plaintiff's designation of a corporate security
department expert.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing. and good cause appearing
therefore,
[*301] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant
Colorado Belle Corporation's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
Expert Witness Designation (# 56) is granted in part and
denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Colorado Belle Corporation's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Witness Designation (If 56) is granted as to James
Bass and the unknown security department expert.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Colorado Belle Corporation's Motion [** 15] to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness Designation (# 56) is denied as to
Dr. Kenneth Jackson, M.D. and Nurse Praetitioner, Joyce
Matcham.

DATED this IIth day of May, 1998.
ROBERT J. JOHNSTON
United States Magistrate Judge
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OPINION
FTNDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
JONES, Judge
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Pamela L. Bond, the widow of Craig R.
Bond, deceased, and the personal representative of his
estate, brings this Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTC A")
action pursuant to 2B U.S.c. §§ 1346(b) and 2674,
against the United States of America ("defendant") to
recover damages for medical malpractice resulting from
the negligent treatment, wrongful acts, and omissions of
employees at the Portland Veterans Administration
Medical Center ("V AMC"). Complaint (# I) at 2-3. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent
for failing to properly and timely diagnose Bond's cardiac condition; failing to provide him with appropriate
specialty surgical intervention; failing to conduct medically necessary testing prior to his discharge; and [*2)
for improperly discharging him before his dangerous,

life-threatening cardiac condition was properly stabilized. See id. at 6. As a result, plaintiff claims that Bond,
who was 55 years old, suffered an untimely death from
his cardiac condition on September 26, 2005, approximately 48 hours after he was discharged from the
VAMC.
Pursuant to the FTCA, plaintiffs medical malpractice claim was tried to the court, without a jury. The applicable substantive law in this FTCA case is that of the
State of Oregon, where plaintiffs alleged injuries occurred. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 1346(b)(1) and 2672. In Oregon, wrongful death actions are authorized under O.R.S.
§ 30.020, and the standard of care is set forth in O.R.S. §
677.095(1), as follows: "A physician . . . licensed to
practice medicine ... by the Board of Medical Examiners fOT the State of Oregon has the duty to use that degree
of care, skill, and diligence that is used by ordinarily
careful physicians . . . in the same or similar circumstances in the community of the physician ... or a similar community."
The four-day trial commenced on February 5, 2008.
After carefully considering the large volume of medical
literature submitted by both [*3] parties before, during,
and after trial, as weI! as hearing the testimony of sixteen
expert witnesses regarding the liability and damages issues in this case, the court concludes that the physicians
who treated Bond at the V AMC from the time of his
emergency room admission on September 22, 2005, to
the time of his discharge on September 24, 2005, met the
standard of care for physicians in the Portland area. I
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, defendant
did not commit medical malpractice.
I At the end of the trial, the court ruled that the
parties could submit supplemental literature to
address the following question What percentage
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of stenosis would call into play a surgical approach? In particular, the court sought literature
showing the percentage breakdowns of stenosis
correlated with life expectancy (mortality). The
material submitted by plaintiff is listed in Appendix A, and the defendant's submissions are listed
in Appendix B.
SUMMARY OF BOND'S MEDICAL HISTORY
The data contained in Bond's 607-page medical record is not subject to dispute; though the interpretation of
several key tests and the course of treatment the VAMC
doctors chose to address Bond's cardiac condition [*4]
involve a number of judgment calls, which plaintiff contends were not appropriate. It is undisputed that Bond,
who was a combat veteran from the Vietnam conflict,
was permanently disabled from post-traumatic stress
disorder ("PTSD") and hearing loss. There is evidence in
the record that Bond smoked a pack a day of unfiltered
cigarettes for approximately 30 years and had not yet
managed to quit as of the date of his discharge from the
hospitaL See Exhibit P I at 262; and see id. at 170, 174
(discussing cessation counseling at discharge). Bond also
struggled with alcohol abuse; a notation in his medical
records indicates that he reported regularly consuming a
J2-pack of beer per day for 30 years. See ld. However,
his widow testified that she believed his alcohol use declined significantly the past few years. Bond, who was
six feet two inches tall and weighed 240 pounds, was
also borderline obese.
In spite of the health risk factors associated with his
lifestyle choices, Bond did not suffer from any liver disease or iung disorder. In June of 2005, physician progress notes show that he was being treated for PTSD;
depression; upper back, shoulder, and neck pain; hypertension; elevated cholesterol; [*5J and severe gastroesophageal reflux disease ("GERD"). See id. at 264. Additionally, the 2005 progress notes from his primary care
physician show that Bond did not report symptoms of a
serious cardiac ailment before his September admission
to the V AMC. Exhibit P I at 246-277. When Bond visited
the VAMC emergency room for symptoms related to his
GERD on July 16, 2005, an electrocardiogram C"EKG H),
which measures the electrical activity of the heart during
its contractions, showed normal cardiac activity. Id. at
250,550.
It is undisputed that when Bond arrived at the
VAMC emergency room on September 22nd, he was
suffering from acute coronary syndrome (HASCH) and
unstable angina as evidenced by his symptoms of severe
substernal chest pain (reported 10+ on a scale of I to 10),
shortness of breath, sweating, and nausea. See Exhibit PI
at 212,217,238,517. When questioned later during his
admission about his history of chest pain, Bond reported
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for the first time that he had been experiencing episodes
of pain lasting 45 minutes to 5 hours almost daily for the
past two months; that the pain radiated to his shoulders;
that it occurred at rest and with exertion; that it was occasionally associated ["'6] with nausea; and that two
days before he had experienced his most severe episode,
which lasted close to 20 hours and was accompanied by
vomiting and sweating. ld. at 209.
Each of the seven EKGs taken during Bond's
VAMC admission showed abnormal readings indicative
of ischemia, which means that Bond's heart muscle was
suffering from a lack of oxygenated blood; there was
also evidence of an older myocardial infarction (UMI")
that occurred sometime after the July EKG. See id. at
543-547 (EKG test strips). Further testing revealed that
Bond had 1313 pglml of brain natriuretic peptide
("BNP") present in his blood, which is abnormally high
given that the level should have been less than 126
pg/ml. Yd. at 203. All of the cardiology experts agreed
that such a high BNP reading indicated that Bond's heart
muscle suffered some form of stress. However, Bond's
levels of Troponin, a cardiac enzyme that is present
when cell damage or death occurs and is an indicator of a
recent MI, were negligible-- less than 0.01 uglL--in a
series of three tests. See id. at 189-191. Finally, an echocardiogram was performed to determine Bond's ejection
fraction in the left ventricle. The ejection fraction measures [*7J the contractions of the heart, and is expressed
as a percentage of blood that is pushed out with each
heartbeat; Bond had a reading of 56 percent, which falls
within the normal range. See Exhibit Pl at 189,509.
It is undisputed that during the first 24 hours or so
following Bond's admission, the V AMC physicians appropriately treated his cardiac condition with aspirin,
beta blockers, and ACE inhibitors, as well as intravenous
nitrates, heparin, and Tirofiban. It also is undisputed that
the decision to perform a cardiac catheterization and angiogram to view the condition of Bond's coronary arteries was appropriate, and that the diagnosis that Bond was
suffering from coronary artery disease ("CAD") was correct. Notes in Bond's medical records show that his chest
pain and other symptoms of cardiac distress disappeared
during his stay at the VAMC, and the monitoring equipment that he was connected to throughout his admission
did not register any acute arrhythmias. See id. at 172,
176, 183, 189. On September 23rd, Bond was up and
walking around without experiencing further chest pain
or shortness of breath, and he reported that he was feeling well and wanted to go home. ld. at 183,203. [*8] A
few hours before he was discharged on September 24th,
Bond reported that he fe It "great," and had "no chest pain
since admission." ld. at 176.
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What remains disputed and therefore must be resolved by the court, as the trier of fact, are the following
issues:

J. Whether the V AMC doctors mis-read Bond's angjogram when they concluded that he had 40 percent
stenosis (narrowing) in the proximal section of the left
anterior descending ("LAD") coronary artery;
2. If the V AMC doctors did mis-read the angiogram,
whether the stenosis was 80 percent as plaintiff contends,
and as noted in Bond's autopsy report, or whether the
stenosis was some other percentage;
J. Based on my determination of the percentage of
stenosis present in Bond's proximal LAD, as well as the
presence of stenosed areas in the LAD and other coronary vessels, whether the standard of care required an
invasive procedure such as angiopJasty, stent placement,
or bypass surgery before Bond was discharged from the
VAMC to prevent death from an acute cardiac event
such as an arrhythmia or infarction;

4. Whether VAMC doctors committed medical malpractice in failing to perform a fmal EKG, as ordered,
before Bond was discharged; and
5. [*9J Whether VAMC doctors' failure to perform
an exercise tolerance test ("ETT") before Bond was discharged constituted medical malpractice.
The above medical issues were the subject of extensive and conflicting expert testimony throughout the
four-day trial. Based on my review of the testimony, my
credibility determinations, and my review of the conflicting medical literature offered by the parties, I make the
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw set forth below.

FINDINCS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW
A. The Angiogram Reading, Percentage of Stenosis, and Appropriate Treatment
The primary divergence between plaintiffs and defendant's expert cardiologists revolves around the analysis of the arteries of Bond's heart; in particular, the
proximal (upper) segment of the LAD. According to
plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Jay Schapira, the LAD is
one of three arteries running downward from the mouth
of the aorta at the top of the heart and is functionally
important because it supplies the largest territory of heart
muscle. Therefore, any blockage or narrowing that impedes the flow of blood through the LAD, especially if it
occurs near the origin of the vessel as it did in Bond's
case, is considered [* I 0] serious because a large portion
of the heart muscle could suffer damage.
Dr. Schapira claimed that a visual inspection of
Bond's proximal LAD showed a tight lesion, with 70 to

80 percent stenosis, that he labeled "the widow maker."
He also identified areas of stenosis further down the
LAD, as well as in two other coronary arteries, and
opined that Bond should have been treated surgically
before he was discharged from the VAMC, preferably
with at least four bypasses. Just before trial, with no notice to the court or opposing counsel, Dr. Schapira performed a quantitative analysis using calipers and micrometer to confirm his visual estimation of 80 percent
stenosis based on a single frame of the digital angiogram
"film" See Exhibits P58 and P62.
In contrast, two of defendant's treating cardiology
experts, Dr. George Giraud and Dr, Eric Stecker, who
perfonned Bond's cardiac catheterization and interpreted
the angiogram results on September 23,2005, concluded,
based on their visual examinations, that the same stenosis
identified in the proximal LAD was only 40 percent. See
Exhibit Pl at 509. Because the plaintiffs calibration was
done without notice to the defense, the court requested
[* 11] that the defense experts perform a similar calibration. Dr. Giraud performed the same quantitative analysis
on the same frame of film and testi fied that his measurements confirmed that the lesion had a stenosis of 38
to 39 percent. Defendant's leading expert witness, nontreating cardiologist Dr. John McAnulty, performed
quantitative angiographY on the same lesion using that
frame, but also based his measurements on other camera
angles after reviewing both still-frame and motion picture films, and calibrated the stenosis at 48 to 50 pereent.
See Exhibit 0-129.
There is no question in the court's mind that all of
the expert witnesses were sincere, highly trained, and
with respect to most of the opinions they expressed, each
passed the screening required by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Parmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S, 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125
L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). Thus, to resolve this schism of
expert opinions regarding the percentage of stenosis present in Bond's proximal LAD, and to make a determination as to whether the VAMC doctors mis-read the degree of stenosis shown in Bond's angiogram films, the
court must evaluate the credibility of each expert who
gave an opinion about these issues.
Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jay [*12] Schapira, a
very active board certified cardiologist from California,
teaches as an adjunct at UCLA, diagnoses heart disease,
and maintains a highly active surgical practice in which a
large percentage of patients receive surgical intervention.
He describes his practice as invasive cardiology and
interventional cardiology; that is, utilizing mechanical
devices to open up coronary arteries, including performing angioplasty with balloons and inserting stents, He
testified that he personally performs stent procedures, but
refers patients who require bypasses to heart surgeons
who specialize in that procedure. Dr. Schapira also is a
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very experienced medicaVlegal expert witness who
charges $ 10,000 per day and who has testified at trial
more than 100 times in his career; at least 20 times between 2000 and 2005. In 2005, he testified in depositions
as many as 42 times, approximately 70 percent of the
time for the plaintiff in the litigation. At trial in this case,
he testified that only five percent of his practice deals
with giving expert testimony in medical/legal litigation
where he is not the treating physician. Without doubt,
Dr. Schapira is a highly qualified and highly paid nontreating [*l3J expert. Thus, the court expected him to be
extremely careful in presenting his testimony in his Rule
26 report, his pretrial deposition, and during the trial of
the case.
To evaluate the weight of Dr. Schapira's opinions, 1
examined not only his vast credentials, but also any inconsistent or questionable basis for his opinions under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In his deposition, Dr
Schapira was asked to justify his position with medical
articles to support the opinion that a patient with a stenosis such as Bond's should have been given immediate
surgical intervention, and that an invasive procedure
"would have significantly reduced the mortality rate of
patients like Mr. Bond." See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Daubert Motion (# 28) at Exhibit A, p. 7 J. Dr.
Schapira testified during his deposition that he thought
the BARI trial, the CASS trial, and several other research
studies supported his opinion that surgery improves life
expectancy in patients like Bond. See id. However, when
I read these studies before the trial, they revealed that the
researchers concluded the opposite; there is no statistically significant difference in survival rates between surgical intervention [* 14] versus medical therapy even in
patients with 3-vessel CAD, particularly if their left ventricu lar ("LV") function (determined by measuring ejection fraction) was normal. See Exhibit D 120; Appendix
B, Exhibit 14. Further, the CASS research involved patients with mild stable angina, who were free of angina
after infarction, as opposed to patients such as Mr. Bond,
whom plaintiff contends had unstable angina and high
risk CAD. Following this observation, I wrote to plaintiffs counsel requesting that Dr. Schapira submit articles
to justify his opinion. Plaintiff submitted trial exhibits
that included medical treatises and journal articles, see
Exhibits P ll-P36; however, Dr. Schapira's trial testimony covered only the 2002 ACC/AHA Guideline Update dealing with the classification of risk of death from
unstable angina, Exhibit P14, and the significance of
BNP in predicting risk of an adverse cardiac event, Exhibits 29, 32-34.
Because it remained unclear whether there was a
correlation between surgical intervention and increased
chance of survival in patients with the percentage of
stenosis observed in Bond's proximal LAD, at the court's

*

request, post-trial on February 13, 2008, plaintiff [* I 5]
submitted supplemental articles purporting to support
plaintiff's claims. See Appendix A. There is reliable
medical evidence in the 2004 ACC/AHA Guideline Update to support Dr. Shapira's contention that bypass surgery generally improves long-term survival in patients
with 3-vessel CAD if there is "significant"--meaning
greater than 50% stenosis--and "[t]he more severe the
symptoms, the more proximal that LAD CAD, and the
worse the LV function, the greater the benefit from surgery." Appendix A, Exhibit Cat 3.2.2.2. However, literally turning the page to read a bit further, the same
source supports defendant's contention that non-surgical
medical treatment was an appropriate choice, as follows:
"LV systolic function remains an important predictor of
which patients are likely to benefit from surgery. In patients with a normal EF [ejection fraction], surgical revasculatization generally provides little survival benefit."
Id. at 3.2.2.4. Bond's echocardiogram shows that his
ejection fraction was normal. Dr. Schapira's failure to
fully inform the court of the significance of all of the
data acquired· during Bond's admission io the V AMC
does little to bolster his credibility.
Another problem [* 16] with Dr. Schapira's testimony is that he bases his conclusion that Bond's proximal LAD stenosis was 80 percent on the findings made
by the VA pathologist, and he now claims his earlier
estimate at 70 percent in his Rule 26 report to the court
was a typographical error. Defendant contended that a
physician cannot necessarily rely on measurements
found at autopsy as an indicator of the percentage of
stenosis present while the patient is alive with his heart
still beating, and drew the analogy that postmortem
measurements are akin to measuring the diameter of a
bicycle tire after it has gone flat--which is what happens
to arteries after death-- versus measuring a fully inflated
tire. Defendant's expert, Dr. John McAnulty, emphasized
this discrepancy at trial when he testified as folJows:
[T]here's a well-recognized discrepancy
between findings from an angiogram and
findings from an autopsy.
Even if it's understood that the same
region of the blood vessel is looked at, the
situation is different enough that measurements very rarely match between the
two techniques, and overwhelmingly it's
observed that autopsy measurements result in greater narrowing than angiogram
measurements.

***
[T]here [* l7] are probably a number
of explanations, but I think the concept of
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measuring a tube that's collapsed, versus
one that's held open by pressure is probably one of the major differences in the
measurements when a person has died,
and when a person is being studied with
an angiogram.

Transcript of McAnulty Testimony, February 7, 2008,
("McAnu Ity Tr. ") at 49-50.
In addition, Dr. McAnulty pointed out that the autopsy report did not specify whether the pathologist took
samples from the proximal region of Bond's LAD coronary artery as described in the angiogram, or from a region further down the vessel where there were narrowings that may have been 80 percent.
The V AMC pathologist testified that she did not recall and had not specified in her report precisely which
region of Bond's LAD she obtained the samples that she
analy~ed, only that it was her common practice to take
them from the narrowest part of the vessel. In addition,
the pathologist was not qualified to make a before death
and after death analysis regarding the degree of stenosis
observed in Bond's proximal LAD, and Dr. Schapira
never clarified how that difference could justify his assumption. He simply adopted the autopsy report of ['"18J
80 percent or greater stenosis by referring to "the Glagov
phenomenon," a study he claims all pathologists would
know. However, the V AMC pathologist testified that she
did not account for the Glagov phenomenon when she
calculated the percentages of coronary artery stenoses
listed in her report.
Plaintiff did not supply the court with a reference to
Glagov's research study; however, post-trial defendant
submitted three supplemental articles that discuss
"Glagov's phenomenon." Appendix B, Exhibits 10-12, In
1987, Glagov and his fellow researchers published their
conclusion that "human coronary arteries enlarge in relation to plaque area and that functional important lUmen
stenosis may be delayed until the lesion occupies 40 percent of the internal elastic laminal area." Appendix B,
Exhibit 10. After the stenosis exceeds 40 percent, "lumen
diameter decreased, resulting in a restriction in flow ...
[w]hen this [Glagov] phenomenon fails to occur the result is stenosis," Appendix B, Exhibit 12 at 4, 10; see
also Exhibit 11 at 518, Fig. 1. None of the articles explain how the Glagov phenomenon would be relevant to
support a finding that Bond's proximal LAD stenosis was
80 percent or greater [* 19J at the time his angiogram
was performed.
Regarding the reliability of the testimony provided
by Dr. George Giraud, a VAMC cardiologist who
teaches at that hospital as well as the Oregon Health Sci-

*
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ences University ("OHSU"), and who is a specialist who
directs the VAMC cardiac catheterization lab; and that of
Dr. Eric Stecker, a cardiologist and electrophysiologist,
now practicing at the Legacy Good Samaritan Hospital
here in Portland, I find both of these experts 10 be very
credible, There is no question that these doctors are dedicated professionals who took great care to review Bond's
relevant medical history and to perform the cardiac
catheterization procedure properly, Both testified that
they took multiple motion picture angiogram views of
Bond's coronary arteries quickly and efficiently using the
V AMC's state-of-the-art dual-camera system to adjust
the camera angle to obtain unobstructed views of the
LAD along the entire length of the vessel. Doctors
Giraud and Stecker testified that they spent more than an
hour conducting a visual examination of Bond's angiogram film clips on September 23rd; however, it was
not standard practice to perform a quantitative analysis
on a single frame [*20] of film to confirm their visual
reading that the lesion in Bond's proximal LAD was 40
percent stenosed.
When asked by the court to re-examine Exhibit PS8,
which plaintiff submitted as the prime exhibit of the
"widow maker" stenosis, Dr. Giraud spent hours analyzing Bond's angiogram and testified that, due to the camera angle, the single frame plaintiff relied upon at trial
gave a false impression of the severity of the stenosis in
Bond's proximal LAD artery because there were overlapping segments on either side of the lesion. Calibrating
the thinnest section on Exhibit PSg and comparing other
camera angles of the same artery, which more faithfully
represented in three dimensions the severity of the stenosis, Dr. Giraud testified that his quantitative analysis confirmed that the disputed stenosis was 38 to 40 percent.
However, because they were Bond's treating doctors, and
their angiogram interpretations are directly at issue in
this case, the court recognizes the potential bias inherent
in the testimony given by doctors Giraud and Stecker
Defendant's non-treating expert, Dr, McAnulty, provided the final analysis of the "widow maker" stenosis,
Dr. McAnulty, one of the leading cardiologists [*21] in
this community, is also a clinical researcher in the field
of cardiac sudden death, and currently serves as the
medical director of arrhythmia services at Legacy Good
Samaritan Hospital. In the past, he has served as the head
of the division of cardiology at OHSU, director of the
OHSU cardiac catheterization lab, director of the OHSU
arrhythmia service, and head of the OHSU cardiology
division; he also used to hold an appointment to work at
the V AMC, but no longer has any formal affiliation with
that institution. I have commented on the potential bias
of plaintiffs medical expert witness. By like token, 1 am
fully aware that doctors do not like to testify against fellow doctors or condemn the institution with which they
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are or have been affiliated. In this case, I recognize that
Dr. McAnulty was once closely allied with the Veterans
Hospital and would be most reluctant to condemn or
criticize the procedures of the very persons with whom
he taught, practiced medicine, and in some cases continues to work alongside. In particular Dr. Stecker, who
perfonned Bond's angiogram, was once Dr. McAnulty's
student, and is now associated with Dr. McAnulty at
Good Samaritan Hospital and obtained [*22] his position at McAnulty's request. Thus, I closely scrutinized
Dr. McAnulty's testimony for any temptation to simply
back up the actions of his present and fanner colleagues,
rather than give an independent analysis. I find that any
such potential bias did not alter the reliability of his testimony.
Dr. McAnulty testified unequivocally that in 2005,
as it is today, the standard of care for cardiologists reading an angIOgram in the Portland metro area was to do a
visual inspection using motion picture angiogram films,
and evaluate the vessels in multiple views. Based on an
initial visual assessment of the lesion in Bond's proximal
LAD, Dr. McAnulty concluded that the stenosis was 40
percent, and further testified that he does not routinely
quantify a stenosis by comparing the diameter of the
narrowing relative to the vessel before and after, as Dr.
Shapira did in this case. Dr. McAnulty concurred with
Dr. Giraud's reasons for objecting to using a single frame
of angiogram film as the basis for interpreting the degree
of stenosis in Bond's proximal LAD, testifying that he
"could not do it from frame 22 alone, because the overlap
of vessels just makes it impossible to have a reference
[*23) vessel to compare the stenosis." McAnulty Tr. at
10. Without knowing precisely what Dr. Giraud's measurements were, Dr. McAnulty engaged in the same quantitative analysis as the other experts but utilized additional views where there was no overlap to better quantify the degree of stenosis, and concluded that it was 48
to 50 percent. See Exhibit D 129.
In the final analysis, to resolve the issues of whether
the V AMC doctors mis-read Bond's angiogram, and
what percentage of stenosis was present in Bond's
proximal LAD coronary artery, the court must choose the
most credible of three sets of witnesses. I find that Dr.
McAnulty is the least biased, the most credible, and has
provided the most well-reasoned and thorough analysis
of Bond's coronary anatomy. He carefully evaluated and
personally marked articles that justify his position and
ultimate conclusions. Also, having taught or supervised
about a third of Oregon's 200 practicing cardiologists, he
is in a unique position to base his testimony on his extensive knowledge of the degree of care, skill, and diligence
used by ordinarily careful cardiologists in the Portland
metro area. Careful doctors who viewed all of Bond's
angiogram films [*24] could not detennine the amount

of stenosis with exactness. All experts agreed reading
angiograms is a most difficult task and that reasonable
minds could and did differ. Accordingly, I conclude that
the V AMC doctors did not mis-read Bond's angiogram,
and that the catheterization report issued by doctors
Giraud and Stecker met the legal standard of care. Furthennore, J find based on the evidence presented at trial
that the stenosis in Bond's proximal LAD did not exceed
50 percent.
Given that detennination, it is less difficult to find
that an invasive procedure such as stent placement or
bypass was not warranted under the circumstances presented in this case. Dr. Schapira argued that based on the
2002 ACC/AHA practice Guidelines, Bond was in the
"highrisk" category for short-term risk of death, see Exhibits P14 and P57, and that an invasive procedure such
as bypass surgery could be justified under the legal standard of care. Nevertheless, viewing Bond's medical record as a whole and given that the extensive medical
literature showing no statistically significant difference
in mortality between medical management and an invasive procedure, the course of treatment chosen by the
VAMC doctors ["25] for this veteran was also easily
justifiable. The preamble to the ACC/ AHA Guidelines
themselves say it best: "These practice guidelines are
intended to assist physicians in clinical decision making
by describing a range of generally acceptable approaches
for the diagnosis, management, or prevention of specific
diseases or conditions .... The ultimate judgment regarding the care of a particular patient must be made by the
physician and patient in light of all of the available infonnation and the circumstances presented by that patient." Exhibit P 14 at 3.
A review of Bond's symptoms showed, without a
doubt, that he was in aeute coronary distress when he
arrived at the V AMC, as his seven abnonnal EKGs confirmed. His angiogram revealed a number of significant
stenoses in three different coronary arteries, and he was
diagnosed--for the first time--with diffuse CAD. When
questioned about his history of chest pain he revealed-for the first time--that he had been suffering symptoms
for two months that were indicative of coronary ischemia
and unstable angina. Although of questionable relevance
at the time, Bond's BNP level was at least ten times
higher than nonnal, and gives some indication [*26] that
he was suffering from severe ischemia,
In contrast, Bond's Troponin levels were undetectable, meaning that he had not had an MJ within the past
six days. His echocardiogram showed a normal ejection
fraction. He responded well to the medications he received, his cardiac condition stabilized, and his symptoms of cardiac distress disappeared. He did not have
further arrhythmias or show other signs of ischemia even
after the intravenous medications were stopped. Doctors
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who examined him found that did not have a heart murmur, and he was not suffering from pulmonary edema
because his lungs were clear--"no rales, ron chi or
wheezes," See Exhibit P I at 211. At discharge, he reported that he felt great and was walking around without
suffering any symptoms of cardiac distress.
The 2006 ACCiAHA research study that correlated
BNP and Troponin levels to predict "mortality benefit
from coronary revascularization in acute coronary syndromes" elegantly and succinctly demonstrates why the
judgment call that Bond's treating doctors had to make
between medical management and a more invasive
treatment such as revascularization was a difficult one--a
patient such as Bond who had a Troponin level of [*27)
less than 0.0 I uglL, but also a BNP higher than 237
nglL, is literally right on the line between "lower mortality with revascularization" and "higher mortality with
revascularization," Exhibit P34, at 1152, Fig, 5. Dr.
Schapira referred to the figure in this study solely to support his testimony that the test for BNP was useful to
stratify patients into risk categories, and that Bond was at
high risk for an adverse cardiac event based on his BNP
level of 1313 pg/mL See Transcript of Schapira Testimony, February 5, 2008, ("Schapira Tr.") at 63-65. By
contrast, Dr. McAnulty explained that the significance of
the research was that based on those two lab tests alone,
likelihood of mortality would not have been greater or
lesser with revascularization. See McAnulty Tr. at 21-23.
Moreover, the V AMC doctors who treated Bond
emphasized in their testimony, as previously noted, that
Bond had a normal ejection fraction, and it factored into
their decision to manage his CAD medically by putting
him on a regimen of drug therapy and conducting fol]owup tests to monitor his cardiac condition. See Exhibit
P I at 191. Dr. McAnulty explained the significance of
this test, as follows: "When the ejection [*28J fraction is
normal, in a group of patients like Mr. Bond, it's actually
a favorable prognostic marker. ... In this particular case,
it's also one more reason why should he have even had a
tight narrowing, of 80 percent, why, the role of intervention would not have been clear in that when the ejection
fraction is normal, even if there is a vessel where there
would be agreement about stenting or coronary bypass
surgery, the effects of survival on that person, with mechanical intervention, are not clearly any better than
medical therapy, alone." McAnulty Tr. at 34-35. Dr.
Schapira commented that Bond's good ejection fraction
made him "at low risk from an arrhythmia that you
would call a death due to sudden cardiac death ... [but)
(h]e didn't die of sudden cardiac death .. which is a
particular unexpected death syndrome. He died of
ischemia which caused a cardiac arrhythmia." Schapira
Tr. at 95,

Although plaintiff's and defendant's cardiology experts agree, as the V AMC pathologist found, that Bond
died ofa lethal arrhythmia, meaning that the ventricles in
his heart either went into fibrillation or he suffered a cardiac standstill, the precise cause of his arrhythmia remains in dispute, [*29) Dr. McAnulty, who is an expert
in treating cardiac arrhythmias, testified that while
ischemia from coronary artery narrowing can cause a
lethal heart rhythm to occur and is a reasonable explanation, it is not a definitive explanation because the mechanism that triggers lethal arrhythmias is still uncertain.
McAnulty Tr. at 38-39. Arrhythmias can be caused by
myocardial damage from CAD, micro-scarring that promotes the chance of developing a lethal arrhythmia at
any time, elevated adrenal in levels, or from a random
sudden death rhythm. Id. at 39 The precise cause of
Bond's arrhythmia is a scientific dispute that need not be
resolved to answer the ultimate question in this case.

1 find, based on all of the evidence, and particularly
on the well-supported testimony of Dr. McAnulty, that
even if Bond had undergone an invasive cardiac surgery
with four bypasses, as recommended by Dr. Schapira, his
life expectancy would not have been extended as compared to treating him medically. 2 Bond died of an unforseen arrhythmia from an unknown cause that would
not definitively have been prevented by an invasive surgical procedure. Therefore, I conclude that the VAMC
doctors' decision to pursue a more [*30] conservative
medical approach, and to treat Bond accordingly with a
well-accepted regimen of drug therapy, did not violate
the standard of medical care in the community.
2

Regarding the issue of Bond's life expectancy,

I note that Dr. Schapira testified that he simply
took 10 years off Bond's normal life expectancy
because of Bond's documented use of cigarettes
and alcohol. Without citing to any epidemiological study or other research to support it, Dr,
Schapira's opinion amounts to nothing more than
a non-educated guess plucked out of thin air, and
thus fails the Daubert screening. An expert's willingness to gratuitously guess and express an opin. ion with no scientific basis as to one subject,
casts doubt on the reliability of his other opinions.

B. The Final EKG Order
Even in a nationally recognized, first-rate training
hospital such as the Portland VAMC, the volume of
medical records generated and the numbers of orders
issued can overwhelm the capacity of a managed-care
system to deliver every test precisely as ordered. In
Bond's case, each doctor or team of doctors handled a
discrete aspect of his care, posted the observations and
conclusions on a computer network that other care pro-
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viders [*31] could access hospital-wide, and moved on
to the next patient. The number of witnesses caJled to
testify on the care Bond received during his relatively
brief admission in September of2005 reminded the court
of the adage: "Too many cooks can spoil the broth." One
of the doctors-in-training, without a request from a supervisor, ordered an EKG to be performed before Bond's
discharge. This order was neither carried out nor rescinded by superiors. However, during his hospitalization Bond had already received seven EKGs, all of which
were abnormal and indicated that Bond was suffering
from cardiac ischemia A senior V AMC staff cardiologist testified, and Dr. McAnulty confirmed, that performing another EKG would have been redundant because
Bond was already being treated for ischemia with the
optimal medical program, his symptoms of acute cardiac
distress had disappeared within the past 24 to 36 hours,
his overall condition was stable, and the information
provided by another EKG would not have provided additional information to change the diagnosis or treatment,
nor would it have affected the timing of the discharge or
the ultimate outcome in Bond's case. In other words, the
failure to perform ["32] another EKG or rescind it was
harmless error.
Once again, Dr, Schapira did not hesitate to opine
that the defendant's failure to do the final EKG constituted medical malpractice, even though he never explained any basis for his opinion. In like manner, he
summari Iy accused the defendant of wrongfully discharging Bond, without giving any meaningful specifics.
I find that both of these opinions lack a sufficient basis to
support his conclusion that the defendant via lated the
standard of care by neglecting to perform another EKG
before Bond was discharged.

C. The Exercise Tolerance Test
Plaintiff also complains that defendant's failure to
perform some type of ETT while Bond was hospitalized
violated the standard of care because the data obtained
from evaluating the heart's function with exertion could
have resolved the mixed results of the other objective
tests, clarified the cause of Bond's pain syndrome, and
presumably tipped the balance in favor of lifesaving surgical intervention. See Schapira Tr. at 10 I-I 02. Dr.
Schapira contends that if V AMC doctors were concerned
about the potentially adverse complications, such as
bleeding, that could occur from having Bond exercise on
a treadmill [*33] so soon after his catheretization procedure. such complications could have been avoided by
performing a pharmacologic stress test while Bond was
still bedridden.
However, Dr. McAnulty testified that the standard
of care for a patient like Bond who had undergone a cardiac catheterization was to send him home to recover,

then bring him back for a follow-up ETT as an outpatient. See McAnulty Tr. at 32, He gave two logical and
compelling reasons: first, it is difficult for someone who
has had a femoral artery punctured and a tube inserted
and withdrawn to perform in their usual manner when
walking during a treadmill exercise test; second, an ETT
would be of greater diagnostic value to test the effectiveness of the medical program after the patient had been on
the additional drug therapy for a longer period of time.
Id. Regarding the usefulness of a chemical stress test, Dr.
McAnulty testified that a chemical test does not mimic
an exercise test to assess a person's performance on the
prescribed course of medical treatment. Id. at 33. Also, a
chemical test is used to evaluate CAD; because it was
already known that Bond had CAD and that it was affecting the blood flow to his heart based on [*34] the
EKG results, the data obtained from a chemical test
would have been less useful than an exercise test. See id.
Accordingly, plaintiffs complaint lacks merit because the defense proved to the court's satisfaction that a
pharmacologic stress test perfonned on an inpatient basis, although not unusual, is a poor substitute to evaluate
the coronary function of an ambulatory patient like
Bond, who was capable of returning in a few days for a
follow-up outpatient ETT to be performed on a treadmill.
Plaintiff made much ado about the fact that the V AMC
medical records revealed that six doctors recommended
or ordered that Bond undergo an ETT, and yet it was not
done before he was discharged, However, I note that
there was no time limit specified in the order issued by
Bond's treating cardiologist, who wrote HI think the best
plan is to treat him for ischemia with ASA and beta
blocker and then bring him back for an ETT to see if
there is objective evidence of ischemia with exertion on
medications." Exhibit PI at 191. In fact, several VAMC
staff physicians testified that they anticipated that the
stress test would best be completed as an outpatient approximately two weeks after discharge. [*35] Unfortunately, Bond's time ran out. Nevertheless, i find that defendant did not violate the standard of care when it discharged Bond without first performing an ETT.
CONCLUSION
Tn sum, evaluating this exceptionally well-tried case
by extremely competent counsel and confronted with
outstanding witnesses, I conclude that plaintiff simply
has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
the medical treatment the doctors at the V AMC provided
to Craig Bond in September of 2005 in any way vio Jated
the standards of medical care as practiced in this community; therefore, defendant is not liable under the
FTCA for his death. Because the issue of liability is dispositive, I need not reach the issue of damages. '

122

03/20/ ~ 0 0 9 14: U'[

l'AA
If!,jU;;:1/U4b

Page 9

2008 U,S. Dist. LEXIS 19881,

3 One of the issues that continues to trouble the
court is that the defense stipulated that Bond had
a life expectancy of 15 years, yet took the inconsistent position that Bond had an unknown life
expectancy considering his lifestyle choices and
the condition of his heart, and that he suffered
sudden cardiac death unrelated to any treatment
(or lack of treatment) he received at the VAMC,
Apparently, defense counsel entered into the
stipulation simply to save the economists' time,
["'36] so that if the court reached the damages issue, the court could assume that Bond would
have lived 15 more years, The economic losses
could then be based on the disability payments
received and services provided by a stay-at-home
spouse doing domestic care for a specific period
of time,
In closing, I note that this extremely sensitive case
involved two casualties of a long-ago war--Bond, who
became a victim of substance abuse early on, presumably
because of his combat experience; and his loving, supportive wife who did her best to cope with his disabilities, Yet, sympathy for the litigants can play no role in
the court's factual findings and conclusions of law.
Judgment is for the defendant.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2008,
/s/ Robert E, Jones

ROBERT E, JONES
U,S, District Judge
APPENDIX A

The following medical peer-reviewed literature is attached in support of plaintiffs claims:
Exhibit A E. Braunwald et aI., ACC/AHA 2002
Guideline Update for the Management of Patients With
Unstable Angina and Non-ST-Segment Elevafion Myocardial Infarction. A Report of the American College of
Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on
Practice Guidelines (Committee on the Management of
Patients [*37] with Unstable Angina), available at:
http://www,acc.org/clinical!
guidelines/unstable/unstable, pdf.
Exhibit B 1. L. Anderson et aI., ACC/AHA 2007
Guidelines for the Management of Patients With Unstable Angina and Non-ST-Segment Elevation Myocardial
Infarction: A Report of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Practice Guidelines (Writing Committee to Revise the 2002
GUidelines for the Management of Patients with Unstable AnginaiNon-ST-Elevation Myocardial Infarction)
116 CIRCULATION e148 (2007).

~

Exhibit C 1(. A. Eagle et aI., ACC/AHA 2004 Guideline Update for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery:
A Report of the American College of Cardiolog;>lAmerican Heart Association Task Force on Practice
Guidelines (Committee to Update the i999 Guidelines
for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery), available at;
http://www.acc. org/c IinicaVguidelines/cabg/cabg.pdf.
Exhibit 0 S. C. Smith, Jr. et aI., ACC/AHA/SCAI
2005 Guideline Update for Percutaneous Coronary Intervention: A Report of the American College of Cardiology/ American Heart Association Task Force on Practice Guidelines (ACC/AHA/SCAl Writing Committee to
Update the 200J Guidelines for Percutaneous Coronary
["'38]
intervention),
available
at:
http://www,americanheart,org,
Exhibit E Robert H. Jones et aI., Long-term Survival
Benefits of Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting and Percutaneous Transluminal Angioplasty in Patients with
Coronary Artery Disease, 1996 J. THORACIC AND
CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY 1013.
Exhibit F Salim Yusef, et al. Effect of Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery on Survival: Overview of 10Year Results From Randomized Trials by the Coronary
Artery Bypass Graft Surgery Trialists Collaboration, 344
LANCET 563 (1994),
Exhibit G Ron T. van Domburg et aL Sustained
Benefit 20 Years After Reperfusion Therapy in Acute
Myocardia/infarction, 46 1. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 15
(2005),
Exhibit H Excerpt from: indications for Bypass Surgery, in CECIL MEDlCfNE, Ch, 74 (23d ed, 2008),
available at: hnp:llwww.mdconsult.comJdaslbook/body
/891491 12-6/6794987311l492/314.html.
Exhibit I Airlie Cameron et ai., Coronary Bypass
Surgery with internal-Thoracic-Artery Grafts--Effects on
Survival over a 15-year Period, 334 N, ENG. 1.
MEDICINE 216 (1996),
Exhibit J Excerpt from: F, D. Loop et aI., Influence
of Internal-Mammary-Artery Graft on 10-year Survival
and Other Cardiac Events, 314 N, ENG. j, MEDICfNE
1 (1986).
Exhibit [*39] K H. Oelert, Kardiochirurgisches
Standy-by und AkuteingrifJe nach intervention ellen kardiologischen MaBnahmen, 85 Suppl.6 Z KARDIOL 303
(1996) (Ger.).
APPENDIXB

The following medical peer-reviewed literature is attached in support of defendant's contentions:
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Exhibit 1 Alfred F Parisi et aI., Medica! Compared
with Surgical Management of Unstable Angina: 5-Year
Mortality and Morbidity in the Veterans Administration
Study, 80 CIRCULATION 1176 (1989),
Exhibit 2 TIMI IllB Investigators, Effects of Tissue
Plasminogen A ctivator and a Comparison of Early invasive and Conservative Strategies in Unstable Angina and
Non-Q-Wave Myocardial Infarction, 89 CIRCULATION
1545 (1994),
Exhibit 3 William E. Boden et aI., Outcomes in Patients with Acute Non--Q-Wave Myocardial Infarction
Randomly Assigned to an Tnvasive as Compared with a
Conservative Management Strategy, 338 NEW ENG. 1.
MEDICINE 1785 (1998).
Exhibit 4 Peter A, McCullough et ai., A Prospective
Randomized Trial of Triage Angiography in Acute Coronary Syndromes Ineligible for Thrombolytic Therapy:
Results on the Medicine Versus Angiography in Thrombolytic Exc/usion (MATE) Trial, 32 J. AM. C.
CARDIOLOGY 596 (1998).
Exhibit 5 Lars Wallentin et a1., [*40J Invasive
Compared with Non-invasive Treatment in Unstable
Coronary-Artery Disease: FRiSC If Prospective Randomized Multicentre Study, 354 LANCET 708 (1999).
Exhibit 6 Christopher P. Cannon et aI., Comparison
of Early Invasive and Conservative Strategies in Patients
with Unstable Coronary Syndromes Treated with the
Glycoprotein lIb/IIla Inhibitor Tirofiban, 344 NEW
ENG. 1. MEDICNE 1879 (200 I).
Exhibit 7 David A, Morrow et aI., Ability of Minor
Elevations of Troponins I and T to Predict Benefit From
an Early Invasive Strategy in Patients with Unstable
Angina and Non-ST Elevation Myocardial Infarction.
Results from a Randomized Trial, 286 AM, MEDICAL
ASS'N 2405 (2001).
Exhibit 8 David A, Morrow et al., Evaluation of BType Natriuretic Peptide for Risk Assessment in Unstable
AnginaiNon-ST-Elevation Myocardial Infarction, 41 J,
AM, C. CARDIOLOGY 1264 (2003).
Exhibit 9 Leopoldo S. Piegas et aI., The Organizalion to Assess Strategies for Ischemic Syndromes
(OASIS) Registry In Patients with Unstable Angina, 84
AM, J. CARDIOLOGY 5A, 7M (1999).
Exhibit 10 Abstract of: S, Glagov et aI., Compensenatory Enlargement of Human Atherosclerotic Coro-

'*

nary Arteries, 316 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1371
(1987).

Exhibit [*41] 11 R, H. Mohiadin et aI., Glagov Remodeling of the Atherosclerotic Aorta Demonstrated by
Cardiovascular Magnetic Resonance: The CORDA Asymptomatic Subject Plaque Assessmenf Research
(CASPAR) Project,
6 1. CARDIOVASCULAR
MAGNETIC RESONANCE 517 (2004).
Exhibit 12 Vyacheslav A. Korshunov et aI., Vascular Remodeling: HemodynamiC and Biochemical Mechanisms
Underlying
Glagov's
Phenomenon,
27
ARTERIOSCLEROSIS,
THROMBOSIS,
AND
VASCULAR BIOLOGY 1722 (2007).
Exhibit 13 Rehan Qayyum et at, Systematic Review,
Routine and Selective Invasive Strategies for the Acute
Coronary Syndrome, 148 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 186 (2008).
Exhibit 14 Michal B, Mock et aI., Survival of Medically Treated Patients in the Coronary Artery Surgery
Study (CASS) Registry, 66 CIRCULATlON 566 (1982).
Exhibit 15 Whady Hueb et aI., Five- Year Follow- Up
of the Medicine, A ngioplasty, or Surgery Study (MASS
11): A Randomized Controlled Clinical Trial of 3 Therapeutic Strategies for Multivessel Coronary Artery Disease, 115 CIRCULATION 1802 (2007).
Exhibit 16 William E. Boden et aI, Optima! Medical
Therapy with or without PCI for Stable Coronary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. 1. MEDICINE 1503 (2007).
Exhibit 17 E. Braunwald et aI., ACC/AHA [*42]
2002 Guideline Update for the Management of Patients
With Unstable Angina and Non-ST-Segment Elevation
Myocardial Infarction: A Report of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task
Force on Practice Guidelines (Committee on the Management of Patients with Unstable Angina), available at:
http://www.acc.org/clinicall
guidelines/unstable/unstable. pdf.
Exhibit 18 S. C. Smith, Jr. et aL, ACCIAHA/SCAI
2005 Guideline Update for Percutaneous Coronary Intervention: A Report of the American College of Cardiology/ American Heart Association Task Force on Practice Guidelines (ACC/AHA/SCAI Writing Committee to
Update the 2001 Guidelines for Percutaneous Coronary
Intervention),
available
at:
http://www,americanheart.org.
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LEXSEE
CECELIA WALLACE, individually and as the executor of the estate of William M.
Wallace (deceased), Plaintiff, VS. JERRY HOUNSHEL, individually and in his official capacity as SHERIFF OF JACKSON COUNTY, et at, Defendants.
] :06-cv-1S60-RLY -TAB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRJCT OF
INDIANA, INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44977

May 22, 2008, Decided
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLlCA TION

Kerns Harris, RUDOLPH FINE PORTER & JOHNSON,
Evansville, IN.

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion denied by Wallace
v. Hounshel, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52442 (S.D. Ind.,
July 3, 2008)

JUDGES: Tim A. Baker, United States Magistrate
Judge.

NOTICE:
IN PRINT

OPINION BY: Tim A. Baker
PRIOR HISTORY; Wallace v. Hounshel, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6607 (S.D. Ind., Jan. 29,2008)

OPINlON
ORDER ON DISCOVERY MOTION

COUNSEL: [of I] For CECELIA WALLACE, individually and as the executor of the estate of WILLIAM M.
WALLACE (deceased), Plaintiff: Michael K. Sutherlin,
MICHAEL K. SUTHERLIN & ASSOCIATES, PC, Indianapolis, IN.
For JERRY HOUNSHEL, in his individual capacity,
LIEUTENANT MARC LAHRMAN, in his individual
and official capacity as Sheriff of Jackson County and
former Jail Commander of the Jackson County Jail,
MISSY ROBlNSON, (Miser) Nurse, in her individual
capacity, Defendants: Max Eric Fiester, Ross E. Rudolph, Stacy Kerns Harris, RUDOLPH FINE PORTER
& JOHNSON, Evansville, TN.
For
DR.
FAISAL
AHMED,
ADVANCED
CORRECTIONAL HEAL THCARE, INC., Defendants:
Michael D. Rogers, Robert Ballard Clemens, Steven D.
Groth, BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP, Indianapolis, IN.
For DA VTD RlDLEN, in his individual capacity. JOSH
TElPEN, in his individual capacity, Defendants: Stacy

I. Introduction.
Before the Court is Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery and award sanctions, or in the alternative, to
strike Defendants' expert witness. [Docket No. 70.] For
the foregoing reasons, the Court grants [*2] Plaintiff's
motion in part and strikes Defendants' expert witness.
II. Background.
Defendants Jerry Hounshel, Marc Lahrman, Missy
Miser Robinson, David Ridlen, and Josh Teipen retained
Dr. Bruce Waller as their expert witness in this case.
Defendants provided Plaintiff with Dr. Waller's expert
report on February 15, 2008, as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). [Docket No, 70, Ex. 1.J
In this report, Dr. Waller indicated that he did "not maintain lists of prior cases/reviews." [Id. at S.J Plaintiff responded by letter on February 20, 2008, requesting that
Dr. Waller clarify this statement and noting that if Dr.
Waller had testified in prior cases, then his report would
be deficient. [Docket No 70, Ex. 2.] On February 29,
2008, Defendants provided Plaintiff with an addendum
to Dr. Waller's report, in which Dr, Waller provided a list
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of topics on which he had testified that was not necessarily limited to the prior four years. The addendum also
included four case names without citations (except two
included the county) that were obtained by defense counsel upon conducting a Lexis search; however, Dr. Waller
also noted, "I do not recall any details and have no[] records [*3) for these cases." [Docket No. 70, Ex. 3 at 2.]
Plaintiff agam objected to the report, so Defendants conducted a West!aw search and produced for Plaintiffs four
more case names, indicating the counties, the nature of
the cases, and in two instances the cause numbers.
[Docket No. 70, Exs. 4-5.]

m. Discussion.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), even
after having provided them notice and two opportunities
to cure the deficiencies. Thus, Plaintiff requests the
Court compel these disclosures and award costs and fees
or, in the alternative, that the Court strike Dr. Waller as
an expert witness. Defendants argue that they have substantially complied with the rule and that to the extent
they have not, Plaintiff is not harmed. Furthermore, Defendants characterize Plaintiffs request as "the extraordinary remedy of witness exclusion" and the alternative
remedy as "something [Dr. Waller] has already stated he
is unable to produce," [Docket No. 78 at I.]

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires expert witnesses to disclose a written report containing, among other things, "a
list of all other cases in which, during the previous four
years, the witness ['"4] testified as an expert at trial or by
deposition." Other jurisdictions have interpreted this
provision as follows:
The information to be disclosed is
"cases" in which the witness has testified.
The identification "cases" at a minimum
should include the courts or administrative agencies, the names of the parties, the
case number, and whether the testimony
was by deposition or at trial. Such information should be sufficient to allow a
party to review the proceedings to determine whether relevant testimony was
given. With this information, a party
should be able to determine the type of
claim presented and locate any recorded
testimony.

Bethel v. United States, Civil Action No. 05-cv-01336PSF-BNB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43395 at *3-4 (D.
Colo June 13, 2007); Norris v. Murphey, Civil Action
00-12599-RBC, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10795, at *3-4

(D. Mass. June 26, 2003); Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 162
F.R.D. 675,682 (D. Kan. 1995). Defendants' expert does
not claim that his list of cases includes "all" cases in
which he has testified in the last four years. Furthermore,
the information included to identify these cases does not
sufficiently enable Plaintiff to obtain the expert's testimony in them.
The [*5] consequences of failing to disclose this information are provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1):
If a party fails to provide information ..

as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the
party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a
motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless
the failure was substantially justified or is
harmless. In addition to or instead of this
sanction, the court, on motion and after
giving an opportunity to be heard:
(A) may order payment
of the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the
jury of the party's failure,
and

(C) may impose other
appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders
listed
in
Rule
37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).

According to this rule, because Defendants have failed to
provide the required information, they must demonstrate
that their failure was substantially justified or that it was
harmless. The Seventh Circuit has provided four factors
for the district court to consider when determining
whether the failure to disclose was either substantially
justified or harmless: "(I) the prejudice or surprise to the
party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability [*6J of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption to the tria I; and (4) the bad faith or
willfulness involved in not disclosing the evidence at an
earlier date." David v. Caterpillar, 324 F.3d 851, 857
(7th Cir. 2003).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff faces no risk of surprise since Plaintiff has time to explore any information
about Dr. Waller's opinion through deposition before
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trial They further argue that Plaintiff is not prejudiced
by the fact that she will be unable to review Dr. Waller's
prior testimony and opinions "given the scope of material
that has been provided, the time remaining before trial,
and the existence of the Plaintiffs own expert witness,"
[Docket No. 78 at 4.] They argue that Plaintiff may still
depose Dr. Waller so the problem can be cured, Defendants contend that the trial, having not yet been scheduled, will not be disrupted by the expert's failure to comply with the rule. Finally, Defendants argue they have
not acted in bad faith in their failure to disclose these
cases
Defendants' good faith is not in question. Likewise,
because the expert's failure to disclose is not about the
timing of disclosure but rather the ability to make a sufficient [*7] disclosure. trial disruption or surprise to
Plaintiff are irrelevant.
Nevertheless, Defendants' failure to disclose is
prejudicial. Having access to other cases in which the
expert witness has testified "allow[sJ the opposition to
obtain- prior testimony of an expert and, potentially, to
identify inconsistent positions taken in previous cases for
use in cross-examination," Bethel, 2007 U.S. Dis!.
LEXIS 43395, at * J 7, This testimony may also be useful
to Plaintiff in ascertaining the legitimacy of Defendants'
expert. See Elgas v. Colorado Belle Corp., 179 F.R.D.
296, 300 CD. Nev, 1998) ("[T]he disclosure of prior recorded testimony is designed to give the other party access to useful information to meet the proposed experts'
opinions. The proliferation of marginal or unscrupulous
experts will only be stopped when the other party has
detailed information about prior testimony."). Furthermore, a deposition cou Id not cure all prejudice to Plaintiff--Dr. Waller will not be able to reproduce his prior
testimony at the deposition, particularly since he does
"not recall any details" and has no records of these cases.
[Docket No. 70, Ex, 3 at 2.]
Likewise, Defendants' reason--that their expert [*8]
does not keep a list of cases--does not substantiaJly justify their expert's failure to provide this information as
required by the rule. See Norris, 2003 U,S. Dist. LEXIS
10795, at * II ("An expert cannot deliberately put himself or herself in a position where it is impossible to
comply with a rule and then claim that he or she cannot
comply. Self-induced inability to comply with a rule is
simply not justified."); Palmer v, Rhodes Machmery, 187
F.R.D. 653,656 (N.D. Okla, 1999) (denying defendant's
motion for relief from the reporting requirement determining that "the cost or difficulty of compiling the list is
insufficient for the purpose of meeting the 'substantial
justification' requirement" where defendant's expert did
not believe he could compile a completely accurate list);
Nguyen, 162 F.R.D, at 681 ("An expert's failure to maintain records in the ordinary course of his business suffi-
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dent to allow the disclosures to be made[J does not constitute 'substantial justification' for the failure to provide
the required disclosures as to any retained expert expected to testify at the trial of the case,"), Rule 26(a)-amended in 1993 to impose on parties the duty to disclose certain ["'9] information without waiting for a request--requires expert witnesses be disclosed and that
they provide a signed written report. Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
lists specific requirements for the report, therefore delineating the basic criteria necessary for a witness to hold
himself out as an "expert" in federal court. Dr. Waller
has unambiguously stated that he cannot comply with
one of those basic criteria. Ignoring the rule and allowing
Dr. Waller to testify would reinforce Defendants' failure
to follow the rules and would lower the bar for other
experts. Therefore, Dr. Waller is not permitted to testify
in this case,
Defendants have requested that if they are prohibited
from presenting Dr. Waller, that they be allowed a minimum of forty-five days to obtain a substitute expert witness. [Docket No. 85 at 3.] In affirming a district court's
decision to deny witnesses who were belatedly disclosed
as experts, the Seventh Circuit noted:
In affirming this judgment, we are
mindful of our warning that 'in the normal
course of events, justice is dispensed by
the hearing of cases on their merits ...
We urge district courts to carefully consider Rule 37(c), including the alternate
sanctions available, [* I 0] when imposing
exclusionary sanctions that are outcome
determinative. "

Musser v, Gentiva Health Servs, 356 F.3d 751, 759-60
(7th Cif. 2004) (quoting Salgado by Salgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., ) 50 FJd 735, 740 (7th Cir. 1998». Defendants are unable to cure the prejudice to Plaintiff that
would result if Dr. Waller were allowed to testify, so no
sanction other than striking the witness is appropriate.
However, in keeping with the spirit of the Seventh Circuit's admonition, the Court will enlarge the deadline by
forty-five days from the date of this order for Defendants
to produce an expert witness. As a result, and because a
trial date has not yet been set, the Court shall also modify.
the dispositive motions deadlines and the date of the settlement conference,

IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion in part and strikes Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Waller. [Docket No. 70,J Defendants shall have
forty-five days from the date of this order in which to
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produce an expert witness and report confonning with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2).
This enlargement of time for Defendants to produce
an expert conflicts with the dispositive motion deadlines
recently modified [* I 1] by the Court. [See Docket No.
81J Therefore, the dispositive motion deadlines shall be
modified as follows: Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment will be due on July 14, 2008; Defendants' motion for summary judgment and response to Plaintiffs
motion will be due on August 14, 2008; Plaintiffs reply
and her response to Defendants' motion will be due September 15, 2008; and Defendants' reply will be due September 29,2008. The Court does not anticipate enlarging
any of these deadlines, including the deadlines for response and reply briefs.

*

Page 4

In addition, the settlement conference currently
set for July 1, 2008, at 9 B.m. is now vacated and rescheduled for August 20, 2008, at ] :30 p.m. in Room
234. All requirements and deadlines established in the
order originally setting the settlement conference remain
in effect. [See Docket No. 58.]
Dated: May 22, 2008

lsi Tim A. Baker
Tim A. Baker
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977
Matthew F. McColl, ISB No. 6005
Angela K. Hermosillo, ISB No. 7425
QUANE SMITH LLP
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
Attorneys for Defendants

;r-.. _:t-..
r""l~

"....,..-

N

U1

V
N

0i

U1

ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVIN F. MORGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C.,

Case No. CV-06-4332
RENEWED MOTIO~ TO EXCLUDE
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS
JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D.

Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants, Chambers, Demos and the Idaho Heart Institute,
by and through their counsel of record, the law firm of Quane Smith

LLP,

and move this

Court for its Order excluding the testimony of Jay N. Schapira, M.D. on the grounds,
and for the reasons that Plaintiff has violated the Court's Order of March 24, 2009,
demanding a list of cases in which Jay N. Schapira, M.D. has provided expert witness

RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA,
M.D.-1
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testimony, and on the further grounds that Jay N. Schapira, M.D. should be excluded
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702.
This Motion is made upon the facts of this case, the pleadings and files
herein, including, but not limited to, the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Renewed
Motion to Exclude, filed contemporaneously herewith; the Memorandum in Support of
Renewed Motion filed contemporaneously herewith; and the Motion to Exclude Jay N.
Schapira, M.D. and the accompanied pleadings. This Motion is also based upon, and
supported by the Idaho Rules of Evidence, including, but not limited to Rule 702, and
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including, but not limited to, Rules 26 and 37.
Oral argument is ,requested.

+-

DATED this

<J c;". day of March, 2009.
QUANE

By

SM1YJ UP

.

~

Matthew . McColl, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA,
M.D. - 2

[4J 005/010

03/25/2009 14: 16 FAX

CERTIFICATE OF SE~

)g/
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of March, 2009, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S
EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. by delivering the same to each of the
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

Lowell N. Hawkes
Ryan S. Lewis
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho

[Xl
[J
[]
{]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

,~

Matthew F. McColl

RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA,
M.D.-3
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977
Matthew F. McColl, ISB No. 6005
Angela K. Hermosillo, ISB No. 7425
QUANE SMITH LLP
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Boulevard
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
Attorneys for Defendants

ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVIN F. MORGAN,
Case No. CV-06-4332

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITN ESS
JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D.

vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C.,
Defendants.

I.
INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Renewed Motion to
Exclude the Testimony of Jay N. Schapira, M.D., Plaintiff's standard of health care
practice witness. The procedural history is well known to this Court.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S
EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. - 1
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II.
FACTS
Defendants refer this Court to its Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit of
Exciude Jay N. Schapira, M.D., a courtesy copy of which is attached hereto.
On March 24, 2005, at or around the hour of 2:00 p.m., this Court
convened a hearing to undertake Defendants' Motion to Exclude Jay N. Schapira, M.D.
At that hearing, this Court directed counsel for Plaintiff to provide a list, in compliance
with Defendants' discovery requests, of the testimonial history of Jay N. Schapira,
M.D. by 12:00 noon on March 25, 2009. At approximately 3:30 p.m., Plaintiff's
counsel faxed to defense counsel the list appended as Exhibit E to the Affidavit of
Counsel in Support of Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N.
Schapira, M.D., filed contemporaneously herewith.
Omitted from the list of cases provided were four cases in which Jay N.
Schapira, M.D. has provided deposition testimony over the requested period. See
A ffidavit, supra. Three of those cases were accessible by an internet search, and an
additional case was secured by defense counsel dependently, and involves trial
testimony in the year 2008. Id.
Importantly, in the matter of Bond v. United States, Dr. Schapira omitted
a case in which U.S. District Judge Jones discussed Dr. Schapira's extensive
testimonial history:
Dr. Schapira also is a very experienced medicaillegal expert
witness who charges $ 10,000 per day and who has
testified at trial more than 100 times in his career; at least
20 times between 2000 and 2005. In 2005, he testified in

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S
EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. - 2
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depositions as many as 42 times, approximately 70 percent
of the time of the plaintiff in the litigation.

Without doubt, Dr. Schapira is a highly qualified and highly
paid non-treating expert. Thus, the court expected him to
be extremely careful in presenting his testimony in his Rule
26 report, his pretrial deposition, and during the trial of the
case.
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19881, *12 - *13.
The judge in Bond went on to describe Dr. Schapira's trial testimony in
that court trial, including Dr. Schapira's opinions on his examination of a heart patient.

'd., * 14. Judge Jones noted that Dr. Schapira had failed to be fully candid with the
court with respect to the significance of certain data stating: "Dr. Schapira's failure to
fully inform the court of the significance of all of the data acquired during Bond's
admission to the VAMC does little to bolster his credibility."

'd.

Judge Jones further

pointed out that "another problem with Dr. Schapira's testimony is that he bases his
conclusions that Bond's proximal LAD stenosis was 80 percent on the findings made
by the VA pathologist, and he now claims his earlier estimate at 70 percent in his Rule
26 report to the court was a typographical error."

'd.

Finally, Judge Jones stated:

Regarding the issue of Bond's life expectancy, I note that
Dr. Schapira testified that he simply took 10 years of
Bond's normal life expectancy because of Bond's
documented use of cigarettes and alcohol. Without citing
to any epidemiological study or other research to support it,
Dr. Schapira's opinion amounts to nothing more than a noneducated guess plucked out of thin air, and thus fails the
Daubert screening. An expert's willingness to gratuitously
guess and express an opinion with non scientific basis as to
one subject, casts doubt on the reliability of his other
opinions.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIF.IF~)3"
EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. - 3
J t·1
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Id., *30.
In the matter of Panayiotou v. Johnson, also omitted, an Alabama
Supreme Court case, the Alabama Supreme Court discussed whether or not it should
apply the "sham affidavit doctrine" to an affidavit of Dr. Schapira to prevent the direct
contradiction of his deposition testimony. Id., 995 So. 2d 871, 879 (Ala. 2008).
Despite Dr. Schapira's extensive testimonial history from 2002 through
2007, only five cases are cited to from 2008. He omitted at least the trial testimony
in Blaha v. Ganem, M.D. See Affidavit, supra.

III.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff has now violated an Order of this Court. This list supplied is
obviously incomplete.
complete.

There is no way to know whether any list could ever be

There is no way to know whether we could ever trust this witness.

Plaintiff's failures to comply have made it impossible for Defendants to prepare for this
witness and have cast in doubt the reliability of a witness who has not provided a
complete testimonial history.

IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully move this Court under Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 26 and 37, and under this Court's gate-keeping function in the Rules of
Evidence 702, for an Order excluding this witness.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS
EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. - 4
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DATED this

\)

ia

tl
y of March, 2009.

QUANESf~
By

,
Matthew F. McColl, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SEf\VICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisdi+day of March, 2009, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. by
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Lowell N. Hawkes
Ryan S. Lewis
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho

[J
[]
[]

[Xl

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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Matthew F. McColl, 'S8 No. 6005
Angela K. Hermosillo, ISB No. 7425
QUANE SMITH LlP
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza
101 South Capitol Bo ulevard
P. O. Box 519
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 345-8600
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
MARVIN F. MORGAN,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C.,

Case No. CV-06-4332
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION
TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT
WITNESS JAY N. SCHAP/RA, M.D.

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
: 55.

County of ADA

)

Comes now Matthew F. McColl, having been first duly sworn upon oath
and depose and says:

137
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE
PLAINTIFF' EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. - 1

141 0041068
03/25/2009 14:43 FAX

1.

I am an attorney with the law firm Quane Smith LLP, counsel of

record for Defendants Chambers, Demos and the Idaho Heart Institute.

The

information and facts specified herein are based upon your Affiant's own first-hand
and personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a

Supreme Court of Alabama published decision: Panayiotou, M.D. v. Johnson, 995 S.
2d 871 (Ala. 2008).
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Bond v.

U.S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19881 (Ore. 2008).
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Potts v.

Radioshack, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6504 (Ct. App. Cal. 4th App. 2006).
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 0 is what your Affiant believes to be a

true and correct copy of the direct examination of Jay Schapira, M.D. in the matter of

Blaha v. Ganem conducted on April 15, 2008 in the Superior Court of the State of
Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa.
6.

The above-referenced exhibjts are not contained on the list provided

by counsel for Plaintiff, which list was received by fax in my office 35 minutes after
the hearing which took place yesterday afternoon.
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FURTHER your Affiant saith naught.

Matthew F. McColl

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 th day of March, 2009.

~Qf,d~tfut~
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
Commission expires 12/1 2/14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of March, 2009, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF
RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA,
M.D. by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below,
addressed as follows:
Lowell N. Hawkes
Ryan S. Lewis
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered
1322 East Center
Pocatello, Idaho

[]
[]
[)
[Xl

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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LexisNexis'
10flDOCUMENT
Hercules Panayiotou, M.D. v. Jamie Sullivan Johnson, as administratrix
or Mae Sullivan, deceased

or the estate

1061829

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
995 So. 2d 871; 2008 Ala. LEXIS 105

May 30, 2008, Released
PRIOR HISTORY: [**IJ
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court . (CV -04-728).
DISPOSITION:

REVERSED AND REMANDED .

JUDGES: STUART, Justice. See, Lyons, Woodall,
Smith, Bolin. and Parker, J1., concur. Cobb, C.J., concurs
in part and dissents in part. Murdock, 1., dissents.
OPINION BY: STUART
OPINION

[*872) STUART,lustice.

Dr. Hercules Panayiotou appeals the order of the
Mobile Circuit Court denying his motion for a summary
judgment in the medical-malpractice action filed against
him by Jamie Sullivan Johnson, as administratrix of the
estate of Mae Sullivan, deceased . We reverse and remand .
l.

On March 7, 2002 , Dr. Panayiotou performed a
heart-catheterization procedure on Mae Sullivan at the
Mobile Infirmary Medical Center. During the course of
the procedure, a coronary artery ruptured. Emergency
coronary artery bypass surgery was performed; however,
Sullivan died on March 9, 2002.
On March 8, 2004, Johnson sued Dr. Panayiotou,
Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, and Dr. Panayiotou's
medical practice, [MC Diagnostic & Medical Clinic,
PC., in the Mobile Circuit Court, alleging medical malpractice. 'an May 1),2007, Dr. Panayiotou moved for a
slim mary judgment arguing that Johnson could not establish , by substantial evidence, that he had breached the

appropriate standard of ("'*2] care during his treatment
of Sullivan. Specifically, Dr. Panayiotou argued that because 10h_nson's action was governed by the Alabama
Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala. Code 1975
("the AMLA"), Johnson was required to present expert
testimony from a "similarly situated health care provider" to establish a breach of the standard of care . See
Holcomb v. Carraway, 945 So. 2d 1009, 10 12 (Ala.
2006) (stating that a plaintiff ordinarily must present
expert testimony to establish that a defendant health-care
provider failed to meel the standard of care; however,
"such expert testimony is allowed only from a 'similarly
situated health care provider"') . Dr. Panayiotoll further
argued that the only expert witness identified by Johnson, Dr. Jay N. Schapira, was not a "similarly situated
health care provider" as that term [*873J is detined in §
6-5-548(c) because, he says, while Dr. Panayiotou was
certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine
("AB 1M") in internal medicine, cardiovascular disease,
and interventional cardiology, Dr. Schapira was certified
by ABIM in only internal medicine and cardiovascular
disease . 1 Therefore, Dr. Panayiotou argued, because it
was undisputed that he was [**3] practicing interventional cardiology when he performed the heartcatheterization procedure on Sullivan, Dr. Schapira was
not a similarly situated health-ca re provider eligible to
provide expert testimony regarding the standard of care.
In conjunction with his motion for a summary judgment,
Dr. Panayiotou submitted an excerpt of his own deposition in which he stated that he received his "interventional cardiology certification the first time [the examin ation) was ever given in 1999" and a copy of his curriculum vitae showing, under a head ing listing the examinations he had passed:
"ABIM: Intemal Medicine, 25 September 1991
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"ABIM: Cardiovascular Subspecialty, November
1993
"ABIM:
1999."

lnterventional

Cardiology,

November

Mobile Infirmary Medical Center and IMC
Diagnostic & Medical Clinic, P.c., were later
dismissed from the case.
2 Section 6-5-548(c) provides:
"(c) Notwithstanding any provision of the Alabama Rules of Evidence to the contrary, if the health
care provider whose breach of the
standard of care is claimed to have
created the cause of action is certified by an appropriate American
board as a special ist, is trained and
experienced in a medical specialty,
and holds himself or herself (**4]
out as a specialist, a 'similarly
situated health care provider' is
one who meets all of the follOWing
requirements:
"( I) Is licensed
by the appropriate
regulatory board or
agency of this or
some other state.
"(2) Is trained
and experienced in
the same specialty.

"(3) [s certified
by an appropriate
American board in
the same specialty.

"(4) Has practiced in this specialty during the
year preceding the
date that the alleged
breach of the standard of care occurred."

(Emphasis added.)
On June 14,2007, Johnson filed her response to Dr.
Panayiotou's summary-judgment motion, arguing that §
6-5-548(c) requires only that an expert witness be certi-

H

fied in the same "specialty" as the defendant to be considered a similarly situated health-care provider and that
Dr. Panayiotou and Dr. Schapira are in fact both certified
in the same specialty .- internal medicine. Cardiovascular disease, she argues, is actually a "subspecialty" of
internal medicine, and interventional cardiology is, at
best, she argues, another "subspecialty" of internal medicine. However, she argues, interventional cardiology is
more properly viewed as a subspecialty of cardiovascular
disease and thus a "sub-subspecialty" of inlernal l ++ 5]
medicine,
Johnson also argued that, although Dr. PanayioloLl
held an ABIM-issued "certificate of added qualification"
in interventional cardiology at the time he performed the
heart catheterization on Sullivan, ABIM did not formally
recognize interventional cardiology as a subspecialty of
cardiovascular disease until July 2006. In support of her
argument, she submitted printed copies of pages from the
Web sites of both ABIM and the American Board of
Medical Specialties ("ABMS") indicating that, on July
14,2006, ABlM, in an attempt to standardize the way it
recognized subspecialties, announced that it now recognized all certificates of added qualifications as subspecialties of internal medicine. 1 Johnson [·874] also
submitted an affidavit from Dr. Schapira in which he
stated that
"Dr. Panayiotou was not board certified
in the specialty or subspecia Ity of interventional cardiology at the time of the incident made the basis of this suit (March
9, 2002), but rather had a 'certificate of
added qualification' that was not recognized as either a specialty or a subspecialty by [ABMSJ ,.. until July of 2006
when [ABIMJ reclassified the 'certificate
of added qualification' in inlerventional
cardiology [**61 as a subspecialty of cardiology."

Finally, Johnson also submitted a copy of Dr. Panayiotou's curriculum vitae and noted that it specifically
designated the examination he passed in November 1993
as being for the "Cardiovascular Subspecialty" (emphasis
added), but the November 1999 examination was merely
listed as being for "interventional cardiology" with any
description of that practice as a subspecialty conspiCUously absent. ~
3 ABMS is an umbrella organization that oversees 24 specialty boards, including ABIM, and
establishes standards for specialty certification.
The other boards governed by ABMS include the
American Board of Allergy & Immunology, the
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American Board of Anesthesiology, the American Board of Colon & Rectal Surgery, the
American Board of Dermatology, the American
Board of Emergency Medicine, the American
Board of Family Medicine, the American Board
of Medical Genetics, the American Board of
Neurological Surgery, the American Board of
Nuclear Medicine, the American Board of Obstetrics & Gynecology, the American Board of
Ophthalmology, the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery, the American Board of Otolaryngology, the American Board of Pathology, the
American Board of [**7] Pediatrics, the American Board of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation,
the American Board of Plastic Surgery, the
American Board of Preventive Medicine, the
American Board of Psychiatry & Neurology, the
American Board of Radiology, the American
Board of Surgery, the American Board of Thoracic Surgery, and the American Board of Urology.
4 In court filings contained in the supplemental
record, Johnson indicated that, at a June 19,2007,
hearing on Dr. Panayiotou's summary-judgment
motion, she also proffered as evidence a printed
copy of e-mail correspondence her counsel had
engaged in with Joan Otto, senior credentials
manager for ABrM, on the topic of certificates of
added qualifications and subspecialties. However,
she acknowledged in her motion to supplement
the record that the trial court rejected the proffer
as not being in the proper form, apparently because it was unauthenticated.
After receiving Johnson's motion opposing his
summary-judgment motion, Dr. Panayiotou filed, on
June 18, 2007, a motion asking the trial court to strike
Dr. Schapira's affidavit on the ground that it contradicted
his previous sworn testimony. 5 See Wilson v. Teng. 786
So. 2d 485, 497 (Ala. 2000) ("This Court [H8] has held
that 'a party is not allowed to directly contradict prior
sworn testimony to avoid the entry of a summary judgment.'" (quoting Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki,
611 So. 2d 313, 317 (Ala. 1992»). The next day, June
19,2007, Dr. Panayiotou filed another motion asking the
tria I court also to strike the printed copies of pages taken
from ABMS and ABlM's respective Web sites on the
ground that the documents were unsworn, uncerti fled,
unauthenticated, and, therefore, inadmissible. See Carter
v. Cantrell Mach. Co., 662 So. 2d 891, 893 (Ala. 1995)
("The documents were not properly authenticated and,
thus, they were inadmissible hearsay, which cannot be
relied on to defeat a properly supported motion for a
summary judgment. "). Dr. Panayiotou simultaneously
submitted a personal affidavit in which he made the following statements:

H

"2. I am a physician duly licensed to
practice medicine in the State of Alabama
and was so licensed at the relevant times.
1 am certified by [ABIMJ as a specialist in
Internal Medicine, Cardiology ["875]
and Interventional Cardiology and was so
certified at the relevant times,
"3. [ABIMJ formally recognized certification in the subspecialty of Interventional Cardiology [**9) in 1999. In 1999,
as part of the certification process in
Interventional Cardiology, I submitted
verified data to the Board stating that I
had successfully accomplished the appropriate number of interventional cardiology
procedures to enable me to take the examination for certification in lnterventional Cardiology.
"4. As a result of passing this examination, (ABIMJ certified me as a specialist in the subspecialty of Interventional
Cardiology.

"5. By meeting the certification requirements of [ABIMJ, beginning in 1999
I was allowed to represent to the public
that I am board-certified in the subspecialty of Interventiona I Cardiology."

On June 21, 2007, Dr. Panayiotou submitted two additional affidavits. In the first, ABIM official Joan Otto
swore that "[ABIM] recognized certification in Interventional Cardiology in \999" and that "Dr. Panayiotou was
certified by [ABIM] in I nterventional Cardiology in
1999." In the second, Amy A, Mosser, vice president of
administration and operations for ABMS, swore as follows:
"5. ABMS approved the certification
process for Interventional Cardiology in
J 996 and began recognizing certification
in this subspecialty in 1999, when the first
certifying examination [h J OJ was offered by the ABIM.
"6. ABIM, like other Member
Boards, originally designated ils board
certification for subspecialties as a 'certificate of added qualifications.' This was
in conformity with general ABMS practice at that time. Subsequently, ABMS
decided to transition away from such language. The ABMS Bylaws in effect in
2002 required future applications for sub-
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Blue Cross & Blue Shield 0/ Alabama v.
Hodurski. 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala
2004). In making such a determination,
we must review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovanl. Wilson
v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 (Ala.
1986). Once the movant makes a prima
facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shi fis
to the nonmovant to produce "substantial
evidence" as to the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Bass v. SoUlhTrus(
Bank 0/ Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, §
12-21-12.'"

specialty certificates to be designated as
subspecialty certificates, but gave the
Member Boards discretion to continue
designating existing subspecialty certificates as certificates of added qualifications or special qualifications or to discontinue those terms and simply use the
subspecialty designation. These differences in terminology are just that, however, and have no substantive effect on
ABMS's recognition of certification.
ABMS has continually recognized ABIM
certification in the subspecialty of Interventional Cardiology since its inception in
1999."

5 During his deposition, Dr. Schapira testified
that interventional c<udiology had been a subspecialty of internal medicine "[s]ince 1999 or 2000"
and that the interventional cardiology board
"started in 1999,2000."
On August 15, 2007, the trial court denied Dr.
Panayiotou's [**11] motion for a summary judgment,
holding that Dr. Schapira was a similarly situated healthcare provider "regardless of [his] lack of subsubspecialty certification" and without addressing
whether Dr. Panayiotou was actually certified as a specialist in interventional cardiology in March 2002 when
he performed the heart catheterization on Sullivan. The
tfial court simultaneously entered an order granting Dr.
Panayiotou's "motion to strike" without specifying
whether it intended to grant the June 18 motion to strike,
the June 19 motion to strike, Of both.
Dr. Panayiotou subsequently moved the trial court to
certify its order denying his motion for a summary judgment for a permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.
App. P., and, on September 7, 2007, the trial court did
so. On September 21, 2007, Dr. Panayiotou petitioned
this Court for permission to appeal. We granted that petition on November 1,2007.
II.

"'We apply the same standard of review
[in reviewing the grant or denial [*876]
of a summary-judgment motion] as the
trial court applied. Specifically, we must
determine whether the movant has made a
prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant
is entitled IHI2] to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56 (c), Ala. R. Civ. P;

Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Schulte. 970 So. 2d 292, 295
(Ala. 2007) (quoting Dow v. Alabama Democratic Parly.
897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004».
II I.
This appeal presents two issue for this Court to consider: (I) what is the meaning of the term "specially" as
used in § 6-5-548(c); and (2) was Dr. Panayiolou certified by ABIM as a specialist in interventional cardiology
at the time he allegedly breached the standard of care in
March 2002.
The legislature has defined a similarly situated
health-care provider as a health-care provider that is
"certified by an [H13] appropriate American board in
the same specialty" as the defendant health-care provider. 6 § 6-5-548(c)(3) (emphasis added). Dr. Panayiotou argues that a "specialty" for the purposes of § 6-S548(c) is any specialized area of medicine in which a
medical board offers certification and that, because
ABIM offers certification in interventional cardiology,
that area is therefore a "specialty" for purposes of § 6-5548. Johnson, however, argues that an area of medicine
is a "specialty" only if it is specifically designated by a
medical board as a "specialty"; hence, she argues, because ABIM officially designates interventional cardiology as a "subspecialty," il is nol a "specialty" for § 6-5548 purposes.
6 This presupposes that the defendant healthcare provider is certified by an appropriate board
as a specialist; if not, § 6-5-S48(b) governs instead of § 6-5-S48(c), and there is no such requirement.
We agree with Dr. Panayiotou that a specialty is any
specialized area of medicine in which an American
medical board offers certification. There is no indication
in the AMLA that the legislature intended to define the
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term "specialty" based upon the taxonomic scheme used
by ABTM, ABMS, or any [**14] other professional
medical board. 7 That any appropriate American medical
board offers certification in an area of medicine is itself
evidence that that area of medicine is a specialty.
7 Eighteen of the specialty boards govemed by
ABMS, including ABIM, offer certification in
specialized areas of medicine that they officially
designate as "subspecialties."
The interpretation of the term "specialty" advocated
by Johnson, if adopted, would be problematic in its application because it fails to recognize that some areas of
medicine may technically be deemed "subspecialties" by
some boards, but recognized as specialties by others. For
examp Ie, in Chapman v. Smith, 893 So. 2d 293 (Ala.
2004), this Court recognized that the defendant anesthesiologist was certified in the specialty field of pain management by the American Academy of Pain Management
("AAPM"), a non-ABMS board.' (*877] ABMS does
not recognize pain management as a "specialty" under its
taxonomic scheme; however, the relevant ABMS board,
the American Board of Anesthesiology, does recognize
"pain medicine" as a "subspecialty." Thus, applying the
argument advanced by Johnson, whether a boardcertified anesthesiologist practicing in the [** J 5] painmanagement/pain-medicine field was a specialist in that
field would hinge on whether the anesthesiologist's certificate was issued by AAPM, in which case he would be
recognized by our courts as a specialist, or by the American Board of Anesthesiology, in which case he would
not be recognized as a specialist -- even though both
boards apparently agree that the field is a unique area of
medicine and recognize it as such. The only difference is
that the field is deemed a "subspecialty" in the ABMS
hierarchy. Whether an area of medicine is a "specialty"
for purposes of § 6-5-548 should not change depending
on which board has certi fied the particular health-care
provider in that specialty.
8 The defendant physician in Chapman was also
board-certified in anesthesiology, although the
opinion does not identify the board that issued
that certification. 893 So. 2d at 296.
Moreover, if we were to adopt Johnson's argument
relying on the taxonomic designations used by ABiM
and ABMS, it would pave the way for a gastroenterologist, an endocrinologist, or a nephrologist, all of whom
practice in an area recognized as a "subspecialty" by
ABIM, to testify as a similarly situated health-care provider [""'J6] against a cardiologist merely because they
were all certified by ABIM in the "specialty" of internal
medicine -- regardless of the fact that their expertise is in
the digestive system, the endocrine system, and the kid-

H

neys, respectiveJy, and that they might have had minimal
experience with medical issues related to the heart. This
is precisely the situation § 6-5-548 was enacted to prevent. Thus, we now explicitly hold that if an appropriate
American medical board recognizes an area of med icine
as a distinct field and certifies health-care providers in
that field, that area is a specialty for purposes of § 6-5548.
We note that the Supreme Court of Michigan
reached a similar conclusion when it considered th is issue. In Woodard v. Custer, 476 Mich. 545,719 N.W.2d
842 (2006), that court considered the definition of "specialty" as the term is used in Mich. Compo Laws §
600.2169, which states, in relevant part:
"( I) In an action alleging medical malpractice, a person shall not give expert
testimony on the appropriate standard of
practice or care unless the person is licensed as a health professional in this
state or another state and meets the following criteria:
"(a) If the party against [""" 17] whom
or on whose behal f the testimony is offered is a specialist, specializes at the time
of the occurrence that is the basis for the
action in the same specialty as the party
against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered. However, if the party
against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist who is
board certified, the expert witness must be
a specialist who is board certified in that
specialty."

Referring to Dorland's !tIustrated Medical Dictionary
(28th ed.), the Woodard court concluded:
"[AJ 'specialty' is a particular branch of
medicine or surgery in which one can potentially become board certified.
" ... Moreover, 'sub' is defined as 'a
prefix ... with the meanings "under," "below," "beneath"
"secondary," "at
["878] a lower point in a hierarchy[.}'''
Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). Therefore, a 'subspecialty'
is a particular branch of medicine or SUTgery in which one can potentially become
board certified that falls under a specialty
or within the hierarchy of that specialty. A
subspecialty, although a more particularized specialty, is nevertheless a specialty
Therefore, if a defendant physician spe-
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cializes in a subspecialty, the plaintiffs
[** 18] expert witness must have specialized in the same subspecialty as the defendant physician at [he time of the occurrence (hat is the basis for the action. "

476 Mich, at 561-62, 719 N.W,2d at 851 (emphasis
added). The court also noted in a footnote that ABMS
had filed an amicus curiae brief in which it agreed that a
sUbspecialty constitutes a specialty, 476 Mich. at 562
n,6, 719N,W.2dat851 n,6.

Having held that interventional cardiology is a recognized specialty. we must now address whether in fact
Dr. Panayiotou was certified in that specialty at the time
of the a Ileged breach of the standard of care. Dr. Panayiotou alleges that he was; Johnson alleges he was noL In
conjunction with his motion for a summary judgment.
Dr. Panayiotou submitted evidence, summarized above,
sufficient to make a prima facie showing that he was
board-certified in interventional cardiology at the time of
the alleged breach of the standard of care in March 2002;
thus, the burden then shifted to Johnson to produce substantial evidence showing that Dr, Panayiotou was not
board-certified in interventional cardiology in March
2002. Johnson has failed to meet that burden.
The evidence Johnson submitted in an attempt

[H 19] to meet her burden included: (I) printed copies of
pages from the Web sites of both ABIM and ABMS; (2)
an affidavit from Dr. Schapira; and (3) Dr, Panayiotou's
curriculum vitae. • Dr. Panayiotou filed separate motions
to strike both the printed copies of the pages from the
Web sites and Dr. Schapira's affidavit, and the tfial court
subsequently entered an order granting a motion to strike
without stating which motion to strike it was granting.
Dr. Panayiotou's position is that the trial court's order
granted both motions to strike, while Johnson alleges it is
unc lear what O1olion or motions the trial court intended
to strike, Regardless of the trial court's intent, however,
the evidence submitted by Johnson was insufficient to
rebut Dr. Panayiotou's prima facie showing that he was
board-certified in interventional cardiology at the time he
allegedly breached the standard of care in March 2002,
9 After the trial court denied Dr. Panayiotou's
motion for a summary judgment and after we
granted his subsequent petition to fi Ie an immediate permissive appeal of that ruling, Johnson obtained a new affidavit from ABIM official Joan
Ono and moved the trial court to supplement the
record to include
[**20] that affidavit. Dr.
Panayiotou objected, arguing that Rule 1OCt), Ala,

**

R. App, P., does not allow the record on appe al to
be supplemented to include evidence that was not
in the record at the trial court level. The trial
court nevertheless granted Johnson's motion to
supplement, and the new affidavit was added to
the record. DL Panayiotou has since moved this
Court to strike the supplement to the record, and
that motion has been granted. See Cowen v, MS
Enters" Inc" 642 So. 2d 453, 455 (Ala, J 994)
("Rule IOU) provides for the supplementation of
the record only to include matters that were in
evidence in the trial court. That rule was not intended to allow the inclusion of material in the
record on appeal that had not been before the trial
court."),
We first note that the printed copies of pages from
the ABIM and ABMS Web sites submittcd by Johnson
"were not [*879J properly authenticated and, thus, thcy
were inadmissible hearsay, which cannot be relied 011 10
defeat a properly supported motion for a summary j udgment." Carfer, 662 So. 2d at 893, Accordingly, we will
not consider that evidence on appeal, regardless of
whether the trial court actually struck it. See Chatham v.
CSX Transp., Inc" 613 So. 2d 341,346 (Ala. 1993)
[*"21] (stating that this Court "may not consider" inadmissible evidence that a party properly moved to strike)
Citing Wilson, supra, Dr, Panayiotou also urges us not to
consider Dr. Schapira's affidavit, which directly contradicted his deposition testimony. However, the so-called
"sham affidavit doctrine" applied by this Court in Wi/son, which prevents an individual from contradicting
prior sworn testimony to avoid the entry of a summary
judgment, has, to date, been applied only against actual
parties in Alabama, and Dr. Schapira is an expert witness, not a party, See Champ Lyons, Jr. & Ally W, Howell, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated § 56,7
(4th ed. 2004) ("Strong dictum in Tittle v, Alabama
Power Co" 570 So, 2d 60 I (Ala, 1990) suggests that the
rule preventing a party from contradicting an earlier
deposition by affidavit for purposes of avoidance
(he
entry of summary judgment does not apply to prevent
such activity when the deponent is a non-paliy,"). While
one law review article has noted that other courts to consider the issue have "generally agreed that [the shamaffidavit doctrine] applies to the contradictory testimony
of expert witnesses," Applying the Sham Affidavit [* ;022]
Doc/rine in Arizona, 38 Ariz, SL LJ. 995, 1048 (Winter
2006) (footnotes omitted), and one court has noted that
"[itJ can think of no reason, however, not to apply this
rule to the present case involving the testimony and affidavit of the plaintiffs sole expert witness," AdelmanTremblay v, Jewel Cos, 859 F.2d 517, 521 (7th CiL
1988), we need not address that issue at this time because, even if we considered the affidavit, we would
have to conclude that Johnson failed to create a genuine

or
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issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Panayiotou was
board-certified in interventional cardiology in March
2002.

gue that certificates of special qualifications are not board cel1ifications that need
to be matched. We c{arifY. however, that
under (he above definition 0/ the phrase
'board certified,' any difference between
what are traditionally referred (0 as
board certificatiOns and what have commonly been called certificates 0/ special
qualifications is merely one 0/ semantics.
When a certificate of special qualifications is a credential bestowed by a national, independent medical board indicating proficiency in a medical specialty, it is
itself a board certification ["*25j thaI
must be matched"

In his affidavit, Dr. Schapira declared that Dr.
Panayiotou was not board certified in interventional cardiology in March 2002 because, at that time, Dr. Panayiotou held only a "certificate of added qualification."
Johnson argues that Dr. Schapira's statement is further
supported by Dr. Panayiotou's own curriculum vitae,
which omits the word "subspecialty" next to "'nterventiona I Cardiology" in the list of examinations passed by
Dr. Panayiotou, but explicitly lists "Cardiovascular Subspecialty" (emphasis added) in that same list, thus indicating, Johnson argues, that even Dr. Panayiotou [**23]
recognized that interventional cardiology was not a "subspecialty" in 1999 when he passed the examination.
However, Johnson's argument was directly refuted
by an ABMS official, who, in an affidavit submitted by
Dr. Panayiotou, explained that there was no substantive
difference between a certificate of added qualification
and certification in a subspecialty, and that" ABMS has
continually recognized ABIM certification in the subspecialty of Interventional Cardiology since its inception in
J999." In light of this definitive evidence on this point,
we can say as a matter of law that the certificate of added
qualification Dr. Panayiotou held in interventional cardiology in March 2002 was the equivalent of subspecialty
certification and that he was accordingly a boardcertified specialist in interventional cardiology at that
time.
We further note that the Michigan Supreme Court,
in Woodard, did not have to directly consider this issue;
however, a concurring Justice nevertheless did so and
similarly concluded that there was no functional [*880]
difference between a certificate of added qualification
and board certification, stating:
"As we did above with regard to the
'specialty' versus 'subspecialty' [* *24)
dispute, it is again necessary for us to resolve a question that arises in most cases
as a result of nomenclature often used to
distinguish between certifications offered
for broad specialty areas and certifications
offered for the narrower subspecialty areas. Specifically. certifications coinciding
with the broader specialty areas are often
referred to by p3l1ies and in case law as
board certifications. while certifications
coinciding with the narrower specialty areas are referred to as 'certificates of special qualifications' or 'certificates of added
qualifications,' The result is that in many
cases, such as Woodard, plaintiffs will ar-

*~

476 Mich. 545, 613, 719 N.W.2d 842, 878 (Taylor, CJ.,
concurring in the result) (emphasis added).
V.

Dr. Panayiotou moved the trial court to enter a
summary judgment in his favor in the medicalmalpractice action filed against him by Johnson, alleging
that she had failed to identify a similarly situated health·
care provider who would testify that he had breached the
standard of care in his treatment of Sullivan. The trial
court denied his motion, holding that the expert identified by Johnson, Dr. Schapira, was in fact similarly situated to Dr. Panayiotou because they were both boardcertified by ABIM in internal medicine. However, because Dr. Panayiotou put forth evidence indicating that
he was also board-certified by ABIM in interventional
cardiology when the alleged malpractice occurred and
that Dr. Schapira did not hold that certification, the trial
court erred in holding that Dr. Panayiotou and Dr.
Schapira were similarly situated health-care providers.
Accordingly, the order of lhe trial court denying Dr.
Panayiotou's motion for a summary judgment is reversed, and this cause is remanded for the trial court to
enter a summary judgment for Dr. Panayiotou.
REVERSED [**26) AND REMANDED
See, Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Murdock, J., dissents.
CONCUR BY: COBB (In Part)
DISSENT BY: COBB (In Part)
DISSENT
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COBB, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The majority opinion presents a new rationale for
defining the term "specialty" as applied to similarly situated health-care providers under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5548. Although J do not disagree with this rationale and I
concur in its adoption, I do not believe that it is appropriate to apply it to this case. In this case, and under the
state of the lawaI the time the trial court found that Dr.
Panayiotou and Dr. Schapira were similarly situated
health-care providers, the trial court was correct. The
record shows that, in the context of the medical proce-

**

dur: in question, Dr. Schapira [·881) had experience
similar to or greater than Dr. Panayiotou. Under these
circumstances, I believe that it would be more just to
apply t,he. new constr.uction of § 6-5-548 as adopted by
the majority prospectively, rather than retroactively. Sec,
e.g., Ex parte FP" 857 So, 2d 125 (Ala. 2003); Cily oj
Daphne v. City oj Spanish Fort, 853 So. 2d 933 (Ala.
2003); and Ex parte Bonner, 676 So. 2d 925 (Ala,
1995)(cases [**27] supporting the general rule that statu,tes should be construed prospectively and not retrospcctlvel~ In the absence of a particular indication of legislative mtent to apply statute retrospeetively).
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PAMELA L. BOND, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Craig R. Bond, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Ddcndant.
Civil No. 06-16S2-JO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

2008 U.S. Dist. LEX(S 19881

March 10, 2008, Decided
COUNSEL: [*1] For Plaintiff: Jamal K Alsaffar, Michael E. J. Archuleta, ARCHULETA ALSAFFAR &
HIGGINBOTHAM, Au.stin, YX; Ernest J . Simmons,
ATTORNEY AT LA W, Portland, OR.
For Defendant: Britannia 1. Hobbs, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Portland , OR; Kristen A . Nelson, OFFICE OF REGlONAL COUNSEL, U.S .
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Portland,
OR.
JUDGES: ROBERT E. JONES, U.S. District Judge.
OPINION BY: ROBERT E. JONES
OPINION
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA W
JONES, Judge :
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Pamela L. Bond, the widow of Craig R.
Bond, deceased, and the personal representative of his
estate, brings this Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")
action pursuant to 28 U.S .c. §§ 1346(b) and 2674,
against the United States of America ("defendant") to
recover damages for medical malpractice reSUlting from
the negligent treatment, wrongful acts, and omissions of
employees at the Portland Veterans Administration
Medical Center ("VAMC"). Complaint (# I) at 2-3. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent
for failing to properly and timely diagnose Bond's cardiac condition ; failing to provide him with appropriate
specialty surgical intervention; failing to conduct medically necessary testing prior to his discharge; and [*2J
for improperly discharging him before his dangerous,

life-threatening cardiac condition was properly stabilized . See id. at 6. As a result, plaintiff claims that Bond,
who was 55 years old, suffered an untimely death from
his cardiac condition on September 26, 2005, approximately 48 hours after he was discharged from the
VAMC.
Pursuant to the PTCA, plaintiffs medical malpractice claim was tried to the court, without a jury. The applicable substantive law in this FTCA case is that of the
State of Oregon, where plaintiffs alleged injuries occurred . See 28 U.S.C . §§ 1346(b)(I) and 2672. In Oregon, wrongful death actions are authorized under O .R.S.
§ 30.020, and the standard of care is set forth in O. R.S. §
677 .095(1), as follows : "A physician
licensed Lo
practice medicine .. . by the Board of Medical Examiners for the State of Oregon has the duty to use that degree
of care, skill , and diligence that is used by ordinaril y
careful physicians . .. in the same or similar circumstances in the community of the phys ician . . . or a similar community."
The four-day trial commenced on February 5, 2008.
After carefully considering the large volume of medical
literature submitted by both [·3] parties before, during,
and after trial, as well as hearing the testimony of sixteen
expert witnesses regarding the liability and damages issues in this case, the court concludes that the physicians
who treated Bond at the VAMC from the time of his
emergency room admission on September 22, 2005, to
the time of his discharge on September 24, 2005, met the
standard of care for physicians in the Portland area. '
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, defendant
did not commit medical malpractice.
At the end of the trial, the court ruled that the
parties could submit supplemental literature to
address th e following questio n: What percentage
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of stenosis would call into play a surgical approach? In particular, the court sought literature
showing the percentage breakdowns of stenosis
correlated with life expectancy (mortality). The
material submitted by plaintiff is listed in Appendix A, and the defendant's submissions are listed
in Appendix B.

SUMMARY OF BOND'S MEDICAL HISTORY
The data contained in Bond's 607-page medical record is not subject to dispute; though the interpretation of
several key tests and the course of treatment the V AMC
doctors chose to address Bond's cardiac condition [*4J
involve a number of judgment calis, which plaintiff contends were not appropriate. It is undisputed that Bond,
who was a combat veteran from the Vietnam conflict,
was permanently disabled from post-traumatic stress
disorder CHPTSD") and hearing loss. There is evidence in
the record that Bond smoked a pack a day of unfiltered
cigarettes for approximately 30 years and had not yet
managed to quit as of the date of his discharge from the
hospital. See Exhibit P I at 262; and see id, at 170, 174
(discussing cessation counseling at discharge). Bond also
struggled with alcohol abuse; a notation in his medical
records indicates that he reported regularly consuming a
12-pack of beer per day for 30 years. See id. However,
his widow testified that she believed his alcohol use declined significantly the past few years. Bond, who was
six feet two inches tall and weighed 240 pounds, was
also borderline obese.
In spite of the health risk factors associated with his
lifestyle choices, Bond did not sutTer from any liver disease or lung disorder. In June of 2005, physician progress notes show that he was being treated for PTSD;
depression; upper back, shoulder, and neck pain; hypertension: elevated cholesterol; [*5] and severe gastroesophageal reflux disease (HGERD"). See id. at 264. Additionally. the 2005 progress notes from his primary care
physician show that Bond did not report symptoms of a
serious cardiac ailment before his September admission
to the V AMC, Exh ibit P I at 246-277, When Bond visited
the V AMC emergency room for symptoms related to his
GERD on July 16, 2005, an electrocardiogram (HEKGH),
which measures the electrical activity of the heart during
its contractions, showed normal cardiac activity. Id. at
250,550.
It is undisputed that when Bond arrived at the
VAMC emergency room on September 22nd, he was
suffering from acute coronary syndrome ("ASC") and
unstable angina as evidenced by his symptoms of severe
substernal chest pain (reported J 0+ on a scale of 1 to 10),
shortness of breath, sweating, and nausea. See Exhibit PI
at 212, 217, 238,517. When questioned later during his
admission about his history of chest pain, Bond reported

for the first time that he had been experiencing episodes
of pain lasting 45 minutes to 5 hours almost daily for the
past two months; that the pain radiated to his shoulders;
that it occurred at rest and with exertion; that it was occasionally associated ("6] with nausea; and thal rwo
days before he had experienced his most severe epi sode,
which lasted close to 20 hours and was accompanied by
vomiting and sweating. ld, at 209.
Each of the seven EKGs taken during Bond's
VAMC admission showed abnormal readings indicative
of ischemia, which means that Bond's heart muscle was
suffering from a lack of oxygenated blood; there was
also evidence of an older myocardial infarction ("MI")
that occurred sometime after the July EKG. See id. at
543-547 (EKG test strips). Further testing revealed that
Bond had 1313 pglml of brain natriuretic peptide
("BNPIl) present in his blood, which is abnormally high
given that the level should have been less than 126
pglml. ld. at 203, All of the cardiology experts agreed
that such a high BNP reading indicated that Bond's heart
muscle suffered some form 0 f stress. However, Bond's
levels of Troponin, a cardiac enzyme that is present
when cell damage or death occurs and is an indi cator of a
recent MI, were negligible-- less than 0.0 I uglL--in a
series of three tests. See id. at 189-191. Finally, an echocardiogram was performed to determine Bond's ejection
fraction in the left ventricle. The ejection fraction measures [*1] the contractions of the heart, and is expressed
as a percentage of blood that is pushed out with each
heartbeat; Bond had a reading of 56 percent, which falls
within the normal range. See Exhibit P I at J89,509.

It is undisputed that during the tirst 24 hours or so
following Bond's admission, the V AMC physicians appropriately treated his cardiac condition with aspirin,
beta blockers, and ACE inhibitors, as well as intravenous
nitrates, heparin, and Tirofiban. It also is undisputed that
the decision to perform a cardiac catheterization and angiogram to view the condition of Bond's coronary arteries was appropriate, and that the diagnosis that Bond was
suffering from coronary artery disease ("CAD") was COTrect. Notes in Bond's medical records show that his chest
pain and other symptoms of cardiac distress disappeared
during his stay at the V AMC, and the monitoring equipment that he was connected to throughout his admission
did not register any acute arrhythm ias. See id. at J72,
176, 183, 189. On September 23rd, Bond was up and
walking around without experiencing further chest pain
or shortness of breath, and he reported that he was feeling well and wanted to go home. ld. at 183, 203. [*8] A
few hours before he was discharged on September 24th,
Bond reported that he felt "great," and had "no chest pain
since admission." Id. at 176.
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What remains disputed and therefore must be resolved by the court, as the trier of fact, are the following
issues:
I. Whether the V AMC doctors mis-read Bond's angiogram when they concluded that he had 40 percent
stenosis (narrowing) in the proximal section of the left
anterior descending ("LAD") coronary artery;

2. If the V AMC doctors did mis-read the angiogram,
whether the stenosis was 80 percent as plaintiff contends,
and as noted in Bond's autopsy report, or whether the
stenosis was some other percentage;

3. Based on my determination of the percentage of
stenosis present in Bond's proximal LAD, as well as the
presence of stenosed areas in the LAD and other coronary vessels, whether the standard of care required an
invasive procedure such as angioplasty, stent placement,
or bypass surgery before Bond was discharged from the
V AMC to prevent death from an acute cardiac event
such as an arrhythmia or infarction;
4. Whether VAMC doctors committed medical malpractice in fai I ing to perform a final EKG, as ordered,
before Bond was discharged; and

5. [*9] Whether VAMC doctors' failure to perform
an exercise tolerance test ("Err") before Bond was discharged constituted medical malpractice.
The above medical issues were the subject of extensive and con flicting expert testimony throughout the
four-day trial. Based on my review of the testimony, my
credibility determinations, and my review of the conflicting medical literature offered by the parties, 1 make the
findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth below,
FINDJNGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

A. The Angiogram Reading, Percentage of Stenosis, and Appropriate Treatment
The primary divergence between plaintiffs and defendant's expert cardiologists revolves around the analysis of the arteries of Bond's heart; in particular, the
proximal (upper) segment of the LAD. According to
plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jay Schapira, the LAD is
one of three arteries running downward from the mouth
of the aorta at the top of the heart and is functionally
important because it supplies the largest territory of heart
muscle. Therefore, any blockage or narrowing that impedes the flow of blood through the LAD, especially if it
occurs near the origin of the vessel as it did in Bond's
case. is considered [·10] serious because a large portion
of the heart muscle could suffer damage.
Dr. Schapira claimed that a visual inspection of
Bond's proximal LAD showed a tight lesion, with 70 to

80 percent stenosis, that he labeled "the widow maker."
He also identified areas of stenosis further down the
LAD, as well as in two other coronary arteries, and
opined that Bond should have been treated surgically
before he was discharged from the V AMC, prefe rably
with at least four bypasses, Just before trial, with no notice to the court or opposing counsel, Dr. Schapira performed a quantitative analysis using calipers and micrometer to confirm his visual estimation of 80 percent
stenosis based on a single frame of the digital angio gram
"film." See Exhibits P58 and P62.
In contrast, two of defendant's treating cardiology
experts, Dr. George Giraud and Dr. Eric Stecker, who
performed Bond's cardiac catheterization and interpreted
the angiogram results on September 23,2005, concluded,
based on their visual examinations, that the same stenosis
identified in the proximal LAD was only 40 percent. Sec
Exhibit PI at 509. Because the plaintiffs calibration was
done without notice to the defense, the court requested
['" II] that the defense experts perform a similar calibration, Dr. Giraud performed the same quantitative analysis
on the same frame of film and testi fied that his measurements confirmed that the lesion had a stenosis of 38
to 39 percent. Defendant's leading expert witness, nontreating cardiologist Dr. John McAnulty, performed
quantitative angiography on the same lesion using thai
frame, but also based his measurements on other camera
angles after reviewing both still-frame and motion picture films, and calibrated the stenosis at 48 to 50 percent.
See Exhibit 0-129,
There is no question in the court's mind that all 01'
the expert witnesses were sincere, highly trained, and
with respect to most of the opinions they expressed, each
passed the screening required by Daubert v, Merrell Dow
Parmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125
L. Ed. 2d 469 (J 993). Thus, to resolve this schism of
expert opinions regarding the percentage of stenosis present in Bond's proximal LAD, and to make a determination as to whether the V AMC doctors mis-read the degree of stenosis shown in Bond's angiogram films, the
court must evaluate the credibility of each expert who
gave an opinion about these issues.
Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jay [+ 12] Schapira, a
very active board certified cardiologist from California,
teaches as an adjunct at UCLA, diagnoses heart disease,
and maintains a highly active surgical practice in which a
large percentage of patients receive surgical intervention.
He describes his practice as invasive cardiology and
interventional cardiology; that is, utilizing mechanical
devices to open up coronary arteries, including performing angioplasty with balloons and inserting stents. He
testified that he personally performs stent procedures, but
refers patients who require bypasses to heart surgeons
who specialize in that procedure. Dr. Schapira also is a
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very experienced medical/legal expert witness who
charges $ 10,000 per day and who has testified at trial
more than 100 times in his career; at least 20 times between 2000 and 2005. In 2005, he testified in depositions
as many as 42 times, approximately 70 percent of the
time for the plaintiff in the litigation. At trial in this case,
he testified that only five percent of his practice deals
with giving expert testimony in medical/legal litigation
where he is not the treating physician. Without doubt,
Dr. Schapira is a highly qualified and highly paid nontreating (* 13] expert. Thus, the court expected him to be
extremely careful in presenting his testimony in his Rule
26 report, his pretrial deposition, and during the trial of
the case.
To evaluate the weight of Dr. Schapira's opinions, I
examined not only his vast credentials, but also any inconsistent or questionable basis for his opinions under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In his deposition, Dr.
Schapira was asked to justify his position with medical
articles to support the opinion that a patient with a stenosis such as Bond's should have been given immediate
surgical intervention, and that an invasive procedure
"would have significantly reduced the mortality rate of
patients like Mr. Bond." See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Daubert Motion (# 28) at Exhibit A, p. 71. Dr.
Schapira testified during his deposition that he thought
the BARI trial, the CASS trial, and several other research
studies supported his opinion that surgery improves life
expectancy in patients like Bond. See id. However, when
I read these studies before the trial, they revealed that the
researchers concluded the opposite; there is no statistically significant difference in survival rates between surgical intervention [*141 versus medical therapy even in
patients with 3-vessel CAD, particularly if their left ventricular (ilL V") function (determined by measuring ejection traction) was normal. See Exhibit D120; Appendix
B, Exhibit 14. Further, the CASS research involved patients with mild stable angina, who were tree of angina
after infarction, as opposed to patients such as Mr. Bond,
whom plaintiff contends had unstable angina and high
risk CAD. Following this observation, I wrote to plaintiff's counsel requesting that Dr. Schapira submit articles
to justify his opinion. Plaintiff submitted trial exhibits
that included medical treatises and journal articles, see
Exhibits PI I-P36; however, Dr. Schapira's trial testimony covered only the 2002 ACC/AHA Guideline Update dealing with the classification of risk of death from
unstable angina, Exhibit PI4, and the significance of
BNP in predicting risk of an adverse cardiac event, Exhibits 29,32-34.
Because it remained unclear whether there was a
correlation between surgical intervention and increased
chance of survival in patients with the percentage of
stenosis observed in Bond's proximal LAD, at the court's

request, post-trial on February 13, 2008, plaintiff [" 15j
submitted supplemental articles purporting to support
plaintiffs claims, See Appendix A. There is reI jable
medical evidence in the 2004 ACC/AHA Guideline Update to support Dr. Shapira's contention that bypass surgery generally improves long-term survival in patients
with 3-vessel CAD if there is "significant"--meaning
greater than 50% stenosis--and "[tJhe more severe the
symptoms, the more proximal that LAD CAD, and the
worse the LV function, the greater the benefit from surgery." Appendix A, Exhibit C at 3.2.2.2. However, literally turning the page to read a bit further, the same
source supports defendant's contention that non-surgical
medical treatment was an appropriate choice, as follows:
"LV systolic function remains an important predictor of
which patients are likely to benefit from surgery. In patients with a normal EF [ejection tractionJ, surgical revasculatization generally provides little survival benefit."
Id. at 3.2.2.4. Bond's echocardiogram shows Ihat his
ejection fraction was normal. Dr. Schapira's failure 10
fully inform the court of the Significance of all of the
data acquired during Bond's admission to the VAMC
does little to bolster his credibility,
Another problem [* \6] with Dr. Scnapira's testimony is that he bases his conclusion that Bond's proximal LAD stenosis was 80 percent on the findings made
by the VA pathologist, and he now claims his earlier
estimate at 70 percent in his Rule 26 report to the court
was a typographical error. Defendant contended that a
physician cannot necessarily rely on measurements
found at autopsy as an indicator of the percentage of
stenosis present while the patient is alive with his heart
still beating, and drew the analogy that postmortem
measurements are akin to measuring the diameter of a
bicycle tire after it has gone flat--which is what happens
to arteries after death-- versus measuring a fully inflated
tire. Defendant's expert, Dr. John McAnulty, emphasized
this discrepancy at trial when he testified as follows:
[T)here's a weI/-recognized discrepancy
between findings trom an angiogram and
findings trom an autopsy.
Even if it's understood that the same
region of the blood vessel is looked at, the
situation is different enough that measurements very rarely match between the
two techniques, and overwhelmingly it's
observed that autopsy measurements result in greater narrowing than angiogram
measurements.
.... '+

[T]here ['" 17J are probably a number
of explanations, but J think the concept of
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measuring a tube that's collapsed, versus
one that's held open by pressure is probably one of the major differences in the
measurements when a person has died,
and when a person is being studied with
an angiogram.

Transcript of McAnulty Testimony, February 7, 2008,
("McAnulty Tr.") at 49-50.
In addition, Dr. McAnulty pointed out that the autopsy report did not specify whether the pathologist took
samples from the proximal region of Bond's LAD coronary artery as described in the angiogram, or from a region further down the vessel where there were narrowings that may have been 80 percent.
The V AMC pathologist testified that she did not recall and had not specified in her report precisely which
region of Bond's LAD she obtained the samples that she
analyzed, only that it was her common practice to take
them from the narrowest part of the vessel. In addition,
the pathologist was not qualified to make a before death
and after death analysis regarding the degree of stenosis
observed in Bond's proximal LAD, and Dr. Schapira
never clarified how that difference could justify his assumption. He simply adopted the autopsy report of [* J 8]
80 percent or greater stenosis by referring to "the Glagov
phenomenon," a study he claims all pathologists would
know. However, the VAMC pathologist testified that she
did not account for the Glagov phenomenon when she
calculated the percentages of coronary artery stenoses
listed in her report.
Plaintiff did not supply the court with a reference to
Glagov's research study; however, post-trial defendant
submitted three supplemental articles that discuss
"Glagov's phenomenon." Appendix B, Exhibits 10-12. In
1987, Glagov and his fellow researchers published their
conclusion that "human coronary arteries enlarge in relation to plaque area and that functional important lumen
stenosis may be delayed until the lesion occupies 40 percent of the internal elastic laminal area." Appendix B,
Exhibit JO. After the stenosis exceeds 40 percent, "lumen
diameter decreased, resulting in a restriction in flow ...
IwJhen this [Glagov] phenomenon fails to occur the resu It is stenosis." Append ix B, Exhibit 12 at 4, 10; see
also Exhibit ) I at 518, Fig. I. None of the articles explain how the Glagov phenomenon would be relevant to
support a finding that Bond's proximal LAD stenosis was
80 percent or greater [* 19] at the time his angiogram
was performed.
Regarding the reliability of the testimony provided
by Dr. George Giraud, a V AMC cardiologist who
teaches at that hospital as well as the Oregon Health Sci-

ences University ("OHSU"), and who is a specialist who
directs the VAMC cardiac catheterization lab; and that of
Dr. Eric Stecker, a cardiologist and electrophysiologist.
now practicing at the Legacy Good Samaritan Hospital
here in Portland, I find both of these experts to be vcry
credible. There is no question that these doctors are dedicated professionals who took great care to review Bond's
relevant medical history and to perform the cardiac
catheterization procedure properly. Both testitied that
they took multiple motion picture angiogram views or
Bond's coronary arteries quickly and efficiently using the
VAMC's state-of-the-art dual-camera system to adjust
the camera angle to obtain unobstructed views of the
LAO along the entire length of the vessel. Doctors
Giraud and Stecker testified that they spent more than an
hour conducting a visual examination of Bond's angiogram film clips on September 23rd; however, it was
not standard practice to perform a quantitative analysi>
on a single frame [*20] of film to confirm their visual
reading that the lesion in Bond's proximal LAD was 40
percent stenosed.
When asked by the court to fe-examine Exhibit PS8,
which plaintiff submitted as the prime exhibit of the
"widow maker" stenosis, Dr. Giraud spent hours analyzing Bond's angiogram and testified that, due to the cam·
era angle, the single frame plaintiff relied upon at trial
gave a false impression of the severity of the stenosis in
Bond's proximal LAO artery because there were overlapping segments on either side of the lesion. Calibrating
the thinnest section on Exhibit P58 and comparing other
camera angles of the same artery, which more faithfully
represented in three dimensions the severity of the stenosis, Dr. Giraud testified that his quantitative analysis confirmed that the disputed stenosis was 38 to 40 percent.
However, because they were Bond's treating doctors, and
their angiogram interpretations are directly at issue in
this case, the court recognizes the potential bias inherent
in the testimony given by doctors Giraud and Sleeker
Defendant's non-treating expert, Or. McAnulty, provided the final analysis of the "widow maker" stenosis.
Dr. McAnulty, one of the leading cardiologists [*21] in
this community, is also a clinical researcher in the field
of cardiac sudden death, and currently serves as the
medical director of arrhythmia services at Legacy Good
Samaritan Hospital. In the past, he has served as the head
of the division of cardiology at OHSU, director of the
OHSU cardiac catheterization lab, director of the OHSU
arrhythmia service, and head of the OHSU cardiology
division; he also used to hold an appointment to work at
the VAMC, but no longer has any formal affiliation with
that institution. I have commented on the potential bias
ofpJaintiffs medical expert witness. By like token, I am
fully aware that doctors do not like to testify against fellow doctors or condemn the institution with which they
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are or have been affiliated. In this case, I recognize that
Dr. McAnulty was once closely allied with the Veterans
Hospital and would be most reluctant to condemn or
criticize the procedures of the very persons with whom
he taught, practiced medicine, and in some cases continues to work alongside. In particular Dr. Stecker, who
performed Bond's angiogram, was once Dr. McAnulty's
student, and is now associated with Dr. McAnulty at
Good Samaritan Hospital and obtained [*22] his position at McAnulty's request. Thus, I closely scrutinized
Dr. McAnulty's testimony for any temptation to simply
back up the actions of his present and former colleagues,
rather than give an independent analysis. I find that any
such potential bias did not alter the reliability of his testimony.
Dr. McAnulty testified unequivocally that in 2005,
as it is today, the standard of care for cardiologists reading an angiogram in the Portland metro area was to do a
visual inspection using motion picture angiogram films,
and evaluate the vessels in multiple views. Based on an
initial visual assessment of the lesion in Bond's proximal
LAD, Dr MCAnulty concluded that the stenosis was 40
percent, and further testified that he does not routinely
quantify a stenosis by comparing the diameter of the
narrowing relative to the vessel before and after, as Dr.
Shapira did in this case. Dr. McAnulty concurred with
Dr. Giraud's reasons for objecting to using a single frame
of angiogram film as the basis for interpreting the degree
of stenosis in Bond's proximal LAD, testifying that he
"could not do it from frame 22 alone, because the overlap
of vessels just makes it impossible to have a reference
[*23J vessel to compare the stenosis." McAnulty Tr. at
10. Without knowing precisely what Dr. Giraud's measurements were, Dr. McAnulty engaged in the same quantitative analysis as the other experts but utilized additional views where there was no overlap to better quantify the degree of stenosis, and concluded that it was 48
to 50 percent. See Exhibit D 129.
In the final analysis, to resolve the issues of whether
the V AMC doctors mis-read Bond's angiogram, and
what percentage of stenosis was present in Bond's
proximal LAD coronary artery, the court must choose the
most credible of three sets of witnesses. J find that Dr.
McAnulty is the least biased, the most credible, and has
provided the most well-reasoned and thorough analysis
of Bond's coronary anatomy. He carefully evaluated and
personally marked articles that justify his position and
ultimate conclusions. Also, having taught or supervised
about a third of Oregon's 200 practicing cardiologists, he
is in a unique position to base his testimony on his extensive knowledge of the degree of care, skill, and diligence
used by ordinarily careful cardiologists in the Portland
metro area. Careful doctors who viewed all of Bond's
angiogram films [*24] could not determine the amount

*

of stenosis with exactness. All experts agreed read ing
angiograms is a most difficult task and that reasonable
minds could and did differ. Accordingly, I conclude thaI
the VAMC doctors did not mis-read Bond's angiogram,
and that the catheterization report issued by doctors
Giraud and Stecker met the legal standard of care. Furthermore, I find based on the evidence presented at trial
that the stenosis in Bond's proximal LAD did not exceed
50 percent.
Given that determination, it is less difficult to find
that an invasive procedure such as sten! placement or
bypass was not warranted under the circumstances presented in this case. Dr. Schapira argued that based on the
2002 ACC/AHA practice Guidelines, Bond was in the
"highrisk" category for short-term risk of death, see Exhibits PI4 and P51, and that an invasive procedure such
as bypass surgery could be justified under the legal standard of care. Nevertheless, viewing Bond's medical record as a whole and given that the extensive medical
literature showing no statistically significant difference
in mortality between medical management and an invasive procedure, the course of treatment chosen by the
VAMC doctors [*25] for this veteran was also easily
justifiable. The preamble to the ACC/AHA Guidelines
themselves say it best: "These practice guidelines are
intended to assist physiCians in clinical decision making
by describing a range of generally acceptable approaches
for the diagnosis, management, or prevention of specific
diseases or conditions .... The ultimate judgment regarding the care of a particular patient must be made by the
physician and patient in light of all of the available information and the circumstances presented by that patien!." Exhibit Pl4 at 3.
A review of Bond's symptoms showed, without a
doubt, that he was in acute coronary distress when he
arrived at the V AMC, as his seven abnormal EKGs confirmed. His angiogram revealed a number of significant
stenoses in three different coronary arteries, and he was
diagnosed--for the first time--with diffuse CAD, When
questioned about his history of chest pain he revealed-for the first time--that he had been suffering symptoms
for two months that were indicative of coronary ischemia
and unstable angina. Although of questionable relevance
at the time, Bond's BNP level was at least ten times
higher than normal, and gives some indication [*26] that
he was suffering from severe ischemia.
.
In contrast, Bond's Troponin levels were undetectable, meaning that he had not had an MI within the past
six days. His echocardiogram showed a normal ejection
fraction. He responded well to the medications he received, his cardiac condition stabilized, and his symptoms of cardiac distress disappeared. He did not have
further arrhythmias or show other signs of ischemia even
after the intravenous medications were stopped. Doctors
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who examined him found that did not have a heart murmur, and he was not suffering from pulmonary edema
because his lungs were clear--"no rales, ronchi or
wheezes." See Exhibit PI at 211. At discharge, he reported that he felt great and was walking around without
suffering any symptoms of cardiac distress,
The 2006 ACC/AHA research study that correlated

BNP and Troponin levels to predict "mortality benefit
from coronary revascularization in acute coronary syndromes" elegantly and succinctly demonstrates why the
judgment call that Bond's treating doctors had to make
between medical management and a more invasive
treatment such as revascularization was a diffkult one--a
patient such as Bond who had a Troponin level of [*27]
less than 0.0 I uglL, but also a BNP higher than 237
ng/L, is literally right on the line between "lower mortality with revascularization" and "higher mortality with
revascularization H Exhibit P34, at 1152, Fig. 5. Dr.
Schapira referred to the figure in this study solely to support his testimony that the test for BNP was useful to
stratifY patients into risk categories, and that Bond was at
high risk for an adverse cardiac event based on his BNP
level of 1313 pglml. See Transcript of Schapira Testimony, February 5, 2008, ("Schapira Tr.") at 63-65. By
contrast, Dr. McAnulty explained that the significance of
the research was that based on those two lab tests alone,
likelihood of mortality would not have been greater or
lesser with revascularization. See McAnulty Tr. at 21-23.
Moreover, the VAMC doctors who treated Bond
emphasized in their testimony, as previously noted, that
Bond had a normal ejection fraction, and it factored into
their decision to manage his CAD medically by putting
him on a regimen of drug therapy and conducting followup tests to monitor his cardiac condition. See Exhibit
P I at 191. Dr. McAnulty explained the significance of
this test, as follows: "When the ejection [*28] fraction is
normal, in a group of patients like Mr. Bond, it's actually
a favorable prognostic marker .... In this particular case,
it's also one more reason why should he have even had a
tight narrowing, of 80 percent, why, the role of intervention would not have been clear in that when the ejection
fraction is normal, even if there is a vessel where there
would be agreement about stenting or coronary bypass
surgery, the effects of survival on that person, with mechanical intervention, are not clearly any better than
medical therapy, alone." McAnulty Tr. at 34-35. Dr.
Schapira commented that Bond's good ejection fraction
made him "at low risk from an arrhythmia that you
would call a death due to sudden cardiac death ... [but]
[h]e didn't die of sudden cardiac death ... which is a
particular unexpected death syndrome. He died of
ischemia which caused a cardiac arrhythmia." Schapira
Tr. at 95,

*

Although plaintiff's and defendant's cardiology experts agree, as the VAMC pathologist found, that Bond
died of a lethal arrhythmia. meaning that the ventricles in
his heart either went into fibrillation or he suffered a cardiac standstill, the precise cause of his arrhythmia remains in dispute. [*29] Dr. McAnulty, who is an expert
in treating cardiac arrhythmias, testified that while
ischemia from coronary artery narrowing can cause a
lethal heart rhythm to occur and is a reasonable exp laniltion. it is not a definitive explanation because the mechanism that triggers lethal arrhythmias is still uncertain.
McAnulty Tr. at 38-39. Arrhythmias can be caused by
myocardial damage from CAD, micro-scarring that promotes the chance of developing a lethal arrhythm ia al
any time, elevated adrenalin levels, or from a random
sudden death rhythm. Id. at 39. The precise C<lUse of
Bond's arrhythmia is a scientific dispute that need not be
resolved to answer the ultimate question in this case.
I find, based on all of the evidence. and particularly
on the well-supported testimony of Dr. McAnulty, that
even if Bond had undergone an invasive cardiac surgery
with four bypasses. as recommended by Dr. Schapira, his
life expectancy would not have been extended as compared to treating him medically. ' Bond died of an unforseen arrhythmia from an unknown cause thai would
not definitively have been prevented by an invasive surgical procedure. Therefore. I conclude that theY AMC
doctors' decision to pursue a more [*30J conservative
medical approach, and to treat Bond accordingly with a
well-accepted regimen of drug therapy, did not via/ate
the standard of medical care in the community.

2 Regarding the issue of Bond's life expeclancy,
I note that Dr. Schapira testified that he simply
took 10 years off Bond's normal life expectancy
because of Bond's documented use of cigarettes
and alcohol. Without citing to any epidemiological study or other research to support it, Dr.
Schapira's opinion amounts to nothing more than
a non-educated guess plucked out of thin air, and
thus fails the Daubert screening. An expert's willingness to gratuitously guess and express an opinion with no scientific basis as to one subject,
casts doubt on the reliability of his other opinions.

B. The Final EKG Order
Even in a nationally recognized, first-rate training
hospital such as the Portland VAMC, the volume of
medical records generated and the numbers of orders
issued can overwhelm the capacity of a managed-care
system to deliver every test precisely as ordered. In
Bond's case, each doctor or team of doctors handled a
discrete aspect of his care, posted the observations and
conclusions on a computer network that other care pro-
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viders [*31] could access hospital-wide, and moved on
to the next patient. The number of witnesses called to
testity on the care Bond received during his relatively
brief admission in September of 2005 reminded the court
of the adage: "Too many cooks can spoil the broth." One
of the doctors-in-training, without a request from a supervisor, ordered an EKG to be perfonned before Bond's
discharge. This order was neither carried out nor rescinded by superiors, However, during his hospitalization Bond had already received seven EKGs, all of which
were abnonnal and indicated that Bond was suffering
from cardiac ischemia. A senior VAMC staff cardiologist testified, and Dr, McAnulty confinned, that performing another EKG would have been redundant because
Bond was already being treated for ischemia with the
optimal medical program, his symptoms of acute cardiac
distress had disappeared within the past 24 to 36 hours,
his overall condition was stable, and the infonnation
provided by another EKG would not have provided additional information to change the diagnosis or treatment,
nor would it have affected the timing of the discharge or
the ultimate outcome in Bond's case. In other words, the
failure to perform [*32] another EKG or rescind it was
harmless error.
Once again, Dr. Schapira did not hesitate to opine
that the defendant's failure to do the final EKG constituted medical malpractice, even though he never explained any basis for his opinion. In like manner, he
summarily accused the defendant of wrongfully discharging Bond, without giving any meaningful specifics.
I find that both of these opinions lack a sufficient basis to
support his conclusion that the defendant violated the
standard of care by neglecting to perfonn another EKG
before Bond was discharged.
C. The Exercise Tolerance Test

Plaintiff also complains that defendant's fai lure to
perfonn some type of ETT while Bond was hospitalized
violated the standard of care because the data obtained
from evaluating the heart's function with exertion could
have resolved the mixed results of the other objective
tests, clarified the cause of Bond's pain syndrome, and
presumably tipped the balance in favor of lifesaving surgical intervention, See Schapira Tr. at IOl-102. Dr.
Schapira contends that ifVAMC doctors were concerned
about the potentially adverse complications, such as
bleeding, that could occur fi:om having Bond exercise on
a treadmill [*33] so soon after his catheretization procedure, such complications could have been avoided by
performing a pharmacologic stress test while Bond was
still bedridden.
However, Dr. McAnulty testified that the standard
of care for a patient like Bond who had undergone a cardiac catheterization was to send him home to recover,

then bring him back for a follow-up ETT as an outpatient. See McAnulty Tr. at 32, He gave two logical and
compelling reasons: first, it is difficult for someone who
has had a femoral artery punctured and a tube inserted
and withdrawn to perform in their usual manncr when
walking during a treadmill exercise test; second, an ETT
would be of greater diagnostic value to test the e ITcctiveness of the medical program after the patient had been on
the additional drug therapy for a longer period of time,
ld. Regarding the useful ness of a chern ical stress lest, Dr.
McAnulty testified that a chemical test does not mimic
an exercise test to assess a person's performance on the
prescribed course of medical treatment. Id. at 33. Also. i.l
chemical test is used to evaluate CA 0; because it was
already known that Bond had CAD and that it was affecting the blood flow to his heart based on ,+34 J the
EKG results, the data obtained from a chemical tcsi
would have been less useful than an exercise test. Sec id.
Accordingly. plaintiff's complaint lacks merit because the defense proved to the court's satisfaction that a
pharmacologic stress test performed on an inpatient basis, although not unusual, is a poor substitute to evaluate
the coronary function of an ambulatory patient like
Bond, who was capable of returning in a few days for a
follow-up outpatient ETT to be performed on a treadmill.
Plaintiff made much ado about the fact that the VAMC
medical records revealed that six doctors recommended
or ordered that Bond undergo an ETT, and yet it was not
done before he was discharged. However, I note that
there was no time limit specified in the order issued by
Bond's treating cardiologist, who wrote "/ think the best
plan is to treat him for ischemia with ASA and beta
blocker and then bring him back for an ETT to see if
there is objective evidence of ischemia with exertion on
medications." Exhibit PI at 191. In fact, several VAMC
staff physicians testified that they anticipated that the
stress test would best be completed as an outpatient approximately two weeks after discharge. [*35J Unfortunately, Bond's time ran out. Nevertheless, I find that defendant did not violate the standard of care when it discharged Bond without tirst performing an ETT.
CONCLUSION
In sum, evaluating this exceptionally well-tried case
by extremely competent counsel and confronted with
outstanding witnesses, I conclude that plaintiff simply
has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
the medical treatment the doctors at the VAMC provided
to Cra ig Bond in September of 2005 in any way violated
the standards of medical care as practiced in this community; therefore, defendant is not liable under the
FTCA for his death, Because the issue of liability is dispositive, r need not reach the issue of damages. \
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3 One of the issues that continues to trouble the
court is that the defense stipulated that Bond had
a life expectancy of 15 years, yet took the inconsistent position that Bond had an unknown life
expectancy considering his lifestyle choices and
the condition of his heart, and that he suffered
sudden cardiac death unrelated to any treatment
(or lack of treatment) he received at the VAMC.
Apparently, defense counsel entered into the
stipulation simply to save the economists' time,
[*36] so that if the court reached the damages issue, the court could assume that Bond would
have lived 15 more years. The economic losses
could then be based on the disability payments
received and services provided by a stay-at-home
spouse doing domestic care for a specific period
of time.

In closing, I note that this extremely sensitive case
involved two casualties of a long-ago war--Bond, who
became a victim of substance abuse early on, presumably
because of his combat experience; and his loving, supportive wife who did her best to cope with his disabilities. Yet, sympathy for the litigants can play no role in
the court's factual findings and conclusions of law.
Judgment is for the defendant.

http://www .acc. orglcl i nicalfgu idel ines/cabg/cabg. pd f.
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Update the 2001 Guidelines for Percutaneous Coronary
[*38]
fntervention),
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Benejits of Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting and Percutaneous Trans/uminal Angiopfasty in Patients with
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APPENDIX A
The following medical peer-reviewed literature is attached in support of plaintiffs claims:
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Exhibit I Alfred F. Parisi et al.. Medical Compared
with Surgical Management of Unstable Angina: 5-Year
Mortality and Morbidity in the Velerans Administration
Study, 80 CIRCULATION 1176 (1989).
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Compared with Non-invasive Treatment in Unstable
Coronary-Artery Disease: FRISC /I Prospective Randomized Mutticentre Study, 354 LANCET 708 (1999).
Exhibit 6 Christopher P. Cannon et aI., Comparison
of Early InvaSive and Conservative Strategies in Patients
with Unstable Coronary Syndromes Treated with the
Glycoprotein lib/fila Inhibitor Tirofiban, 344 NEW
ENG. J. MEDICNE 1879 (2001).
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Results from a Randomized Trial, 286 AM. MEDICAL
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nary Arteries, 316 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1371
( 1987).
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Exhibit 13 Rehan Qayyum el aI, Sysfl!malic ReView
Routine and Selective Invasive Strategies fur the Acufe
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MEDICINE 186 (2008).
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2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6504,

THOMAS

pons,

*

Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RADIOS HACK CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.
G033831

COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIV!SION THREE
2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6504

July 26, 2006, Filed
NOTICE: [*1] NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 977(a),
PROHIBIT COURTS AND PARTIES FROM CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OR
ORDERED PUBLISHED, EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 977(B). THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED fOR
PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF RULE 977.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 02CC13107. Derek Guy
Johnson, Judge.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
CORE TERMS: cholesterol, juror, conversation, causes of action, new trial, stress, at-Will, cholesterol levels,
misconduct, recording, good cause, disability, wrongful termination, incapacity, fired, tape, reporter's transcript,
medication, impl ied agreement, employment contract, retaliation, manager's, diet, medical condition, recorded,
blood, order granting, declaration, terminate, recorder

COUNSEL: Geniene B. Stillwell for Plaintiff and AppelJant.
Horvitz & Levy, Barry R. Levy, H. Thomas Watson, Jason T. Weintraub; Woldt & Associates and Wendy A. Woldt for
Defendant and Appellant. I.

,JUDGES: 0' LEARY, J.; BEDSWORTH, ACTING P.J., IKOLA, J. concurred.
OPINION BY: O'LEARY
OPINION

INTRODUCTION
Thomas Potts was employed by RQgiQ~!Jack.ComQ[QtJ.9_n___...as a store manager and was required to work an average
of 50 to 60 hours a week. Potts had high cholesterol. One of Potts's doctors, believing Potts's high cholesterol was
not being managed well by diet and medication, directed him to not work more than 40 hours a week so as to
reduce stress, wnich in turn could lower his cholesterol levels. Potts [*2] informed his supervisor of the work
restriction imposed by his doctor and indicated he wanted to take intermittent medical leave under the California
Family Rights Act (Go\.', COQ~,.§ t2..915.2J 1 (the CFRA). In subsequent meetings with his supervisor to discuss the
issue, Potts attempted to tape record the conversations, the tone of the meetings quickly deteriorated, and Potts
was ultimately fired. Potts claimed he was fired because of his request for qualifying medical leave. Radioshack _~
maintained Potts was fired for insubordination because he insisted on tape recording the meetings wi
supervisor's consent in violation of company policy .

FOOTNOTES
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All statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise indicated.x

A jury returned a special verdict awarding $ 1 million in compensatory damages to Potts for breach of an implied
agreement to not terminate employment except for good cause, violation of his rights under the CFRA, and wrongful
termination in Violation of publiC [*3] policy. The jury found against R(ldioshack .on Its cross-complaint for illegal
recording under Penal Code section 632. The trial court denied R£lillQ.sJl.ill::K .,.·s motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV), but granted its motion for new trial due to juror misconduct.
Potts appeals the order granting new trial contending there was no prejudicial juror misconduct. ftadio!?hack .,.
appeals the order denying ]NOV contending there is insufficient evidence to support a judgment in Potts's favor on
the contract or the CFRA causes of action. Ri;lqios.hack...,.also contends the jury's verdict In Potts's favor on the
wrongful termination cause of action was inconsistent with its verdict in fi.ru:ti.Q:illads. ...·s favor on another of his
causes of action (perceived disability discrimination).
We agree with R,adio?hack .the evidence is insufficient to support a judgment in Potts's favor on the contract causes
of action because Potts expressly agreed in writing he was an (It-will employee. We also agree with RQ.QLoSQQCK .... the
evidence does not support a judgment In Potts's favor on the CFRA causes of action because he failed to
demonstrate that his high cholesterol constituted a "serious medical condition" [*4] under the CFRA-the
uncontroverted evidence being that Potts's high cholesterol was a completely asymptomatic condition, which has
never impacted his ability to perform his job. However, we reject RadiQ.S.QJ:g:k_.'s assertion the inconsistent verdicts
mandate judgment for it on the wrongful termination cause of action-the proper remedy is a new trial on that cause
of action. We reject Potts's contention the new trial order was an abuse of discretion.
II

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Potts was 52 years old when hired by B1Lq~.!s __.in 1997 as a management trainee. He was rapidly promoted. and
by July 2000, he was manager of a high-volume store in Newport Beach. As a salaried manager, Potts was required
to work a minimum of 48 to 54 hours per week, and frequently worked up to 60 hours per week. Potts received
numerous performance awards during his tenure at .R,qd!o.?hi;l~k •.• His goal was to become a District Manager, and
shortly before he was fired by P.,g.dlosha£:k ... in March 2002, had been told he was next in line to go into the District
Manager training program.
In January 2001, Ali Yazdansharif became the Ril.Q].Q.sJl.f1(:_k .• District Manager responsible for Potts and the Newport
Beach store. Yazdansharif reported [*5] to 8,adjQst)a.Ck: ... Regional Manager Dan Barnes.
Potts had undergone two surgeries for bladder cancer in the early 1990s and a follow up surgery in 2001 to remove
scar tissue. He was under the care of general practitioner, Dr. Richard Enns, and a urologist, Dr. Mark Sullivan. Since
1998, Potts had been treated by Dr. Enns for high cholesterol with cholesterOl lowering medication, and
recommended diet and exercise regimes. In February 2000, Dr. Sullivan learned of Potts's high cholesterol when a
blood test showed a total cholesterol level of 325. Dr. Sullivan also began monitoring Potts's cholesterol levels. In
February 2002, Potts's total cholesterol level registered 287. Dr. Sullivan believed stress contributed to high
cholesterol. Potts told Dr. Sullivan he was under stress due to the high number of hours he worked. Dr. Sullivan
advised Potts to cut down on his hours. On February 21, 2002, Dr. Sullivan wrote a note stating, "Mr. Potts should
work no more than 40 hours a week[.J" (We will discuss the medical evidence in more detail, anon.)
The next day, Potts telephoned Yazdansharif and told him about the work restriction. Yazdansharif told Potts they
would discuss the matter when Yazdansharif [*6] returned from a business trip. On Monday March 4, Yazdansharif
called Potts and told him "to fax the doctor's note to him[.]" Potts testified when they spoke later that day
Yazdansharif said Potts had three options: transfer as manager to a smaller store, accept a demotion, or take a leave
of absence. Potts protested that his store was currently understaffed (down by two sales associates), but if he had
proper staffing with an assistant manager, he could run the store working only 40 hours a week. Yazdansharif did
not advise Potts he had to fill out any forms regarding his reduced hours request.
Potts thought Yazdansharif's three options did not sound correct. He had researched the matter on the Internet and
read something about the Family Medical Leave Act, 2 which he understood allowed for an employee to take
intermittent leave using vacation or sick time to make up the difference. Potts found similar language in
Rj'!Qi9shack .,.·s own policy manual. He called an attorney's office and spoke with a man named Charles Russell, whom
he understood to be an attorney, but whom he later learned was a paralegal. Russell confirmed Potts's
understanding of the FMLA. At the time, Potts had three [*7) weeks of vacation and four weeks of sick time on the
books.
FOOTNOTES
2

The federal Family and Medical Leave Act (~J;:-,-§ 2614) (FMLA), closely parallels the CFRA. similar15
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On Tuesday March 5, Yazdansharif spoke with Mark Robinson, a R9JJ.LR2J19~t.-human resources representative. He
told Robinson that Potts had a medical restriction to work only 40 hours a week due to stress and high blood
pressure, and such a work restriction would make it diFficult for Potts to manage a store. Robinson thought the issue
was one involving the Americans with Disabilities Act. J He instructed Yazdansharif to place Potts on temporary
"manager returning from leave status" and give him an "essential [job] functions [information form]" for his
physician to complete. Yazdansharif did not mention to Robinson that Potts had mentioned wanting intermittent
leave under the FMLA, Robinson testified that had he known Potts was making a FMLA leave request, he would have
worked to see if the request could be accommodated, (*8] as it was not R.il(;J.i9~I}QI:!<.• 's policy to demote an
employee seeking FMLA leave,
FOOTNOTES
3

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.c. § 12101 et seq.),

Yazdansharif testified he considered whether Potts was requesting FMLA leave, and he discussed with either
Robinson or Jeff Bland, another human resources representative, whether Potts could take intermittent leave,
Yazdansharif understood from whichever one he spoke with that there was no problem with an employee taking
intermittent leave, Bland denied having any such discussion with Yazdansharif.
Later that day, Potts and Yazdansharif spoke again. Yazdansharif told Potts he would not be allowed to manage any
R.actiQshilck ...store working only 40 hours a week. He now told Potts his choices were to take workers' compensation
leave or move to a sales associate position while retaining some of his manager's benefits. When Potts told
Yazdansharif what he had learned about the FMLA and intermittent leave, Yazdansharif did not reply stating the
optIons [*9] he had offered were RactiQ.sh_iKls .... 's policy. Yazdansharifdiq not provide Potts with any explanation of
his rights under either the FMLA or the CFRA, he did not tell Potts he could take intermittent leave, and he did not
tell Potts he needed any further medical certification of his condition, They scheduled a meeting for the next day.
On March 6, Yazdansharif came to the RadiQsJL~I.~k. ... store where Potts worked, They went into the back orfice to talk.
Yazdansharif did not have any forms with him to give Potts, Potts took out a tape recorder and placed it on the desk,
telling Yazdansharif he wanted to tape the conversation, Yazdansharif told Potts he could not record their
conversation. Potts told Yazdansharif he wanted to record because he was confused, and wanted to clearly
understand his options as they kept changing, Yazdansharif again told Potts he could not record, so Potts turned the
tape recorder off. • The meeting quickly turned hostile over the issue of recording-Potts insisting he had a right to
reCOrd the conversation, and Yazdansharif insisting Potts not record, 80th men started yelling at each other.
Yazdansharif told Potts to give him the store keys. Potts refused, YazdanshariF [*10] then demanded, "give me
your fucking keys, . , ," Potts said, "fuck you[)" and again refused to give Yazdansharif the keys, Because
Yazdansharif had begun using profanity, Potts turned the tape recorder back on and tried to get him to repeat the
profanity on tape, but Yazdansharif would not.
FOOTNOTES
4 At trial, Potts testified he was almost completely deaf in one ear and he routinely taped recorded conversations
so he could confirm what had been said. He often tape recorded Ragioshack .... meetings, always with his tape
recorder in plain view, and no one ever objected or told him recording violated R~Ql~r;:K ...policy or required
consent. Potts conceded he never told Yazdansharif about his hearing problem.

Yazdansharif left the store for about 20 minutes, went out to the parking lot and talked on his cell phone, When he
returned, Yazdansharif brought another store employee into the back office, and again directed Potts to turn over his
keys. Potts complied and left the store. Potts and other employees believed Potts was (*11] being fired.
Yazdansharif instructed Potts to come to the district office in the morning-Potts believed to pick up his final
paycheck,
As he was driving home, Potts telephoned Russell (the paralegal) who told Potts he had "every right" to record his
conversations with Yazdansharif, and in fact Potts had done Yazdansharif a favor by putting the tape recorder out
where Yazdansharif could see it because he could have hidden the tape recorder to record the conversation.
The next day, March 7, Potts went to the Rgdioshack .....district office for a meeting with Yazdansharif. Potts brought
with him a small tape recorder and a video camcorder attached to his clipboard. The camcorder was running as Potts
went into Yazdansharif's office. When Yazdansharif saw the recorder he "made a snicker about oh, what's the
camcorder for." Potts told Yazdansharif an attorney told him he "absolutely had every right to record and document
the conversation," Yazdansharif claimed he told Potts he could not record, and did not believe the conversation was
being recorded. Potts denied this, and testified the light showing the camera was recording was on and pointed
directly at Yazdansharif, 5
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FOOTNOTES

s Potts also relies upon a portion of the transcript of the meeting indicating Yazdansharif had said to Potts, "if you
want to record no problem man, okay." Potts asserts this statement demonstrates he believed Yazdansharif was
agreeing to being recorded. But the context in which the statement was made was that Yazdansharif fjrst told
Potts he had to call regional headquarters to see jf the policy against tape recording could be waived, and if so
"then if you want to record, no problem man .... "

[* 12] During this first conversation, Yazdansharif and Potts discussed Potts's medical restriction and employment
options. Potts attempted to raise his request for FMLA leave, but Yazdansharlf would not discuss it with him.
Yazdansharif had the necessary FMLA/CFRA forms, but did not give them to Potts. Yazdansharif never indicated Potts
needed to provide any additional medical information or ask him any qUestions about the duration of Potts's medical
leave.
After about 23 minutes, a telephone call came from Bland. Yazdansharif asked Potts to wait outside the office. Potts
complied. Yazdansharif then had a conference call with Bland and Barnes. Yazdansharif told them Potts had refused
to provide him any information about his medical condition or any of the information necessary to fill out the FMLA
leave forms. Yazdansharif talked to them about Potts wanting to record their conversations. The decision was made
to fire Potts during this call if he insisted on recording.
After Yazdansharif got off the phone, he called Potts back in telling him to leave all his recording equipment outside,
Potts complied. Yazdansharif did not tell Potts he was going to be fired, but asked when the last [*13] inventory
had been done at his store. Yazdansharif told Potts to come back later that afternoon to speak to Barnes or someone
else in human resources.
When Potts returned, he had his tape recorder with him and told Yazdansharif he wanted to record their
conversation. Yazdansharif refused. Potts said if he could not record, there would be no meeting. Yazdansharif fired
Potts. Potts asked if he could talk to Barnes; Yazdansharif ignored him. A few days later, Potts telephoned Barnes.
Barnes asked if Potts was tape recording the conversation, Potts said he was not. Barnes nonetheless refused to talk
to Potts.
In the formal paperwork terminating Potts, Yazdansharif indicated Potts was fired for poor work performance,
attitude, and attendance. At trial, Yazdansharif and Barnes testified Potts was not fired for poor work performance.
When Potts filed for unemployment benefits, Yazdansharif told the insurance representative Potts was fired "for
using profanity and trying to record the[irJ conversation[.J" In his depOSition in an unrelated lawsuit, Yazdansharif
testified Potts was fired for having a bad attitude and cussing.
Potts filed this action seeking compensatory and punitive [*14] damages against Radioshack yand individual
defendants Yazdansharif and Barnes. The complaint contained causes of action for breach of implied employment
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of rights under the CFRA and
retaliation for exercising those rights, actual disability discrimination (high cholesterol) and perceived disability
discrimination (high blood pressure) under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), age discrimination,
wrongful termination in violation of public policy, Intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of constitutional
rights, and unpaid wages. RaqiQshac;k yand Yazdansharif cross-complained against Potts ror violation of Penal Code
S~~hiQ[Lrn, alleging he recorded confidential conversations without consent.
Prior to commencement of the jury trial, Potts dismissed Barnes and dismissed his causes of action for age
discrimination, unpaid wages, and violation of constitutional rights. Following Potts's opening statement, the court
granted nonsuit on his causes of action for disability discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and on his request for punitive [* 15] damages. Potts dismissed Yazdansharif (and Yazdansharif dismissed his
cross·complaint) and trial went forward on the remaining causes of action against Rag[Qshgck.. "alone.
The jury returned a speCial verdict finding for Potts on his causes of action for breach of employment contract,
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of CFRA rights, and retaliation in Violation of
CFRA. As to Potts's cause of action for perceived disability discrimination in violation of the FEHA, the jury found
Radioshack ...perceived him as being disabled due to high blood pressure, but the perceived disability was not a
motivating factor in his discharge. However, as to Potts's cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of the
public poliCies set forth in the CFRA and the FEHA, the jury found the perceived disability was a motivating factor in
his discharge. The jury awarded Potts $ 83,632 in past lost earnings, $ 750,000 in future lost earnings, and $
166,368 for emotional distress. The jury found against ~..Qr;:;.k. ....on its cross-complaint for violations of PenQ)
CQQ/;..sectiol} .632 because the conversations were not confidential.
R.gclioShgl;k ... [* 16) filed a motion for JNOV on the ground there was no substantial evidence to support a verdict
on any of Potts's causes of action. B.1ldio,S.h.q.cJL.also sought JNOV on the wrongful termination in violation of public
policy cause of action on the grounds the jury's verdict was inconsistent . .8.adlos./lack ..also filed a motion for new
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trial on the grounds of, among other things, juror misconduct, and inconsistent verdict. The court denied
R!;lQiQ~h!lC;k .'s motion for JNOV, but granted Ra9jQ~h~l<:_.'s new trial motion on grounds of juror misconduct. Both
RadiosbilC~ ,Tand Potts appeal.
III
RAQIQSHAJ;:K .,.'5 APPEAL OF ORDER DENYING JNOV

A. Standard of Review
RaJ;1J9!;hac,k Tappeals the order denying its motion for JNOV. We review the record de novo, Independently
determining whether substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports the jury's verdict. (TQSlllil?_z.ifJjy., San l.uis
Coastal Unified School Dist. (2001) 86 Cal.ADPAth 1053,-l.~.) Like the trial court, we must accept as true the
evidence supporting the verdict, disregard conflicting evidence, and indulge every legitimate inference to support the
verdict. We cannot weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. (Ibid. ['" 17] )
B. Contract Claims
1. Breach of Employment Contract

The jury found in Potts's favor on his breach of employment contract cause of action finding RQ.QlQsJ:lilI:)L.,had
promised by words or conduct not to discharge Potts except for good cause and RadiO$h,ack .,fired Potts without
good cause. Radioshack .contends Potts's status as an at-will employee precludes a finding in his favor on this
cause of action. We agree.
Unless there is a written employment agreement stating otherwise, employment is statutorily presumed to be at will,
(I,..ab. Code, § 2922.) "An at-will employment may be ended by either party 'at any time without cause,' for any or
no reason, and subject to no procedure except the statutory requirement of notice. (Citations.]" (GU? v. Bechtel
fYi.Jioaal, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317. 335 (Guz).) The statutory presumption of at-will employment can be overcome
by evidence the employer and employee have impliedly agreed the employee will be terminated only for good cause.
(Guz, suora, 24 Cal. 4th at p. 336; Folev v. Interactive Data Coro, (1988) 4 ;7...kgL...:2d .6.5.4, QZl4~'LQjL,BQtr, . .z H
(Foley).) Relevant [*18] factors in finding such an implied agreement include: the employee's length of service, the
employer's personnel policies and practices, actions or communications by the employer indicating assurances of
continued employment, and industry practices. (F.Qll;,y~.!?upr?, .o:tl .Q!I.,~9.!;lJ pp_, .980-91)1.) The plaintiff bears the
burden of proving an implied agreement not to terminate without good cause. The existence of an implied contract
to discharge only for good cause is normally a factual question for the trier of fact. (L<;t,pt pp" _6}]' 660,,682,)
RadioshQck ...contends the existence of express written agreements between it and Potts that his employment was
at will precludes judgment in his favor on his breach of implied agreement cause of action. We agree. In Guz, the
California Supreme Court observed in dictum "most cases applying California law ... have held that an at-will
provision in an express written agreement, signed by the employee, cannot be overcome by proof of an implied
contrary understanding. (Citations.)" (Guz,5JiP.[fiL.'-~4 CaI.4itLgtQ.,31Q..f.r:klQ.) That observation in Guz, is routinely
followed by cases [* 19] concluding, "There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each
embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.' [Citations.] The express term is controlling even if it Is
not contained in an integrated employment contract. [Citation.] Thus, the ... at-will agreement preclude[s] the
existence of an implied contract requiring good cause for termination." ((PlJ1Q.~Jeffer•. (;1?"(lgs:l~.JJ.l.J..t!t;L& !:JitrtnCJ(Q
(1995) ,J~,_Cal"ADDAth 620,~i see also Agosta_\("_Astor (20!Ml.12.J2...CgLAJ2QAth59.Q.QQ4; Sl?BY.£L5,ki'i, {;iUJit~J
PI.lQIi( BgQig,]nc" CZPO 1) 88 c.QL.~.QQAlh_31, 37-38; tfg99.f;!.aLY~.Ki[T1bt;.C!Y QVil.!iJy eit[l;, In(;,H29,::iJ..l~ C~JJ\.pp.4th
508, 51?; SJjJ{Jns.!s.Y.JL...Watkfns-Johnsoa Co.~) 221 Cal. APD. 3d 79«::!•.e~R.....uQ.caU~Rtu85.) "When the
employment contract contains an 'at-will' provision, an employee's 'reliance on ... oral promises of continuing
employment is simply not justifiable[.]" (Mosta v. A5'tQD5uOra, ..1;1JLCaLAQJ2,4tllilt p, (;;Q4.)
Applying these rules it is apparent that even assuming Potts had produced sufficient evidence to support a
finding [* 20] that an implied-in-fact agreement eXisted, 6 as a matter of law the existence of an express written
agreement specifying at-will employment controls and precludes a finding of an implied agreement to the contrary,
Here, the uncontroverted evidence was that the employment application Potts filled out and signed on September
16, 1997, stated he was applying for at-will employment. The application contained a "certification and agreement"
provision signed by Potts stating, "1 understand and agree that if employed, I will be an employee at will. As an
employee at will: (1) either [Radiosh(lckl .or I may terminate the employment relationship at any time, with or
without cause; and (2) there is no agreement, express or implied, between [Radioshackl .... and me for any speCific
period of employment or for continuing or long term employment. 1 understand and agree that if hired my at! -]will
employment with [RadioshaclD-.,may only be modified by separate written document signed by me and an
executive officer of the Company."
FOOTNOTES

Potts relies on testimony from Yazdansharif and his predecessor that B9Qios.h~g:;~, ~only terminated employees
for good cause and Potts's own testimony he only terminated employees for good cause. He also introduced
testimony from numerous BQ.diilliha~JL ... nonmanagerial employees who said they believed they could only be
6
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fired for good cause.

[*21] Once hired, Potts signed an "employee acknowledgment form" acknowledging receipt of the employee
handbook on September 29, 1997. In the acknowledgment form, Potts again specifically agreed his "employment
with [Radioshack] Tis at-Will," he could be terminated at any time with or without cause, and there were no express
or implied agreements between himself and Racjioshi:lck .. for continuing employment. Potts speCifically agreed that
although the provisions of the employee handbook were subject to change, R._QQ[Qsb~lCK ... '5 policy of at-will
employment "may only be modified by a separate written document, signed by me and a [RadiQshackj ~Executive
Officer." The Radioshack ...employee handbook states Potts was an at-will employee, and at-will status could "on Iy
be modified by a separate written document, signed by the employee and a [RCldioshqckJ ... Executlve Ofricer." The
handbook further provided that "[noJ verbal statements made by any officer or employee at any time shall constitute
an express or implied contract of employment for a specific period of time or for continUing or long term
employment." Potts testified he saw / read, and signed the application's at-will agreement and the
employment [*22] acknowledgement form. He testified he received the employee handbook and understood when
hired he was an at-will employee.
5.tarzvnski y. Capital Public Radio, Inc., supra, 88 Caj.App.4th 33/ is Instructive. In that case the plaintiff employee
worked for the defendant employer for 12 years, repeatedly being assured by his supervisor he would only be fired
for good cause, before signing an '''Employment At-Will Contract And Acknowledgment Form.'" The
acknowledgement, quite similar to the one before us, provided, '''I understand and agree that my employment is AT·
WILL and that either [the employer) or I may terminate the employment relationship at any time, with or withou t
cause or advance notice. I understand further that only the Board of Directors, by affirmative action, has the
authority to change or make any agreement contrary to this at-will employment relationship.'" (lct,-'ltJ:L.JQ.) After
signing the form, the plaintiff was again told by his supervisor he would not be terminated as long as his
performance was satisfactory. When he resigned seven years later and sued alleging constructive discharge, the
court concluded the express agreement was [*23] controlling and '''precluded the existence of an implied contract
requiring good cause for termination.' [Citations.]" (lQ~~§.) Even though not a fully integrated employment
contract, the acknowledgement form signed by the employee, "clearly and unambiguously told him that his
employment was at will" and further provided the employment relationship could be changed only by the Board of
Directors. (lg. fl.t p-,- :36.) Similar acknowledgments have been held in other cases to preclude the existence of an
implied contract to terminate only for good cause, even if they are not part of a fully integrated employment
agreement. (See Hj}.!JfJaLQJ(., Kimb.er!yQuq lttJI.C9..re, loc.. ,'§'llJ)[g. 3.9 Cp.LAppAthgt 'p',5.1.~ (confidentiality agreement,
Signed several years after employment began, providing employment was "'at the mutual consent of both parties[ J'''
and either party '''can terminate the employment relationship at will, at any time, with or without cause or advance
notice[J'" precluded claim of implied agreement to contrary}; Ca!J1Q.J(~ l~.rter:, !1iHl9~1$, EJIJ.Uf!( & fv!fJrmMQ, s.upri2.~5
CaL.ll,lWArl1 g1 pp.. 622~63Q [acknowledgment Signed [*24] by plaintiffs agreeing "'employment is at will and can be
terminated at any time with or without cause'" precluded claim of implied-in-fact contract requiring good cause for
termination]. )
Potts's exclUSive reliance on (IIe!SQ/ULL lJalte/1. Ter;/J.n.QlQg!es.LL95~9 i 7A C_al,App.4th 597, is misplaced. In Nelson, the
employee "signed an employment application which provided, among other things, that 'J also understand that
neither this application nor any other communication by any management representative either written or oral, made
at the time of hire or during the course of employment, is intended in any way to create an employment contrClct.'"
The court agreed, "this provision did not unambiguously establish at-will employment" and thus did not preclude the
plaintiff from demonstrating an implied agreement to not terminate except for good cause. The court also found the
provision "was internally ambiguous and contradictory" because it "attempts to establish a binding employment
condition while at the same time expressly providing that neither the application nor subsequent communications can
create a binding employment condition or contract." (lsi.. at 0.615.) [*25]
Nelson does not stand for the propOSition that an express at-will agreement can be negated by evidence of an
implied agreement to not terminate absent good cause. Rather, the decision in Nelson is based on the court's finding
there was not an express at-will agreement. Although Potts describes the employment application language at issue
in Nelson as being "almost identical as that signed by [him,J" it is not at all similar. The application at issue in

Nelson, the only document signed by the employee, said nothing about at-will status and contained only a vague
statement the application did not constitute an employment contract. By contrast, Potts signed an acknowledgment
on his application, plus a post-hiring acknowledgment that unambiguously stated he understood and agreed he was
"an employee at will," his employment could "be terminated at any time, with or without causeLJ'" there were no
express or implied agreements "for any speCific period of employment or for continuing or long term employment£]"
and that his status as an at-will employee could "only be modified by a separate written document, signed by [him)
and an Executive Officer (of Radioshackl...-T [*26] "(!tatics added.)
In conclUSion, because there can be no implied-In-fact contract reqUiring cause for termination when there is also a
written agreement expressly providing the employment is at will, the jury's verdict on the breach of employment
contract cause of action is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied
the motion for JNOV on this cause of action. We need not address the remaining related issues of whether there was
substantial eVidence of an implied agreement to terminate only for good cause or whether the jury's finding that
there was not good cause for termination was supported by the evidence.
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2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Because Potts's claim for breach of employment contract fails due to his status as an "at-will" employee, his cause of
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails as well. (See flaJtY,.J'l.QrtlJ.!1merJ\;iIfl
Wiltb:!LCOrp-,-il.2m...;LCaI.ApP.4th 467~~,1..61.) Potts essentially concedes this paint, agreeing with the legal
principle "that jf there was no breach of contract, there can be no breach of the implied covenant." [*27]
C. CFRA Claims

The jury returned a verdict for Potts on two CFRA-related causes of action. First, the jury found Ri'tOtOS_oac;;k "
violated the CFRA by refusing to give Potts CFRA-qualifylng leave. Second, the jury found R~l.dIQsbiLck."retallated
against Potts by terminating his employment because of his request for CFRA leave,
The CFRA provides "protections to employees needing family leave or medical leave." (Gibbs v, Ameri(:,an Iliffines,
(ILC. (999) 74 CaLApDAth 1. 6.) As relevant here, the CFRA allows for an employee to take up to 12 weeks of
medical leave in a year because of a serious health condition. ( § 12945.2, sl!bdS, (a) & (c)(3)(C).) It is unlawful for
an employer to refuse an employee's request for qualifying medical leave ( Lil215...2..~IJQ\LlQ)). or to discharge or
discriminate against an employee who requests such qualifying medical leave ( § 12945.2, subd. (1».7
FOOTNOTES
7 Because the CFRA is substantively identical to its federal counterpart, the FMLA, California courts routinely rely
on federal cases in reviewing the CFRA. (See DVd/~y v. Dr;partment of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255,
2gb; P'H19. \!.. , Bev.Wx Hospital. Inc. (2QQ.QLZ2CaIJ:i.RR..AttL26U9J.)

[* 28] 1. Denial of CFRA Leave
RagjQ.shgc:;!< ?'s primary contention is Potts has failed to prove a violation of the CFRA because he failed to establi sh
his high cholesterol was a qualifying "serious medical condition." We agree.

Facts
Prior to further analyzing the law, we detail the evidence regarding Potts's medical condition. Potts's case was based
on his and Dr. Sullivan's testimony. (Dr. Sullivan testified as a treating phYSIcian, not an expert Witness.) Dr.
Sullivan has about 500 patients who have high cholesterol. He considers an ideal total cholesterol level to be below
200. With levels over 200, there is an increased risk of heart disease, heart attack, stroke, and other circulatory
diseases. Between a level of 200 and 230, Dr. Sullivan believed there was "wiggle room" as to his level of concern,
but whenever he saw a total cholesterol level above 230 he was "very concerned." In treating a patient with high
cholesterol, he considers factors such as diet, exerCise, and stress. Dr. Sullivan believes stress contributes to high
cholesterol levels,
111 February 2000, Potts's total cholesterol was 325, an "awful" result. It was the first Dr. Sullivan knew of Potts's
high cholesterol [*29] problem. Potts explained Dr. Enns was treating him for high cholesterol with medication, but
Potts had not been taking his medication lately. Dr. Sullivan advised Potts to resume his medication as prescribed by
Dr. Enns immediately.
when Dr. Sullivan saw Potts a year later in February 2001, Potts's total cholesterol level was much improved to
somewhere around 209. When Potts returned in February 2002, his total cholesterol level was back up to 287, Potts
advised Dr. Sullivan he was taking his medication and being careful about his diet. Dr. Sullivan inquired about Potts's
stress levels, Potts said he was under a great deal of stress because he had to work so many hours. Dr. Sullivan
advised Potts to cut back on his hours and wrote a note saying he should not work more than 40 hours a week. Dr.
Sullivan conSidered the work hours restriction medically necessary to reduce Potts's stress, which in turn would help
improve his cholesterol levels.
Dr. Sullivan testified Potts did not have heart disease or high blood pressure. Dr. Sullivan had never prescribed
cholesterol redUCing medication for Potts, but on occasion gave him free samples of the medication Potts was taking.
Dr. Sullivan [*30] agreed Potts's job did not cause him to have high cholesterol, rather Potts's stressful reaction to
his job was a possible factor in the numbers being so high. The only incapacity Potts ever suffered as a result of his
high cholesterol was the incapacity resulting from Dr. Sullivan's recommendation Potts reduce his work hours so as
to reduce stress.
Potts testified Dr. Enns had been treating him for high cholesterol since around 199B. Throughout the time at issue,
Potts had pretty much always been taking his medication, gOing off it only with Dr. Enns's knowledge to modify it in
someway or to figure out if it was causing side effects. Potts had a very healthy diet, but the number of hours he
worked (60 to 70 hours a week) made it very difficult to get any exercise. Potts testified the purpose of the 40 hour
a week work restriction was to give him more time off to exercise. Potts believed redUCing his stress could help
reduce his cholesterol levels. He testified that in the four years of being treated for high cholesterol he had
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absolutely no physical symptoms, was never in incapacitated in anyway, and having high cholesterol did not imp act
his ability to work.
Ra(:H9s)lil~k ...called [*31] Potts's treating physician, Dr. Enns. He testified to his extensive training in treating high
cholesterol. He e)(plained high cholesterol is an entirely asymptomatic condition. High Cholesterol is almost always a
metabolic problem, and although he recommends diet and exercise, the condition is only effectively dealt with
through use of statin drugs. Dr. Enns reviewed the history of Potts's cholesterol testing and corresponding changes
to his medication. When Potts's cholesterol level shot back up in February 2002, Dr. Enns increased Potts's
medication and advised him to resume a low-cholesterol diet. 8y July 2002, Potts cholesterol level was back down to
"near goa/."

Dr. Enns testified high cholesterol is a risk factor for developing heart disease, but it can be controlled through
medication. He testified stress does not cause high cholesterol levels. To his knowledge, no expert has ever related
stress to high cholesterol, nor did the American Heart Association mention it in its guidelines. Dr. Enns agreed stress
can impact other "bad habits" such as poor diet and lack of exercise. He testified high cholesterol in no way affected
a person's ability to work, and conversely one's work [*32] could not affect his or her cholesterol levels ("unless
the patient was an ice cream taster"). Nothing in Potts's health record indicated he could not work due to his hig h
cholesterol or that he ever needed to take time off work to recover from physical effects of high Cholesterol.
RadiOshai;::k .also introduced testimony from an expert witness, cardiologist Dr. JAv. Schapira. As did the other
doctors, Dr. Schapira explained high cholesterol is one of several risk factors for developing heart disease, but it has
no symptoms of its own and does not itself incapaCitate a patient in any way. Tens of millions of Americans have
elevated cholesterol levels. Dr. Schapira testified the only effective treatment regime for high cholesterol is a
combination of diet, exercise, and statin drugs. Nothing in the "scientific literature show(s] a causa[l] relationship
between stress and high cholesterol."
Dr. Schapira opined there was simply no scientific evidence for the proposition that reduced work hours or reduced
job-related stress could reduce cholesterol levels. When Potts's counsel questioned Dr. Schapira on various articles
discussing stress in the context of high cholesterol, Dr. Schapira [*33] explained stress was discussed in those
studies only as It related to other relevant (actors such as diet and exercise. He was unaware of any study, which
controlled for diet and exercise, suggesting stress directly affected the biochemical or metaboliC response of
cholesterol production,
Potts's medical records indicated that other than having high cholesterol, he was very healthy, had no signs of heart
disease, and had never suffered any physical incapacity as a result of having high cholesterol. Furthermore, Dr.
Schapira opined that Dr. Enns's records demonstrated when Potts adhered to his drug program, his cholesterol
levels were controlled and he was at very low risk for developing heart disease.

Analysis
To qualify for CFRA leave, the employee must have a "serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
perform the functions of the pOSition of that employee .... " ( §..1.22.45.2L!i.\J_Qd,.L<;lU),(C).) "'Serious health
condition' means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either of the following:
[P] (A) Inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or reSidential health care facility. [P] (8) Continuing treatment or
continuing (*34] supervision by a health care provider." ( ~ 12915,2, subd. (gill).)
The administrative regulations implementing the CFRA provide, "'Serious health condition'" Includes a physical
condition of the employee involving either: "(1) inpatient care (I.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or
residential health care facility, or (2) continuing treatment or continuing supervision by a health care provider, as
detailed in FMLA and its implementing regulations." (Cal...c.90~Rf.gS., Ji.t'_.?1 §]2~7.10, SUQd .. (0).) Accordingly,
because Potts relies on the second qualifier (I.e., his high cholesterol did not require any inpatient care, but does
require continuing treatment or supervision), we look to the FMLA and its implementing regulations in assessing
whether Potts demonstrated a CFRA-qualifying serious medical condition. (See also c_Q[,J:Qd~B.~gs.." lit.. 2, §
72<;)J.10 [incorporates into CFRA regulations federal regulations interpreting FMlA to extent they are not InconSistent
with CFRA, California Constitution, or other state laws].)
The pertinent regulation is 2!LCgde of FeOergJ RegyliltiOn~ Pilrt 61..5,114. As relevant [*35] to this case, it provides
a '''serious health condition' entitling an employee to FMLA leave means [a) ... physical ... condition that involves:
. [PJ (2) Continuing treatment by a health care provider. A serious health condition involving continuing treatment
by a health care provider includes anyone or more of the following: [PJ ... (P] (iii) Any period of incapacity or
treatment for such incapacity due to a chronic serious health condition. A chroniC serious health condition is one
which: [P] (A) Requires periodiC visits for treatment by a health care provider ... ; (P] (8) Continues over an
e)(tended period of time (including recurring episodes of a single underlying condition); and [PJ (C) May cause
episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.)," e (2.9_C.f~8,.,_§
825,114(il).)
FOOTNOTES
8

16 5

"A serious health condition involving continUing treatment by a health care provider" also includes one causing
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a period of incapacity (i.e., inability to work) of more than three consecutive calendar days or incapacity due to
pregnancy-both of which Potts agrees are inapplicable here. (2.2_C~£J-LBJ)2.2 . J_l!.1(i.1).)

[* 36] R,a(;Jioshack ,..contends Potts's high cholesterol does not meet the CFRA standard for a serious health
condition because the uncontroverted evidence is Potts has never suffered any symptoms from the condition and has
never been in anyway incapacitated by the condition itself. Potts responds to this argument first by contending
Radioshack ,..waived the issue by failing to request a second (or third) medical opinion, as permitted by ~Q.Y~mmef)t
Code sec;:tion :1,2945.2... SyJ:~Q.lvi!?jo[1 (k)(1)(C).

Potts relies on two federal cases concerning the FMLA: Thorson V. G.eroin,i. lo.(:". (8th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 370, and
Sims v. Alameda-COntra Costa Transit Dist. (N.p.CaL 1998) 2 F. SUPDLMJ.lli. His reliance on those cases is
misplaced. Although both cases support the proposition that by failing to request further medical certification an
employer waives challenges to the content of the employee's certification, neither relieves the employee of his
burden to prove the medical certification demonstrates the statutory requirements for a "serious health
condition." (Tl19.!son v. Gemini. In.c.,. suora. 205 ~D, .. J.e.l; Sims v .. A@meili1.::.CQillfp.- r;;:~J[JifJsJ.LQi~.L..sJJ.Qri.>, 2
F. Supp. 2d at p. 1263.) [*37] In other words, RaOioshack ~might have waived the right to challenge whether
Potts suffers from high cholesterol, but not the right to challenge whether high cholesterol is a qualifying serious
health condition within the meaning of the CFRA.
We agree With Radiosha<;k .that Potts has failed to make a prima facie showing as a matter of law that his high
cholesterol constitutes a serious health condition qualifying him for leave under the CFRA. Potts agrees he has never
suffered any physical symptom from high cholesterol, he has never suffered any physical Incapacity as a result, and
high cholesterol has never interfered with his ability to work. Rather, he contends he is incapacitated by his high
cholesterol solely due to Dr. Sullivan's advice that he reduce his work hours as a means of reducing stress, which In
turn could affect his cholesterol levels.

Even assuming the medical assertion is correct (i.e., that reducing job-related stress would have a positive effect on
Potts's cholesterol level), the statutory scheme does not provide for protected leave for treatment of a health
condition that in and of itself has absolutely no impact on the ability to perform job functions. The CFRA [*38] is
quite clear that to qualify for leave, the employee must have a "serious health condition that makes the employee
unable to perform the functions of the pOSition of that employee
§...1~9~'tS.2,J_~IJ.PcL (c)G3H~).J Potts agrees
his high cholesterol has never in any way affected his ability to perform his job. Furthermore, the purpose of the
work restriction was to reduce stress (with the hope of a positive impact on cholesterol levels), but stress reduction
is not in itself a proper use of CFRA leave. As the court noted in Q~~Ltt. v,_ Cilrstt;!nCN.p,Gil, 1.996) 941 F. Svpp,
1,2.J2, everyone "would like to hold a job as stress-free as possible" (id. atjk12:2.5), and undoubtedly everyone
would like to have the positive health benefits of living stress-free. But stress inheres in most jobs, and here there is
absolutely no evidence Potts has ever suffered any incapacity as a result of job stress (see Cole \I .. $i!?terso( C/]qrity
Q/'tl:J!g lfi@.rnate'NQni. (E.D.Tex. 199.9J.7.2...LS1!RQ....-2Q.Qfi8....6J2), or from high cholesterol.
<

••• "

(

Potts cites HQQQ,f;[l2. v. G~IJg,rqlQynamics C9rAD..$LCir~ 1998LH.4 L3..9.J5L for the propOSition that [*39]
"incapacity" includes time away from work for treatment for a serious medical condition, not just time away from
work due to the physical affects of the serious medical condition. But that point is not in dispute. Clearly, under the
regulations if one suffers from a serious health condition that causes incapacity, protected leave includes time for
treatment for the incapaCity. But, Hodgens does not stand for the proposition that any health condition becomes a
qualifying serious health condition simply by virtue of the need to obtain treatment for the health condition. And in
any event in Hodgens, the employee's serious medical condition ("atrial fibrillation, a serious and potentially lifethreatening heart condition()") was causing physical symptoms ("chest pains, visual problems, and profuse
perspiration[]") that interfered with the employee's ability to work. (l!1...JrrJ2D, l5J~.:-1.'iZ.)
Potts also places great reliance on 29 Code of.federal Regulations Dart 825.J..l4(Q)alDli)'s definition of a chronic
serious health condition as including a health condition that, n(C) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period
of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, [*40] epilepsy, etc.)." He then pOints us to 29 Cod..~..Qf FedS:Ial.R~g1!lati(lfl:;
part 825.114(e), which explains that work absences attributable to incapacity for chronic serious health conditions
qualify for leave "even though the employee ... does not receive treatment (rom a health care provider during the
absence, and even if the absence does not last more than three days. For example, an employee with asthma may
be unable to report for work due to the onset of an asthma attack or because the employee's health care provider
has advised the employee to stay home when the pol/en count exceeds a certain level . ... " (Italics added.) Potts
argues that his chronic high cholesterol is completely analogous to chronic asthma, and pOSits that if under the
regulations an employee may have CFRA-qualitying leave when having no (or minimal) asthma symptoms, simply so
as to avoid triggering an asthma attack (or to nip one in the bud), then an employee should Similarly be allowed
CFRA-qualifying leave so as to reduce his cholesterol levels, even when he is having no physical effects from high
cholesterol. The analogy is utterly inapt. It goes without saying an employee in the throes of an asthma [*41]
attack may well be incapable of performing his or her job duties. Thus. a work absence at the onset of, or to avoid
such a physically incapacitating response is properly protected. But, the uncontroverted evidence here IS that Potts's
ability to perform his job duties is no different on a day when his cholesterol is high than on a day when it is under
control. Potts fa iled to present sufficient evidence that high cholesterol is a CFRA-qualifying serious medical
condition. Accordingly, his cause of action for violation of the CFRA fails. 9
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FOOTNOTES
In view of this conclusion, we need not address l!adi_Q~t)~ck ~'s contention that Potts also failed to establish he
was entitled to CFRA leave because he failed to present evidence that RaoLQsh_ilc.1< ~employed 50 or more
employees within 75 miles of the store at which Potts worked. ( § 12945.2, subd. (b).)

9

2_ Retaliation in Violation of CFRA
Potts also claimed he was fired in retaliation for having requested CFRA leave. Radioshack .contends that because
Potts's high cholesterol [*42] did not qualify him for CFRA leave, his cause of action for retaliation fails and it was
entitled to JNOV on the retaliation cause of action as well.
Potts responds he was not required to prove he actually had a CFRA-qualifylng serious medical condition, only that
he in good faith believed he was entitled to CFRA leave. His reliance on Flait v.]YQJ1/J.fYTlerif&fl._lftLMc1J.J:9.m"-{ 1992)
3 Ci;lI.ApPAth 467 (Ffait), in support of his claim is misplaced. Flait was not a CFRA case. Tn Flait, the plaintiff
claimed he was discharged in retaliation for his efforts to prevent a subordinate from being sexually harassed. The
court held the plaintiff's reporting of the harassment was protected activity so long as he was motivated by a
reasonable, sincere, and good faith belief harassment had occurred. (Id. at.JL 4ZZ.)
Potts's reliance on tf.Q{fr]1..,g.aY~P£ofe5isi.Qf19Lflied.I~m (fItl}. ClL..2QQ5135H..LJ.9..411, is also misplaced. There,
although the district court had concluded the plaintiff could sue for retaliation regardless of whether she actually
qualified for FMlA leave, the Court of Appeals specifically found it unnecessary to address that issue. [*43] (la..
p.420.)

at

California courts have held that to prevail on a claim of retaliation in violation of CFRA t the employee must prove:
"( 1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA; (2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA leave;
(3) theplaintiff exercised her right to take leave for a qualifying CFRApurpose; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of her exercise of her right to CFRA
leave." (QldJllsgy l'~ Department of Transpo(tation,..2Ll2@L_'NJ;;QLAP.R~11h..atJL,..2Q_L italics added.) Because we ha ve
concluded Potts's high cholesterol did not qualify him for CFRA leave, we agree with RQdjQ~hQ(;J<: ythat his cause of
action for retaliation fails.
D. Wrongful Termination

RaclJQ.sj1gck ...also contends the trial court erred by denying JNOV on Potts's cause of action for wrongful termination
in violation of public policy. We disagree.
The common law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policies may be based on the policies set forth in
the CFRA. (Ne!~Qn_.'t..,_ United Iechnoloqies, supra,~:1 Cal.App.4th at p. 612 [violation of CFRA may form [*44] basis
of employee's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy}.) RaQiQshack ~is correct that because Potts
failed to prove violations of the CFRA, it does not support the wrongful termination tort. (See Jennings v. Marral'e
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 12L US~l;36 [employee could not assert a common law claim for wrongful termination in violation
of public policies embodied in FEHA when there was no Violation of FEHA].) Accordingly, we need not discuss that
ground as support for the jury's verdict further.
Potts's wrongful termination cause of action was also premised upon a violation of the public policy set forth in tlhe
FEHA. (See Citv of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1161 [disability discrimination in violation of
FEHA can form the basis of common law wrongful termination claim].) The FEHA protects against discrimination
based upon an actual disability and or perceived disability. (See § 12926.1, subd. (d) (FEHA "provide[s) protection
when an individual is erroneously or mistakenly believed to have any physical or mental condition that limits a rnajor
life activity"].)
Potts's complaint contained a cause [*45] of action alleging a violation of the FEHA due to "perceived disability
discrimination," namely I high blood pressure. The factual basis for the claim was Yazdansharif's testimony he
thought Potts's medical restriction to work no more than 40 hours a week was due to "high blood pressure and
stress'" In the special verdict form, as to the perceived disability discrimination cause of action, the jury found
BiJdioshack Tin fact did regard "Potts as having a physical disability-high blood pressure-that limited his ability to
work[.]" But, it found the perceived disability of high blood pressure was not a motivating reason for Potts's firing.
However, in the special verdict form, as to the wrongful termination cause of action, the jury found the perceived
disability of high blood pressure was a motivating reason for Potts's firing.
There is no dispute the jury's special verdict was inconsistent-it gave opPOSite answers to the exact same question.
Such inconSistent verdicts are against the law and require a new trial. (Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83

Cc;lI.AQPAt/J. UJ9.LD1.4.)
R.adiosh{\ck ... 's rather terse argument that the inconsistent findings mandated JNOV is [*46] not well taken. Th e
case upon which it relies, Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 CaI.ADp.4th.2Jill, is distinguishable. In that
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case, an express finding in the special verdict against the plaintiffs on one cause of action precluded the court from
implying a foundational finding that was legally required (but which the jury had not been asked to make) to support
the special verdict in the plaintiffs' favor on another cause of action. By contrast, here the jury was asked to make
the exact same express factual finding on different causes of action, and came up with exact oPPosite results. When
the jury makes "inconsistent determinations of fact based on the same evidence," a new trial is the appropriate
remedy. (Cgv?lliJIQ,'L Mjchelin Tire COfQ... H9Z9196 CaL App. Jd 95, tOLl57 Cill, Rptr. 60Z.)
Although primarily raised in the context of Potts's appeal of the new trial order, we will comment here on Potts's
argument that RQQiQ.~hgck .... has waived complaints about the inconsistent verdict. The record Indicates RadioshCliCk ..
's counsel prepared the special verdict form (which Potts's counsel approved). Although Radioshack ... denies it Is
doing so, [*47] it is in fact contending the special verdict form it prepared was defective because It asked the jury
to decide the same factual issue twice, thus inviting an Inconsistent verdict. In this case, It Is clearly invited error.
(See Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992) 9 CaI.AJ2IL"itt:LLQ?l.L~1.Q.61 [inconsistent answers to special
verdict questions did not invalidate jury's verdict where appellant participated in drafting special verdict form and
specifically wanted both questions on verdict form].)
Our agreement with Potts on this point does not, however, win the day for him. As we noted above, an inconsistent
verdict usually requires a new trial and indeed was one of the grounds on which Radioshack ... sought new trial. But,
the trial court granted Radioshack ...·s motion for new trial solely on the grounds of jury misconduct. And as we
conclude below, that order must be affirmed.

IV

pons's APPEAL OF ORDER GRANTING

NEW TRIAL

Potts appeals the order granting new trial due to juror misconduct. He contends there was no misconduct, and even
jf there was, there was no possible prejudice to fu!.QiQ!ib..Q.~k_ ..as a result. We disagree.
A. Facts

RadiQsb9J:..k..T's cross-complaint against [*48] Potts alleged he violated Penall&d.!;..s!!cti.Qn~.6.31 and ~Ll by
recording confidential conversations without consent. The court instructed the jury that to establish a violation of
peni'll C.P.~. se~tion 632, Radioshack ...had to prove: (1) that Potts intentionally recorded his conversations with
Yazdansharif USing an electronic device; (2) RadiQshCl.ch: .and Yazdansharif had a reasonable expectation the
conversation was not being overheard or recorded; and (3) Potts did not have consent to record from all parties to
the conversation. The jury was also instructed that a conversation "was confidential if a party to that conversation
has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded." The jury was
instructed "Potts acted intentionally if he intended to record[,J" and it was no defense that he did not know it wa s
illegal or believed it to be legal. The jury ruled against fl.£ldioshQJ;;k . ...on its cross-complaint.
Ril.QjQs.h9ck .'s motion for new trial due to juror misconduct included a declaration from Juror Maggie Caffrey. As
relevant here, she stated, "[d)uring deliberations, juror Dale [*49] Miller, the foreman, told us that Potts had a
legal right to record the conversations he had with [Yazdansharif] about his desire to work fewer hours. [PJ ...
Many of the jurors, including myself, expressed confusion about whether the recording was illegaL [Juror) Miller
repeatedly told us that Potts('s] recording was legal. He said that he looked up the issue on the internet and found
that Potts has a right to record the conversation because it was about his life. Most of the jurors said they believed
foreman Miller and expressed agreement that Potts had a legal right to record his conversations with .RadiOs,h.i!Q:,. Tn
Another juror, Mike Bolourchi, submitted a virtually identical declaration regarding Juror Miller's statements, with the
exception that he said Miller told other jurors "he read that Potts has a right to record the conversation because it
was about his life."
In opposition to the new trial motion, Potts submitted a declaration from Juror Miller. Juror Miller denied having told
other jurors he had researched the recording issue on the Internet or read about it, and denied having done any
independent research. Rather, he had "express[ed) my opinion that I believed [*50] ... Potts had a right to
openly record conversations with his supervisor because they concerned his own personal life, not any confidential
company information." Potts also submitted a declaration from Juror laurel Jones. She stated Juror Miller never said
anything about independently researching (on the Internet or reading) about Potts's rights to record the
conversations.
In granting the new trial motion, the court explained that in its view "when you boil it all down [this case] revolves
around ... Potts'[sJ insistence on audio taping conversations between himself and ... certain R,adJoshack •
personnel." R?dioshacK.Y's pOSition was its corporate policy prohibited recording without consent of all parties, its
supervisor was unwilling to be recorded, and Potts's refusal to disCUSS his request for medical leave "without
recording the conversations constituted insubordination and grounds for termination." Potts's position was the
charge of insubordination was simply a pretext for firing him because of his request for CFRA-qualifying medical
leave.
Although the trial court would not specifically find Juror Miller had in fact independently researched the law, it to und
he "introduced [*51] into the deliberation process, and quite emphatically so, a (mis)statement of the law
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concerning the 'right' of an individual to record a private conversation to which he is a party, a point of law which
was not contained in the instructions .... (PJ Based upon the representations in the declarations that 'many' jurors
were confused about the legality of individuals recording conversations, the [cJourt is of the opinion that the
offending juror's emphatic inFusion of some legal principle of his own creation improperly Influenced jurors votes In
this case,"
B. Standard of Review

"'In reviewing (an] order granting a new trial, we apply the following rule: "The determination of a motion for a new
trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and
unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears. This is particularly true when the discretion Is exercised In favor of
awarding a new trial, for this action does not finally dispose of the matter. So long as a reasonable or even fairly
debatable justification under the law is shown for the order granting the new trial, the order will not be set aside.
[Citations. [*52] )" [Citations.]'" (Rom~rQ.v. Riggs (1994) 24 C;i3IARp.4th H7, 12l.)
"In ruling on a request for a new trial based on jury misconduct, the trial court must undertake a three-step Inquiry.
[Citation.] First, It must determine whether the affidavits supporting the motion are admissible. (EYiO-,-C<2c!e .. §
1150.) If the evidence IS admissible, the trial court must determine whether the Facts establish misconduct.
[Citation.] lastly, assuming misconduct, the trial court must determine whether the misconduct was prejudicial.
[Citations.] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on each of these issues, and its rulings will not be disturbed
absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]" (People v. D9IS£'~.u995) 34.C9J.8RP.L'illl 69.4,]0.3:7.01.)

C. Analysis
Potts's challenge to the new trial order rests upon the second and third parts of the court's Inquiry-whether the facts
establish misconduct and whether the misconduct was prejudicial.
Potts contends Juror Miller did not commit misconduct. He asserts the comments to the jury regarding the legality of
Potts's recording his conversations with Yazdansharif were, [*53) at worst, indicative of Juror Miller's
misunderstanding of the law as contained in the jury instructions and as such were no more than deliberative error
which may not be used to impeach a verdict. (See Sm..QJs.g1!~fre MurraY', Ltd~ .v.~-'':1Jj1s...CQn'r(;te..CQf151nlC1iQI! J;O.
(1991) 234 Ci,ll. App. 3d F~4, PSO. 2~9 (al. Rptr. 435.)
Although we agree jury verdicts should not be lightly set aside, the decision about juror misconduct was the trial
court's to make. We cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding Juror Miller's statements constituted
misconduct. The facts here go beyond mere deliberative error. The court instructed the jury on the law regarding
illegal recording of conversations. Those instructions were essentially that it is illegal to intentionally record a
conversation in which any party has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation Is not being
overheard or recorded without consent to record from all parties to the conversation. Juror Miller injected into the
deliberations more than just his interpretation of the law as contained in those instructions. He purported to instruct
the jury on additional law about which the jury had no [*54] instructions-namely that the content of the
conversations was an element and conversations "about [one's) life" were removed from the purview of Pene'll Code
seetiQI'] 6.32.
Furthermore, the record supports the concluSion Juror Miller purported to have acquired his erroneous knowledge by
Independently researching, a statement which would have the effect of bolstering his opinion. Potts argues the court
specifically found Juror Miller made no such claim when it stated it could not find he had independently researched.
But whether Juror Miller in fact did independentfy research the law is different than whether he represented to his
fellow jurors that he had done 50. When granting the new trial, the court specifically cited as part of the factual basis
for its ruling the statements in Juror Caffrey's and Juror Bolourichi's declarations regarding Juror Miller's claim to
have "looked up the issue on the Internet" or "read" about the issue. It ruled those statements were admissible.
A jury may not consider extraneous law any more than It may consider extraneous evidence. (Peppi/!:. v" 1'1?1.[~fJf!l(
09.W2Q Cal.3d 907, 950, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269.) The jury may [*55] only consider statements of law set forth in
the jury instructions given by the court. ([n rc $ti3nl<;ewitz 098';;)4Q C::al._3d :391, 39,7, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382.) "Jurors
cannot, without violation of their oath, receive or communicate to fellow jurors information from sources outside the
evidence in the case. (Citation.] Communication to fellow jurors of information on an issue under litigation except in
open court and in the manner provided by law constitutes misconduct. [Citation.]" (YQungy~J2ruf.lkili:dU1986Ll!il
Cal. ADP. 3d 1344, 1349-13SQ. 2.:,32 Cal.. Hptr. !:iSS.) "When extraneous law enters a jury room-i.e., a statement of
law not given to the jury in the instructions of the court-the defendant is denied his constitutional right to a fair trial
unless the People can prove that no actual prejudice resulted." (Tn rr; St.fJfJ,ke.W/tz, supra, 40 C:a!.3d at p, 397.)
We similarly find no abuse of discretion in the court's finding of prejudice. Contrary to Potts's assertion that we
should review prejudice independently, as a mixed question of law and fact, the Supreme Court has made clear that
on review of an order granting a new trial, the standard [*56J of review is abuse of discretion. (PeQpl(! v, Ault
(2QQ11..3J CaI3Jb.1250, 1271-1272.) "Since the trial judge had all the evidence before him on the merits of the
case, and as well the conflicting affidavits, he was in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of the alleged
misconduct." (City of..Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church_U 969) l,Cal. ApR. 3d ~'§4, 430~ 82 .C.~L RR1LJ·)
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Juror Miller's misconduct was prejudicial. Potts argues the
evidence of misconduct was weak. We disagree. Two Jurors declared that Juror Miller advised them Potts had a legal
right to record the conversations with YazdanshariF because the conversations were "about his life." Juror Miller
confirmed he told the other jurors Potts had a right to record the conversations "because they concerned his own
personal life, not any confidential company information." Potts also contends there was no possibility of prejudice
from Juror Miller's statements because the statements only concerned B,adiQs.l:l2cK.• '5 cross-complaint for violation of
Pen.gj. Code section 0;1.2. and had no relevance to the main action. [*57] Nonsense. As the trial court aptly
surmised, Potts's insistence on recording his conversations with Yazdansharif, and whether such recording was
proper, was key to the wrongful termination case. The declarations support the court's conclusion that Juror Miller's
"emphatic infusion of some legal principle of his own creation Improperly influenced the jurors votes In this case. "
The jurors' declarations state several jurors expressed confusion about the legality of recording the conversation 5,
and once Juror Miller repeatedly told them Potts's recording was legal because it concerned hiS own life, the "jurors
said they believed [him) and expressed agreement that Potts had a legal right to record his conversations with
Radioshack .• "

v
POTTS'S PROTECTIVE APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT:
NONSUIT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM
The trial court granted Ri:!9jQsnacl5 ~'s motion for nonsuit on Potts's causes of action for disability discrimination,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and on his request for punitive damages. Potts filed a protective crossappeal from the judgment, but the only issue he raises is the propriety of the order granting nonsuit on his claim for
punitive damages. 10 Furthermore, ("'58] he agrees the order granting nonsuit on punitive damages should only be
addressed if we reverse the new trial order. Because we affirm the order granting new trial, we will not discuss the
punitive damages claim further.
FOOTNOTES
10 The grant of nonsuit on Potts's disability discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of
action was dispositive of those causes of action. (fQJ.llJJ.g!O_ 'Iillley Chateau. BlancJiQ11JCQYfJl~~A?!i.I1LJ!.,.
Depi'lrtmentQf Vet.e.aws Affairs (1998) 67J:;;gl.ADp.4th 741,]51 ("The reason for the 'dispositive' motions is that
the plaintiff cannot win, because the plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence to support a favorable
judgment"].) Accordingly, we agree with RgQ.(O!i.hru;;k_"that Potts's failure to challenge those rulings on appeal
precludes those causes of action From being reconsidered in a new trial.

V
PENDING MOTION FOR COSTS
RadlOshack .... has filed a motion demanding that Potts pay one-half of ~!3c!i.oshClCk .'5 costs of preparing a record on
appeal under California Rules of Court, ryleJQ(gl [*59] . U The declarations from counsel do not appear to conflict
on the salient facts. Prior to filing its motions for new trial and JNOV, Ri;ldiQshac.k .. paid $ 10,500 for an original and
one copy of most of the reporter's transcript from the trial. Potts purchased copies of that reporter's transcript from
the reporter. When Potts Filed his notice of appeal, he deSignated select portions of the trial proceedings to be
included in the reporter's transcript. However, he did not deposit costs of preparing an original reporter's transcript,
or file a certified copy of the proceedings (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4(b)), and the superior court issued a default
notice. Potts tried to lodge his copies of the reporter's transcript, but was told only an original could be used. Potts's
counsel wrote to Radioshack ...'s counsel asking her to confirm that Rac!ioshgck ...would be providing us with the
original reporter's transcript. Radioshack .... 's counsel responded it was Potts's responsibility to procure the record for
appeal. Potts then paid the reporter $ 900 to prepare a duplicate original of the reporter's transcript which was filed.
FOOTNOTES
11 CilJifornia R\.ltl;'s. oJJ;;.QurL...rule..tQ.W pertaining to multiple appeals in the same case provides that "only one
record need be prepared" and in such a case separately represented appellants "must equally share the cost at
preparing the record, unless otherwise agreed by the appellants or ordered by the superior court."

(*60J RgdiQs.hacK ·..-then filed its notice of appeal, designated the entire reporter's transcript as part of the record
on appeal, and depOsited the amou nt estimated by the reporter for preparation of the complete trial transcript-$
4, 700.~diQshClck. ·.wrote to Potts demanding pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 10Ca), he pay one-half of
the costs of preparing the reporter's transcript, including in its demand not only the amount it depOSited, but also
the amount it had earlier paid to obtain the reporter's transcript for new trialnNOV motions. In other words,
RpQ.lQ~!J.QQs...demanded Potts pay one-half of $ 15,200. Potts refused asserting the new charges of $ 4,700 were
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largely comprised of preparing duplicate originals of the reporter's transcripts 8-\'ldiQShack .had already purchased
and could have provided for purposes of this appeal.
We are unsympathetic towards RaQio,S!l';H:k .... on this issue, Although Potts initially defaulted under California Rul.es of
CQurt. rule 4, he cured his default by expending $ 900 to obtain duplicate originals of the reporter's transcript and
lodging them with the superior court, RQPiQ~hq~k .... then filed its notice of appeal, [*61] spent $ 4,700 largely to
obtain new originals of reporter's transcripts it had already purchased, and now seeks to force Potts to kick in ha If of
the total $ 15,200 costs of obtaining two sets of originals, We have discretionary authority to make any appropriate
award or apportionment of costs on appeal (Qll, E\1.![es.Qf .c9J.!ct, r,yle U.(a)l'U), Accordingly, we deny HadiOSha,ck; .... '5
motion and order that the parties shall each bear their own costs incurred on this appeal.

VII
DISPOSITION
The order denying Radios,haCk .... 's motion for ]NOV is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions that the trial
court enter a new order granting Radioshack .... ·5 motion for JNOV as to the complaint's causes of action for breach of
employment contract, breacr1 of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of CFRA rights, and
retaliation in violation of CFRA. The order granting RaQiQs.tlil.!:k,-.·s motion for new trial is affirmed as to the cause of
action for wrongful termination in violation of public poliCy. Radioshack ... 's motion to compel Potts to share its costs
of preparing the reporter's transcript on appeal is denied. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear
their [*62J own costs on this appeal.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA
ROBERT F. BLA.HA, a married man, )
individually and as the son of
)
his deceased mother, MARY E. BLAHA, )
and TERRENCE BLA.IiA, a single man, )
individually and as the son of his )
deceased mother, MARY E. BLAHA. )
)
Plaintiffs.
)
vs.
) CV 2005-053430
)
JAMES GANEM, M.D., et aI.,
)
Defendants.

Phoenix, Arizona
April 15, 2008
1:45 p.m.
BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL A. KATZ
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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1

PROCEEDINGS

2

(Trial continues.)

3

THE COURT; And that all being said. we'll continue

4 with the examination of Dr. Schapira.
5 MR. REYNOLDS: Thank you, Your Honor.
JAY N. SCHAPIRA,

6

7 called as a witness herein, having been previously
8 sworn upon his oath, resumes the witness stand, is
9 examined, and testifies as follows:
10
11
12

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. REYNOLDS:
Q. Dr. Schapira. do you recall from the

13 deposition of Alex Milenkov reviewing that record as to
14 whether or not he commented that the catheter had
15 jumped a little bi during the March 12th. 2004
16 procedure?
17

A. Yes, I do.

18

Q. Okay. And based on that observation, could

19 you tell the Jury what your expert opinion is in that
20 regard?
21

A. Yes. When you see a jumping of the catheter

22 that's consistent with some technical problems -- the
23 angulation, the fact that the lesion is not giving, and
24 it's consistent with the problem with the quickness and
25 speed which the catheter is being pushed through the
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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artery 2

MR. SKELTON: Objection, Your Honor, as to

3 foundation. IMth all due respect, Dr. Schapira wasn't
4 there for him to speculate here.
5

THE COURT: He'll be subject to cross-examination.

6 I'm going to allow him to testify as to what
7 significance·- and there may be different explanations
8 for it -- of what a jumping catheter might indicate.
9 And he's going to be cross-examined, and they'll be
10 other experts called on the issue.
11

The objection is overrured.

12

Go ahead. Dr. Schapira.

13

A. r think the answer was finished. Was there

14 another question?
15

Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: No, I just wanted to --

16 that's fine.
17

Can you -- I'd just like you to look.

18 I've put up the Page from the procedure log, the March
19 12,2004 procedure log. And can you teU me when it's
20 your opinion that the perforation occurred with respect
21
22

to Mary Blaha during this procedure?
A. I believe, sir that it occurred -- first of

23 all, it's not exactfy marked down here. I believe,
24 sir, it's between 1712 and 1716.
25

Q. Okay.

Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1

A. We can see where the 1.4 millimeter was

2 inserted over the wire, and then we can see where the

3 1716 - where the angiomax strip and the Reopro were
4 discontinued. Those are blood thinners, powerful blood

5 thinners that Mary was getting. And so when -- there's
6 a hole basically that's blown in the side of the artery

7 -- the artery is leaking. Torrents of blood come
8 through, and

so you want to stop the

blood thinners so

9 hopefully there will be some clotting and the bleeding
10 will stop. It's like the sealing of the hole in the
11

artery. Similar to when you draw blood from an artery

12 or a vein; you try to get the bleeding to stop.

13

Q. And just to kind of jump from the .9

14 millimeter to the 1.4, is it your understanding in this
15 case that that's what occurred; it started off with a
16 .9 and went to a 1.4 millimeter?
17

A. Yes.

18

Q. And can you describe for the Jury what the

19 difference is in the thickness of the catheters between
20 a.9anda1.4?
21

A. Well, yes. It's just what the numbers say;.9 .

22 millimeters versus 1.4 at the catheter tip, and it's
23 just the number of fibers. It's the array of the
24

fibers, and it's the hole that the fibers will leave

25 when they're pushed through the lesion.
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1

Now if you'll look at the volume of that,

2 if you think three dimensional and you take Pi R
3 squared, which is the radius -- excuse me, "R" being
4 the radius and "pi" being 3,14 - and square the
5 radius, you come out with a number so the .14 is -- I
6 don't want to waste time doing the math, but it's
7 roughly twice as big. Maybe I'll do it at break and do
8 the arithmetic.
9

Bull mean A 1.4 is considerably bigger

10 than a 0.9, if you take Pi R squared, and it's a bigger
11 thing to push through. And the way this works is it

12 photoablates. The optical energy ablates the
13 cholesterol and plaque and melts it away. "Melts" is
14 not the right term. And so you want to move it in such
15 a way so it has time to do that. You won't want to use
16 it as a battering ram; and when you do, it'll jump.
17

Q. And is a jump then consistent with a

18 perforation, in your opinion?
19

A. It's consistent with pushing too hard, too

20 quick, and a perforation, yes.

21

Q. Okay. Do you know or can you tell us whether

22 or nol in Ihis case Dr. Ganem took the appropriate
23 precautions for the setup of this procedure?
24

A. To a degree, yes, sir.

25

Q. And can you tell us with respect to whether or

Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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not it was below the standard of care for him not to

2 have had

an echocardiogram machine available in the

3 cath lab?
4

A. Yes, sir. Echocardiogram was not available

5 readily for the cath lab.
6

Q. And was that something that -- in other words,

7 my understanding is a perforation is a known risk of

8 the procedure; correct?
9

A. Yes. sir. particularly in a patient like Mary

10 with her risk factors.
11

Q. Okay. And is it the standard of care that a

12 doctor should try to anticipate what might happen and

13 have the right equipment there for any emergency that
14 may arise?

15

A. Yes, sir. Under normal circumstances you

16 should. and particularly if you're doing a case which
17 is high risk, because of the anatomic features that we

18 talked about this morning. and when it's your second
19 case and where you've had a dissection before and
20 problems delivering devices in the vessel from prior
21 experience in December.
22

Q. I'd like to--

23

MR. REYNOLDS: Exhibit 28, which is the lab

24
25

schedule for Friday, March 12th.
Any objections?
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1

MR. KENT: It's irrelevant.

2

MR. SKELTON: Join.

3

MR. REYNOLDS: Your Honor, I'd like to offer it for

4 just pOint of timing --

5

MR. KENT: Your Honor --

6

MR. REYNOLDS: -- as to when she was scheduled.

7

MR. KENT: Timing is on the log.

B

THE COURT: I'm going to -- I'll admit it. When

9 other procedures were scheduled of other patients isn't
10 relevant. Buy if you want -11

Go ahead.

12

MR. REYNOLDS: Thank you, Your Honor.

13

THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection.

14

Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: Dr. Schapira, what's been

15 admitted as Exhibit'No. 28 is the Banner Medical Center
16 Cath Lab lab schedule for Friday, March 12th, 2004. Do

17 you see that?
18

A. Yes, sir.

19

Q. And the other patients' names have been taken

20 out of this document for their protection. And I want
21

to just show you the scheduling of this procedure was

22 . at 1630. What time is that?

23

A. 4:30 p.m.

24

Q. And with respect to scheduling a procedure

25 like this in the late -- in the afternoon, are there
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1 any potential problems with scheduling something, a
2 laser procedural like this, so late in the day?
3

MR. SKELTON: Foundation, Your Honor,

4

THE COURT: Counsel will you approach for just a

5 second.
6

(An off-the-record bench conference is held by

7 Court and counsel.)
8

THE COURT: I will allow the question to be asked

9 and answered consistent with disclosures and
10 information that would have been contained in
11 deposition or other records here, but not about to
12 paint a broad brush, we should be dealing with
13 particular -- with a particular concern,
14

Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: Dr. Schapira, based upon

15 your review of the discovery in this case, did you -16 did you come to an understanding as to when the Echo
17 Department would have shut down with respect to the
18 hospital at a particular time?
19

A. Yes.

20

Q. And what is that understanding?

21

A. 5 p.m.

22

Q. And after that, what would someone have to do

23 in order to obtain an echo machine?
24

A. They would have to unlock the echo room, go to

25 the room where they're kept, and unlock and get a key
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1 and unlock it.
2

Q. Would there be also another procedure where

3 they could call -- in other words, call a tech and have
4 them come in. but again that would take some time to
5 have happen?
6

A. Yes, sir. A tech would have to be called in.

7 They leave, it's my understanding, at 5:00 and a tech
8 would need to be called in for an emergency.
9

Q. Okay, thank you.

10

A. They don't stay on the campus.

11

Q. Okay. Now based upon your review of the

12 procedure log, can you tell us as to whether or not
13 any -- there was any reversal of the anticoagulants?
14

A. No, sir, there was not any reversal of the

15 anticoagulants in terms of medicines that could help to
16 stop the bleeding.
17

Q. Okay. And the reversal of the anticoagulants

18 is to accomplish what? What are you trying to
19 accomplish here?
20

A. Well, sir, When there is a perforation of the

21

coronary artery with a laser catheter, realize this is

22 an or arterial -- artery bleeding under pressure, and
23 the pressure in the artery was about .- over 200 write
24 before the perforation occurred. So with a pressure of
25 over 200 -- you see right here at 1710 a pressure of
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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212 over 92. And that's the last pressure that we see
2 before the perforation.
3

What we see is that blood squirts out.

4 Literally it's what we call a "squirter", and the blood
5 squirts out under pressure. And so the purpose is to
6 stop the blood, bleeding. There's several ways we go
7 about it, and one way is to reverse the anticoagulants.
8

Anticoagulants are these powerful drugs

9 that we use to stop the blood from clotting during the
10 laser procedure, because otherwise the laser catheter
11

can cause clotting inside the artery, and that's a bad

12 thing. So we give these strong anticoagulants.
13

But if there is a mishap like there is

14 here, the bleeding needs to stop; and to get the blood
15 to stop, get the blood to coagulate, you have to
16 reverse the anticoagulants, and there's certain ways
17 that we have to do that.
18

Q. Okay. Dr. Schapira, when the perforation

19 occurred around this 171211716 time frame, should that
20 have been one of the first matters that should have
21
22

occurred, a reversal of the anticoagulants?
A. Yes, sir. To reverse the anticoagulants, not

23 just to stop the two -- and that we see there at 1634,
24 where Angiomax and Reopro were both discontinued -- but
25 then to give blood factors, blood products to stop the
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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bleeding, to slow down the bleeding as much as
2 possible, in addition to other things, to try to treat

3 the problem.
4

O. Should fluids have been given at that time as

5 well?
6

A. Yes, sir. Fluids need to be given, as well as

7 other measures, like medicines to raise the blood
8 pressure, called pressors, when we see the blood
9 pressure go to 72 over 36. And those copious fluids I
10 don't see begun here. It's not noted. High rates of
11 flood, just turn up the IV wide open. Get another IV,
12 gel the -- pour the fluids in to raise the blood
13 pressure.
14

And as far as the pressor medications to

15 raise the blood pressure, like dopamine and
16 epinephrine, those weren't started until 1737. So from
17 1718, when the pressure is low, to 1737 is
18 approximately 19 minutes. It should have been done
19 immediately,
20

O. Okay. Now there's been testimony in the case

21 with respect to what occurred after the perforation.
22 And can you explain to the Jury from the procedural eye
23 what occurred next?
24

A. From the procedure log there were a number of

25 things that occurred, We see that the Speclranectics'
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1 balloon -- Spectranectics' catheter that caused the
2 perforation was removed at 1718.21.

3

Q. It says "balloon" there. Do you believe that

4 that's referring to the laser?

5

A. Yes, it's the Spectranectics catheter. Yes.

6 And a Maverick balloon was put in. Now a Maverick
7 bal/oon--

8

May r draw a little picture, is that okay?

9 Or I can draw in the air.
10

MR REYNOLDS: Can he step over to the easel?

11

THE COURT: Sure, if you want.

12

If it needs to be moved out a little bit

13 or counsel needs to move it to see what's being done,
14 you can move.
15

A. I'm just drawing a picture of just an artery.

16 but here's just to show the principal where the artery

17 is like this and the blood of course flows inside.
18 Blood flows inside the artery. and suddenly now there's
19 a hole inside of the artery, and now the blood is

20 coming out.
21

And to stop the blood coming out, of

22 course we're talking about anticoagulants. And also a
23 balloon can be inserted, and a balloon would interpose
24 itself over the hole so as to plug the leak. And the
25 purpose would be at the balloon to -- you have the
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1 balloon in here. You inflate it -- and please imagine
2 this three dimensions. It now stops the leak. And
3 that's a good thing to do.
4

That's the proper way to treat it is to

5 occlude the hole with a balloon, and the Maverick
6 balloon was put in for that purpose. It needs to be
7 left up at least 5 to 10 minutes minimal so as to
8 continue to plug the hole while other things are
9 happening and you're stabilizing your patient.
10

Q. And was the balloon inflated for that amount

11 of time according to the procedure log?
12

A. According to the procedure log, it was

13 inflated for 112 seconds, and it was inflated for 40
14 seconds. So 40 seconds at 1717.54 and 112 seconds at
15 1718.52, and then it came down and then a profusion
16 balloon was placed at 1723.
17

So there was a gap ;n the inflation time

18 of roughly from 1718 until 1723. So approximately 5
19 minutes there was no occlusion of the hole.
20

Q. And during that time what is occurring?

21

A. Blood is pouring out the side just like in the

22 little picture and it's leaking into the pericardial
23 space, and the blood is accumulating under pressure and
24 tamponade is occurring, cardiac tamponade; and the
25 pressure of course is dropping. In fact it's already
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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dropped. You see at 1718 it was at 72 over 36, which

2 is shock.

3

a.

And now was there a code called at some point

4 in time during the procedure?

5

A. Yes.

6

Q. And when was that?

7

A. I believe that's about 1723. It's not on this

8 sheet. I think it's on another sheet. It's called, I

9 think. the "code sheet".
10

Q. If you look at the entry for 1720:12. it says,

11 "Dr. Stein Page d. Code called./I Do you see that?
12

A. Yes.

13

a.

14

A. Yes.

15

Q. And J believe you testified to this, but you

At some point Dr. Stein arrived?

16 do have experience in a pericardiocentesis procedure?
17

A. Yes, sir.

18

Q. And you can perform them. correct?

19

A. Yes, r do perform them.

20

Q. And with respect to when Dr. Stein came in.

21

22

what was his function at that point in time?

A. Dr. Stein came in at about 1724, I believe.

23 And his function, as it states here, was to perform a
24 pericardiocentesis to relieve the fluid from the
25 pericardial space by sticking a needle in and removing
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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it, do a pericardiocentesis. We also tall it "tap"

2 sometimes.

3

Q. Now with respect to Mary Blaha's case, was

4 this a blind procedure?

5

A. Well. no, it was not blind. i mean you had

6 imaging in the room. You had fluoroscopy. We've been

7 talking this morning about fluoro pedals and cine
8 pedals. All that big equipment was right there. J

9 mean it had been making pictures. We saw angiograms
10 that had been made just minutes before and all that
11 equipment was there, so this was not blind. You could

12 certainly use that f1uoro imaging, and you can see the
13 heart and you can see the needle and know where you're

14 going.
15

Q. I just want to make sure we're clear. Your

16 testimony is that the standard of care would have
17 required Dr. Stein to utilize the imaging equipment he
18 had meaning, the fluoroscopy, to help position the
19 pericardiocentesis needle when he was actually in the
20 process of positioning the needle?
21

MR. KENT: It's leading and multiple.

22

THE COURT: It'll sustain the objection regarding

23 the form of the question. Don't lead and break it up
24 so it's only one question at a time.
25

Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: Doctor, should a doctor
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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proceed with a blind procedure when there is guidance

2 available?

3

A. No, sir. A pericardiocentesis is best done

4 with guidance, so that you can -- so the operator, the

5 person doing the procedure. can see the heart, see the
6 needle, and have an idea of guidance where to go. You
7 can see the heart on the x-ray. We've been looking al

8 it most of the morning, and you can see the needle.
9 The needle is made out of steel and it's radio-opaque

10 so (hat you see it on the x-ray and you see it on the
11 f1uoro and you just have to guide the needle to the

12 edge of the heart. which is where the pericardium is.
13 It's on the leading edge of the heart silhouette.

14 That's where the fluid is, so you just have to look at
15 it and guide it in.

16

Q. And this is all-- when you're talking about

17 fluoroscopy. this is all in real time so you can see

18 this as it's happening; correct?
19

A. Yes, sir.

20

Q. So is it your opinion Dr. Stein should have

21

utilized that gUidance in this case?

22

MR. KENT: Objection; leading.

23

THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection.

24

Q. BY MR REYNOLDS: What is your opinion with

25 respect to Dr. Stein in this case and the
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1 pericardiocentesis procedure?
2

A. My opinion is that Dr. Stein, who has -- came

3 to the room to do the pericardiocentesis and was doing
4 it, should have utilized imaging techniques. We talked
5 about the echo. The echo was not readily available.
6 It was after 5; the echo was locked up elsewhere. But
7 the imaging was there in terms
8

at fluoroscopy.

You could utilize that to do the

9 pericardiocentesis, and it's a perfectly adequate way
10 to do a pericardiocentesis. So that this was not a
11

blind procedure, it was in fact a sighted procedure,

12 because you courd rook at the heart and you could look
13 at the needle to hit your target and to tap the fluid.
14

Q. And do you know with respect to your review of

15 the records what actually occurred with respect to Dr.
16 Stein's procedure?
17

A. Yes, sir. I believe that the needle went into

18 the right ventricle. Then a pigtail catheter was
19 exchanged over a wire, and the pigtail catheter was
20 identified to be present in the right ventricle. So it
21

had gone through the pericardium, through the space,

22 and now was in the heart. I can draw that tor you if
23 you want me to explain it, but the pericardium is a
24 layer on the outside.
25

Q. Okay. That's your understanding from the
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1 records as to what actually occurred?
2

A Yes.

3

Q. Once -- do you know if -- I'd like you to take

4 it a step further as far as the pericardiocentesis
5 procedure. Do you know if Dr. Stein actually went
6 forward and inserted the catheter?
7

A Yes, sir. He did insert a plastic catheter.

B Yes, sir, he did. And he identified -- he injected
9 some dye through it, and he used the fIuoro then and he
10 identified it in the pulmonary artery.
11

Q. Okay. But your opinion is related to the

12 placement of the initial pOSitioning of the needle,
13 correct?
14

A. Yes, sir, exactly. You know, and to utilize

15 that to hit the right spot on the heart.
16

Q. Now after Dr. Stein had now inserted the

17 catheter through the right ventricle and up into the
18 pulmonary artery, what could he have done at that
19 point?
20

A Well, recognizing that he had gone through the

21

pericardium and now was into the heart, he could simply

22 take that catheter and pull it back until he entered
23 the pericardial space and backed out on the way out.
24
25

May I draw that just real quickly?
Q. Sure.

Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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1

A. Basically if this is the skin layer and we

2 have a little bit of subcutaneous tissue, some fat, and
3 then we have the heart right under that, and the heart
4 has two layers of pericardium, and then inside the
5 heart of course there is blood. And in sticking the
6 needle into the right ventricle, which I marked "RV' _.
7 and sticking the needle in there, which I'll mark down
8 in orange, the catheter was put in there; and all you
9 had to do then was pull it back until you enter (he
10 pericardial space, which is filling with blood, and
11 getting progressively bigger. So you have to go
12 through the pericardium to get there so you just simply
13 pull this needle back.
14

Alternative NO.2 is to leave it where it

15 is and get another needle and just stick it in and
16 watch it under f1uoro this time as to where it is to
17 ensure that you are stopping at the right moment.
18

At the very edge of the heart, that's

19 where the fluid is. the pericardial space. It's not
20 outside, and it's all around the heart. So all you
21 have to do is just stop the needle at the right time
22 and aspirate it.
23

Q. And what do you mean by "aspirate"?

24

A. Pull back on the syringe, suck back on the

25 syringe as you're going in with the needle. You
Judie Bryant· Certified Reporter
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advance the needle, and you just pull back on the

2 syringe until you hit it.

3

And if you have any question about where

4 you are, you're watching it on fluoro, you can take a
5 little contrast and inject it through the needle as
6 you're going in and see where you are. You can see if

7 you're in the pericardium, in the right ventricle, in
8 the pulmonary artery, or nowhere, sUbcutaneous tissue;

9 but you can see where you're going.
10

Q. Now, Dr. Schapira, can you tell us, was there

11 kind of a critical point in time when the
12 pericardiocentesis procedure would have to be
13 accomplished by?

14

A. Yes, sir. According to the records and her

15 blood pressures, it looks like to me that after 1736,

16 approximately, she would not have survived. But up to
17 that point she could have survived to a reasonable

18 medical probability, had the proper measures been

19 carried oul.
20

Q. Okay. And is it your opinion that Dr. Stein's

21 failure to relieve the tamponade within that time frame

22 was a contributing cause to Mary Blaha's death?
23

A. Yes.

24

Q. Now I'd like to talk about --

25

Have you formulated an opinion with
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter
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respect to Mary Blaha's life expectancy?
2

A Yes, sir, I have,

3

Q. And what is that opinion?

4

A My opinion is that with proper care and

5 treatment, her fife expectancy courd have been extended
6 for another 5 to 6 years.
7

Q. Doctor, I did want to back up. I failed to

8 ask you this at the beginning. But are you being paid
9 for your services here today?
10

A. Yes, sir, I am.

11

Q. And can you teli us the amount of what you're

12 being paid?
13

A. Yes, sir. I'm being paid for the - the

14 amount is the amount of loss to the office, for me not
15 being there and working and for canceling the whole
16 schedule and pay the overhead. My paycheck at the end
17 of the month is the same regardless of whether "m here
18 or at home, and I'm being paid $10,000 for the day.
19

Q. And does any of that money go to a clinic that

20 you volunteer your time to?
21

A. Yes, sir. Part of the proceeds from the

22 medical/legal work' give to the l.A. Free Clinic and
23 we use that to support the patients we see at the LA
24 Free Clinic.
25

The LA Free Clinic is about 2 to 3 miles
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east of Cedars on Beverly Boulevard. We see their
2 patients, their indigent patients, their patients that
3 don't have any Medi-Cal or Medicaid or any insurance.
4 And we provide all the cardiology services for them for
5 free because they can't afford to pay for it; they
6 don't have a budget. So that's what we do with some of
7 the money that we get.
8

Q. There's one last thing that I just wanted to

9 go back over, and that was in respect to when you gave
10 your opinions earlier that Dr. Ganem should have had a
11 physician with him during this procedure. Can you
12 please tel/ the Jury what you base that opinion on.
13

MR. SKELTON: Asked and answered, Your Honor,

14 multiple times.
15
16

THE COURT; 1'1/ overrule the objection.
You may answer.

17

Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: Go ahead.

18

A. A physician doing a procedure for the second

19 time, a complex procedure, requires an experienced
20 physician/operator to be with him tor both cognitive
21

and technical skilfs, hands-on experience to tell the

22 doctor how to handle the catheter, so as it doesn't
23 jump, so as it doesn't perforate, so as you don't get
24 tamponade.
25

The purpose of thai is -- this is a
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1 tactile learning experience. It's equipment, it's

2 technical, and it's learning how to handle, how a

3 doctor handles a catheter. It's like when a doctor
4 handles an instrument, it's got to be done right.

5

These things are powerful. They can do

6 good; they can do bad. I know this because it is what
7 my institution has taught me. It was the way I was

8 trained. It is the way we require it at my hospital.
9 It is what the American College of Cardiology
10 recommends in their competence documents, their

11
12

consensus documents and competence and proficiency.
And I read some information from Banner

13 that tells me they have very simjlar guidelines at
14 their hospital.
15

Q. Thank you. And is it your opinion that the

16 failure of Or. Ganem to abide by the standard of care

17 caused andlor contributed to the death of Mary Blaha in
18 this case?

19

A. Yes.

20

MR. REYNOLDS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

21 That's alii have.
22

(Trial continues.)

23
24
25
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1

2

3
4

5
6
7
8
9

/, Judie Bryant, do hereby certify that the

10 foregoing Page s constitute a full, accurate typewritten

11 record of my stenographic notes taken at said time and

12 place, all done to the best ot my skill and ability.

13
DATED this _ _ _ _ _ _ day of._ _ _ _ __

14

15 2008.
16
17
18
19
20

Official Court Reporter
Arizona Certification #50266
California Certification #12662
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